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# CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND

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BY

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# PREFACE

THIS book is a brief analysis of the historical relation of contemporary writers to their immediate predecessors. It attempts further a comprehensive summary of certain selected writers, and a fairly full criticism of their ideas. In the last chapter a bare attempt is also made at a synthesis. My purpose is essentially critical, and limited to the illustration of the special British environment. I have aimed at making each chapter as complete as possible, even at the price of some repetition. The bibliography at the end of the volume includes mainly those books that are either mentioned or discussed in the text. Additional works are frequently referred to in the notes.

I hope I have succeeded in inserting in the notes all reference to the writers who have been of help to me. To the lectures and published writings of Professor Graham Wallas, Professor L. T. Hobhouse, H. J. Laski, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and H. G. Wells I owe more than a brief reference would indicate. To them I am indebted for a good deal of the mental clarification which my study has given me, even though I dissent from some of their views. I therefore take this opportunity to express to them my obligation. I am also indebted to Mr. Jeffery E. Jeffery for assisting me in preparing the manuscript for the press.

LONDON,
*March*, 1925. L. R.

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I have intentionally refrained from making any changes in this new impression of my book. It represents a certain stage in my mental development, and I therefore prefer that it should remain as originally published.

L. R.

WASHINGTON,
*June*, 1930.

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# CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ENGLAND

## CHAPTER I

### THE INHERITANCE

THAT the eighteenth-century compromise between a governing aristocracy and a "swinish multitude," to be goaded and protected, and Jefferson's dictum that that government is best which governs least [1] could no more be retained are largely the result of the mechanical inventions. They made England mainly industrial instead of agricultural. Their effect was to produce a middle class, conscious of its powers and future possibilities, and a lower class, with which in time the rulers had to reckon. If modern history is a series of dissolutions, the Great Industry is the chief dissolver. The industrial classes of the towns rivalled the landowners, and the rising proletarian class-consciousness put an end to former harmony. That a constitutional change came late is perhaps due to the frightened state of ruling opinion, which identified change with ruin. The doctrines of Ricardo [2] and Malthus,[3] which emphasized less the happiness of the population than the greatest possible volume of production, seemed to justify acquiescence. While reformers like Wilberforce were urging for the emancipation of the negro, they offered to the English poor salvation in the hereafter in recompense for the suffering of the present life; a solution which in no way threatened ancient wrongs. Meanwhile, as Bishop

Horsley declared, "the mass of the people had nothing to do with the laws but to obey them." [4]

Yet England did develop towards democracy. It is a commonplace to say that nineteenth-century British history constitutes a nice compromise between tradition and experiment. The problem was to retain as much as possible of the loaves and fishes of a largely discredited past and still justify the pretension of the popular origin of political power, the fruits of the major efforts of Rousseau [5] and Bentham.[6] That this change was accomplished gradually and peacefully is the wonted boast of British historians. The arms which indignant blacksmiths prepared for the popular revolution in 1832 may have been turned into ploughs. England became a democracy by the typical English process of counting heads instead of breaking them. If the ancient constitution were perfect, the nineteenth century showed that there are degrees of perfection.

(Perhaps, as Dicey points out, between democracy and collectivism there is no relation of cause and effect.[7] Yet surely the extension of the function of the state marks another characteristic of our period. The nineteenth century began with Benthamism and ended with Fabianism. It began with a struggle against class privilege for the sake of individual freedom and ended with a struggle against individual claims for the sake of a common life. But, as T. H. Green remarks, the principle in both cases is identical —it is "the power on the part of the citizens as a body to make the most and best of themselves." [8] If we follow Professor Hobhouse, the New Liberalism is merely the old in new dress.[9] It is this feature of the gradually expanding state that demonstrates the interrelation between political fact and theory during the last century.)

(The half century before 1832 was one of immense ferment. It witnessed new illustrations of the eternal struggle between the defenders of stability and the

advocates of change. Montesquieu [10] and De Lolme [11] considered the English Constitution as the best guarantee of liberty, and Blackstone [12] set out to write its apotheosis. Burke magistrally defended it as the product of a slow and painful progression.[13] A generation later Wellington failed to see any flaw in its perfect symmetry.[14] But the number of dissentients was legion. Already in 1776 Bentham, in his *Fragment on Government*, had hurled the force of his pitiless logic against the shallow optimism of Blackstone. At the same time, the Americans gave the Constitution a shock from which recovery was slow.[15] Paine retorted to Burke that there is no sanctity in perpetuating wrongs.[16] Priestley and Price pointed a finger of scorn at the unrepresentative Parliament.[17] Godwin went a step further and dared to question the basis of authority and private property.[18] During the wars social heresies were temporarily banned, but immediately after the trade union movement showed the latent energies of the working classes. Hodgskin,[19] Gray, and Thompson [20] urged what now passes for scientific socialism: that the workers are by right entitled to the full product of their toil. Cobbett's unphilosophic appeal went straight to the unphilosophic masses. His *Register* showed the capacity for good and evil of uncritical journalism. It was Robert Owen, however, who proved that there is no antithesis between industrial greatness and the solid interests of humanity. He understood that, while man creates the environment, the environment also creates the man. His universal sympathy more than made up for his lack of profundity. His recognition of the value of co-operative enterprise is a seminal discovery. The movement for collective help for the children and the infirm can claim him as one of its foster-parents.[21] Thus, while the solid portion of society acclaimed the defenders of stability, the future was with the dissenters.)

(It is Bentham, however, who typifies the transformations of the first half of the century.[22] The head and centre of a group of astute politicians and acute thinkers, he, more than any one else, personifies his age. His principles were utility and *laissez-faire*. The first meant that institutions were to be judged by the criterion of results. The second implied that, when existing abuses were removed, the government should assume the function of a mere policeman. A whole plan of reform was to replace ancient wrongs. Separating himself from the classic political metaphysics, he made reform palatable to the matter-of-fact British mind. The Reform Act of 1832, the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, the Repeal of the Corn Laws of 1846, the Judicial Reforms, all can claim him as their common father. He is the founder of the older liberalism.)

From the vantage ground of a later generation it is easy to criticize Benthamism. It is now obvious that to apply the Greatest Happiness Principle is as complicated a task as to apply the metaphysics of the school of Rousseau; that Bentham, in the phrase of Professor Hobhouse, thought of individuals more as atoms than as cells in an organism; and that his view of human nature hardly bears scientific scrutiny, as Professor Wallas,[23] following Bagehot,[24] has shown us. After the principle of *laissez-faire* had accomplished its historic mission of divorcing the essential from the existing, the principle of utility was subsequently given a wider synthesis.

(However, the undisturbed reign of the second principle of Benthamism was brief. In fact, the very decades, 1830–50, during which it held its most distinctive sway saw also the definite beginning of the reaction. The year of the Poor Law was preceded by that of the first effective Factory Act. The year of the Repeal of the Corn Laws, the greatest triumph of Benthamism, was succeeded by the year of the Ten Hours Act,

which was sternly opposed by all the Benthamites. Thus in the middle of the century, while the main current was undeniably Benthamite, still, as Dicey has shown, there was a counter-current of collectivism.[25] Shrewd observers could then perhaps have pointed out that the stagnant Palmerstonian era would be followed by a greater awakening of the social conscience.

From the imperfect focus of the present it is easier to understand the causes of that reaction than to apportion the relative importance to each single cause. It is indeed difficult now to distinguish the streams from the ponds among the many tributaries that led to reaction. The most that we can now say is that there were a number of facts and theories that brought about the change. Some of these are of universal import, while others are purely British.

The facts were, perhaps, the chief single influence. They proved that universal benevolence was no logical consequence of Benthamite universal but enlightened selfishness. Reports by lay and expert investigators showed that individual self-assertion was not synonymous with social values. Moreover, the failure of the working-class movement on two fronts—the economic, under Owen's inspiration, and the political, under Chartism—severed the working classes from revolutionary radicalism. If improvement of conditions was ever to come, it would have to come under middle-class leadership in the typical English conservative fashion.[26] The "condition of England" question had to be placed before the chastened powers of Whitehall. It was Shaftesbury and his followers who first aroused the nation "to the wants and rights of the poor; to the powers and duties of the rich." To them the problem was simple. There were women and children who suffered, and the only way to aid was through Parliamentary action.[27] What they lacked in philosophy they more than made up in ordinary humanity.

Another influence was the extension of the franchise. Once the ice was broken in 1832, there was no logical stopping point. As Bright said, " If a class has failed, let us try the nation." [28] Sovereignty was reinterpreted several times in the nineteenth century to include more and more of the unenfranchised. By 1918 the base of authority could fairly be said to be popular. While the reform of 1832 was undeniably in the interest of individualism, because it served the interest of the middle class, the subsequent reforms were also undeniably in behalf of collectivism. For ages the state had been used to serve the special interest of a class. The masses now newly enfranchised were inclined to follow the example. As the base of political authority was widened, new demands had to be satisfied.

Again, the influence of the church was apparent.[29] At the beginning of the century the bulk of the Established Church was solid for the *status quo*, while the Nonconformists supported reform. In the middle of the century a new spirit was evident. By its drastic legislation of 1836–40 Parliament removed the obvious causes of abuse, and thus ensured a change. The Oxford Movement despised the principle of utility; its direct effect was conservative, and confined only to the elect. The High Church movement, which succeeded it, was Anglican, popular, and liberal. The church was now less concerned with its vested privileges than with its social function in a world of change. Maurice and Kingsley emphasized the fact that Christianity was meaningless unless definitely applied. The humanitarian spirit which was characteristic of the Victorian Age found an ally in this revived churchmanship. It meant that human sympathy was not bounded by the limits of class. Collective action seemed to give this spirit effectiveness.

The same spirit is also seen in the teaching and influence of Carlyle and Ruskin. Both dedicated their

faculties to the fight for sweetness and light. Both were Platonists pleading for apportioned services and regulated duties. To both *laissez-faire* was anathema. As early as 1839 Carlyle declared, "A chief social principle (*laissez-faire*) which this present writer, for one, will by no manner of means believe in, but pronounce at all fit times to be false, heretical, and damnable, if ever aught was." [30] To Ruskin "Government and co-operation are the laws of life; anarchy and competition the laws of death." [31] Disciplined order and regulated life were the base of true society. Only the guidance of the elect could reshape it. All social activity must cater for the creative effort of art. Both Ruskin and Carlyle demonstrate the reaction of sensitive minds to the ugliness of life about them.[32] It is easy to pick flaws in the social systems of artists; nevertheless, their teaching helped to undermine the distrust of the state and the abstractions of the economists.

Further, certain movements of a more or less universal nature have had their effect.[33] The rise of the new Economics under List showed the inadequacy of *laissez-faire*. The new biology under Darwin, while it emphasized competition in the struggle for survival, stressed nevertheless the importance of environment and the feasibility of assisted selection. Historical jurisprudence under Savigny, Maine, and Maitland questioned the application of rigid principles to social life. Comtian Positivism, with its religion of service, stressed the unity of the human race, and Sociology, with its concentration on the tangled web of human relationship, revealed a complex social structure. All these factors, though not arising at the same time nor at the same place and though exercising varied influences, contributed to the changed outlook.

But the rise of socialism was the most pregnant international force. The year 1848 marks its entry into the realm of politics. *The Communist Manifesto*

has all the one-sidedness of a party platform. Yet its declaration that the accepted economics is merely the hypothesis of a class could not fail to bear fruit.[34] The rise of Christian Socialism in England, though short-lived, shows the new leaven.[35] *Das Kapital* is less significant as a constructive thesis than as an angry indictment of the existing *régime*.[36] The files of the British Museum furnished Marx with ammunition for his onslaught. Socialism had little definite influence in England before Hyndman and Morris: none the less, it could no longer be denied that problems beg solution and that discontent is violent. Bismarck's strategy of fighting socialism with socialism was not confined to Germany. In its emphasis on a social vision socialism was another factor indicating the decay of individualism.

More than any one else, John Stuart Mill[37] typifies this transition. He was like a Samson groping blindly among the pillars of the past: yet he dimly recognized the blurred outlines of the future. It is true that he was the last of the Utilitarians, but it is also true that he was the first of the great liberal socialists. By tradition and descent a Utilitarian, he imbibed, nevertheless, at the close of his life, the sympathies and beliefs of a wider social experience. If the principle of Utility is nominally retained, it becomes in him, however, a vehicle of self-sacrifice which he declares is "the highest virtue than can be found in man." If liberty is justified as essential to the development of personality, it is none the less necessary to the life of a vigorous society. While his political economy is still based on the accepted individualism, he yet looks forward to see an extension of co-operative effort. In fact, he turns almost a complete somersault when declaring his hope of viewing in the future a system of distribution made "by concert on an acknowledged principle of justice." If the spiritual justification of representative demo-

cracy receives its philosophic finish, it is not, however, an unqualified endorsement. Rule of the democracy is not necessarily coincident with the highest efficiency; nor is the wish of the majority always consistent with the general welfare. Assistance of experts and proportional representation are essential. Thus the new and the old are perhaps inconsistently moulded together. However, if the world were ready for a fuller interpretation than even a modified Benthamism could offer, it was because men like John Stuart Mill interpreted the age.

The decade that saw the death of Mill also witnessed the formation of the New Liberalism. This decade followed the reform of 1867 and began with the astonishing legislation of Gladstone. It ended with the philosophic defence of the liberal state by T. H. Green, followed by Jevons' empirical test of state functions.[38] A host of legislation dealing with popular education, land reforms, sanitation, testify to the expanding state.[39] The conditions of the slums, the sweated industries, the children and aged were studied and the responsibility of the state was affirmed. The municipalities, too, were being aroused to their vigorous future. The legalization of trade unions and the rise of joint-stock companies were other evidence of the economic helplessness of the individual. Sir William Harcourt's remark that "we are all Socialists now" was more true than Chamberlain's similar statement later in regard to imperialism. By the end of the century the question was not whether the state should act, but to what degree its interference should extend.

It is T. H. Green who gives this movement its finished expression.[40] There is essential unity, he affirms, between the individual and the state. If individuals find their expression in the state, it is they who form the state into an entity. The full development of the individual can come only through his membership

of the state, but the state must, for the sake of its own growth, grant to the individual full freedom for his self-realization. There are no individual rights in the sense of the Utilitarians. Rights are given and enjoyed because they are essential to an ideal life in the state. Though the essence of morality is self-compulsion, the state may remove the external obstacles to the moral life. With these removed, the individual can then find his true worth. Thus education, the liquor traffic, landed property are proper spheres of state action. Green thus applied Platonism to his English environment, with its solicitude for freedom and fear of magnifying the state. So far are we removed, at the end of the century, from Benthamite individualism that the cohesive force of the state is perhaps overstated by Bradley and Bosanquet, two of Green's chief disciples.[41]

It would be erroneous to give the impression that the movement of theory was symmetrical. There were dissenters in every camp. Of these Spencer was the chief, and perhaps therefore the most vulnerable.[42] Barker has shown that Spencer's contribution to the theory of politics is not of great value. His views are, indeed "an incongruous mixture of Natural Rights and physiological metaphor."[43] Even from the imperfect view of the present we appreciate that, to justify with much violence to his basic views a discredited individualism, when T. H. Green was expounding the worth of positive liberty, when socialism was obtaining votaries all over the world, and when life was becoming more interdependent, does not bespeak solidity. Perhaps the future may take Spencer's unique position as an additional sign of his genius. But for the present his laurels must rest in other fields than those of politics.

In spite of Spencer, the beginning of the twentieth century saw no slackening in the general movement.[44] Just as the Parliament Act of 1911 indicates the

advance of a determined democracy, so does the Budget Act of 1909 demonstrate the attempt of the contemporary state to relate private income to social function. The belief is that if the state is to undertake further experiments in collective life, the burden should fall on those incomes that are due less to individual effort than to social factors. Nor is the intention of taxing those who have, and giving it in the form of larger opportunities to those who have not any longer disguised. Medical attention for the sick and the school children, pensions for the aged, state-aided insurance for the workers, arbitration in industrial disputes, state regulated wages in certain industries, state aid for the unemployed, are sufficient evidence of the expanding activities of the contemporary state. Behind these acts there is apparent a belief in the collective responsibility of all for each. The war not only accelerated this tendency, but also made the masses less patient with gross economic inequalities. A century ago the Benthamite idea was to confine the state to the removal of abuses; the contemporary practice is that the state should positively undertake to construct the basis of the good life for all its members.

Just as the individualistic state found its best expression in Bentham, the state in transition in Mill, the expanding state in T. H. Green, so does the state at the beginning of this century find its clearest expounders in the group of publicists who are referred to as Fabians. The Fabian doctrine is essentially that of liberal socialism.[45] It discards the idea of revolution, of the class struggle, and the labour theory of value of Marx. It concentrates its attention on the democratization of the state and the socialization of all value, whether in land or in capital, which is created socially. It aims at improving the condition of the masses by expanding collective action through the medium of an expert civil service and yet at

escaping the danger of a bureaucracy by an economic federalism in which the municipalities will be utilized. It thus follows the traditions of John Stuart Mill and T. H. Green, and, like the Benthamite group of a century ago, it influences opinion by penetration. With the more salient views of some of the leading Fabians, as well as other tendencies in contemporary political thought in England, it is our task to deal with some detail.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PSYCHOLOGISTS: McDOUGALL AND WALLAS

WHILE the systematic application of psychology to politics is comparatively recent, yet all theories of the state have always implied a theory of human nature. Discussion on what particular political structure will be most suited to man's needs necessarily involves the related question of what man's nature is. Thus Plato's [1] state is modelled on man's nature; in the state as well as in the individual reason should predominate over the passions. For Aristotle,[2] the state is essential because man's nature is social. Two thousand years later, Hobbes [3] based his theory of absolutism on a psychology which recognized in man a self-seeking and unruly animal held in check mainly by fear. In fact, all the principles of monarchy or aristocracy rest on the assumption that Nature, being niggardly, has made the capacity to govern the monopoly of the chosen few. The "swinish multitude" is stupid and dumbly acquiesces. The task of the defenders of democracy was to vindicate human nature. Hobbes' first principles were assailed; man was viewed in a more edifying light. In the case of Locke [4] and Rousseau [5] this defence took the form of a belief in the existence of a pre-political age, "when wild in the woods the noble savage ran." To the more ardent spirits, such as Godwin,[6] the perfectibility of human nature seemed to be infinite. That "you cannot fool all the people all the time" is the common sense psychology of democracy. Surely all writers made at least a pretence to plumb man's ways and his nature.

In the case of Bentham,[7] however, as in that of no other writer perhaps, a theory of politics was the essential corollary to a theory of human nature. It was as obvious as it was simple. To Bentham, man was a deliberate, hedonistic egoist. Man's actions were governed by hedonic selfish reasons. Happiness was excess of pleasure over pain. Pleasure was subject to quantitative analysis. From these principles it followed that a government which permitted the calculated, selfish pleasure-seeking of each citizen would produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which should in fact be the ethical aim of government. Thus, fortunately, both utility and duty coincided. Since man was rational, he would subject political questions to the acid test of his rationality. He would favour only those proposals which his efficacious reason told him would further his own greatest pleasure. Later on J. S. Mill[8] undermined the whole Benthamite edifice by introducing a qualitative standard of pleasure and making room for self-sacrifice. In our own day Bentham's theory of human nature is brought forward only to be exposed. Man is now conceived to be neither wholly rational, nor entirely self-regarding, nor merely a seeker after pleasure.

A generation after Bentham, Bagehot attempted a more Napoleonic task. His *Physics and Politics* (1873) borders upon a philosophy of history. It is a discussion, as Barker states, of the relation of "psychics" to politics.[9] The book is a "fine imaginative recapture of pre-history,"[10] written with the typical perspicacity of Bagehot. His brilliant restoration of primitive life, if more true historically, is as picturesque as that of Rousseau.

Bagehot's highway of human progress leads from the "cake of custom" to deliberative law. We enter human history through the side door of unconscious imitation, and make our exit through the front door of

reasoned discussion. We are in the morning of civilization, when morality is "a still small voice" and government an unknown luxury. For the subjugation of men there was then necessary not a teacher, but a drill-sergeant. What was needed was not to train man in liberty, but to acquaint him with the rod. Primitive man could be held in check only by crude methods. The groups that were best united survived, transmitting by heredity their favourable characteristics to later generations.

From a psychological standpoint, what kept men together in those days was the cohesive force of unconscious imitation. "The truth is," Bagehot states, "that the propensity of man to imitate what is before him is one of the strongest parts of human nature." [11] "We must not think," he declares further, "that this imitation is voluntary, or even conscious. On the contrary, it has its seat mainly in very obscure parts of the mind, whose notions, so far from having been consciously produced, are hardly felt to exist; so far from being conceived beforehand, are not even felt at the time." [12] Masses of mankind thus passively imitated a predominant type. The "icy chains of custom," made possible because man was an unconscious ape, guaranteed a stable future even before man was able rationally to comprehend his past.

Only later, within recorded history and after man had for ages served his apprenticeship under authority, was it possible for the more progressive peoples to taste the first-fruits of liberty. Imitation was then succeeded by discussion. "To this question," Bagehot states with the utmost assurance, "history gives a very clear and remarkable answer. It is that the change from the age of status to the age of choice was first made in states where the government was to a great and a growing extent a government by discussion, and where the subjects of that discussion

were in some degree abstract, or, as we should say, matters of principle." [13] Discussion by testing institutions with the ordeal of reason lifted the dead hand of the past. Argument replaced agreeable sanctified habits by painful variability. Time was ripe for the suspended judgment, and the pioneer of untrodden ways could then obtain a hearing. Ancient Greece and modern England are examples of the triumph of discussion. In the government of men the early irrational tradition gave place to deliberative law. Thus primitive iron uniformity was as essential to create nations, as the later enlightenment was necessary to change them.

In our own day, two writers, Professor McDougall and Professor Wallas, have enriched politics by definite psychological *aperçus*. Professor McDougall's *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908) is a discussion of the basic tendencies of the human mind which underlie the life of societies. It can, perhaps, be best summarized by the statement that it offers an antithesis to the Benthamite psychology. To Professor McDougall, man is not wholly rational; that is, man's actions are not wholly nor mainly governed by a reasoned calculation as to consequences. In fact, we can only understand them by tracing them back to certain innate tendencies or instincts. "But mankind is only a little bit reasonable, and to a great extent unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways." [14] Human nature possesses a certain number of instincts which form the "prime movers" of man's activities. Thus flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, self-abasement, self-assertion, and the parental instinct are the seven principal instincts. Each instinct has cognitive, affective, and conative aspects. In each of these principal instincts the affective aspect takes form in the specific "primary emotions" of fear, disgust, wonder, anger, subjection, elation, and tenderness respectively. In addition to these seven most

important instincts there are also some minor instincts, which "play but a minor part in the genesis of emotions," but possess impulses that are significant in social life. The chief of these consist of the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, the instinct of acquisition, and the instinct of construction. Imitation, to which Bagehot attributed the stability of early societies, is not an instinct, but forms, with suggestion and sympathy, the three aspects of the general process of mental interaction. Unlike an instinct, each is a general and non-specific tendency, and is influential in moulding the individual by means of his social surroundings. Without the instincts action would be impossible, since the most calculated deliberations are merely means to ends which are determined by instincts. Only by understanding the deeply rooted tendencies of man's nature which man has inherited from a remote past, can we understand the forces that actuate human conduct in societies. Without these tendencies the human organism "would lie inert and motionless like a wonderful clockwork whose mainspring has been removed or a steam-engine whose fires had been drawn." [15] Thus the irrational in man is not supplementary or subordinate to his reason, but, indeed, the more potent and compelling force that determines his behaviour.

Further, Professor McDougall denies the Benthamite contention that all human action can be interpreted on the basis of self-interest. The human constitution, he holds, embodies certain tendencies whose chief characteristic is their disinterestedness. Of these the most potent is mother-love. It is the root of all forms of benevolence and altruism. Nor can mother-love and the various forms of generous impulses which spring from it be interpreted as disguised selfishness. They are primary elements rooted in human nature, and no human being is devoid of them. The Benthamite doctrine libels human nature.

Not only the family, but social life in general, show the manifold applications of the sentiment of love. It is the operative cause in the abolition of slavery, in the attempt to minimize the horrors of war, and in the recent extension of the idea of collective responsibility for the aged and helpless.

Again, the monistic interpretation of Bentham, which attributed all human action to the single desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain, is, according to Professor McDougall, unfounded. Man's nature is pluralistic, and not monistic. Man's actions are governed not by any unitary desire, but by the manifold and complex tendencies of his nature. Thus, when a woman endangers her life to rescue her child, her act is not determined by hedonistic calculations, but is merely the response to her parental instinct. When men seek the society of their fellows, they act in response to the gregarious instinct, and not to the desire for pleasure. Pleasure and pain are, in themselves, not springs of action; they merely modify the duration of a particular action. Pleasure prolongs it; pain terminates it. Happiness is different from pleasure; nor is it a sum of pleasures. Happiness arises from the harmonious integration of all the sentiments that form the human personality. Pleasure is fleeting and momentary; happiness is stable and permanent. Moral actions do not result from utilitarian calculation, but are psychologically the product of the individual's ideal of self-respect as a member of society.

This somewhat inadequate exposition of Professor McDougall's psychological theory will assist us to understand his social doctrine. We have seen that the Benthamite psychology was the foundation of political individualism; an anti-Benthamite psychology ought, then, to offer a social theory which stresses the group rather than the individual. In this we are not disappointed. His *Group Mind* (1920)

is, shall we say, a reincarnation of Plato's *Republic* from the standpoint of the "newer" psychology. The view presented in Professor McDougall's *Social Psychology* is now applied to the life of groups. The two volumes form, then, a single study. We are here primarily concerned with its theory of the group mind and then its application to the most significant and complex group—the modern nation-state.

A highly organized social aggregate is, to Professor McDougall, an organic whole. It is a separate entity with a distinct individuality. "Since, then, the social aggregate has a collective mental life, which is not merely the sum of the mental lives of its units, it may be contended that a society not only enjoys a collective mental life but also has a collective mind or, as some prefer to say, a collective soul."[16] When a group has existed for a considerable time and has in the course of its existence acquired a definite organization it can justly be held to possess a self. Since the relation between the individuals in a group is mental, the group itself can be described only in terms of mind. If we define mind "as an organized system of mental or purposive forces,"[17] a well-developed group possesses such a mind. Such a group becomes a mental system of its own, with the individual minds as units. It thinks and acts as a substantial unit. It exists and develops by laws of its own. It is more developed, more real than the sum of individuals; the individual's action in the group differs from his action when isolated from the group. "The structure and organization of the spirit of the community is in every respect as purely mental or psychical as the structure and organization of the individual mind."[18]

Professor McDougall now applies his theory of the group mind to various types of groups, of which the human aggregate of the nation-state, especially in the highest developed form, is the most noteworthy

example. "A nation," he declares, "we must say, is a people or population enjoying some degree of political independence and possessed of a national mind and character, and therefore capable of national deliberation and national volition."[19] Its essence is psychic, its mental organization alone gives it effective group life. Like the mind of the individual, the national mind possesses not only an intellectual side, but also conative and affective aspects. This national mind has a definable character, and since the national character is the work of the dead and the living it is different from the character of any individual or from all individual characters taken together. Such a national mind can arise only when there exists homogeneity among the citizens of the nation. This common feeling results from the following factors, which are significant only because they tend to create the national mind: (1) a common race, (2) freedom of communication among members, (3) eminent leaders, (4) a well defined common purpose, shown chiefly during periods of national stress, (5) long continuity of existence, (6) organization of national mind, (7) national self-consciousness, and (8) emulation with other nations. The last three need greater detail.

In the more developed nations, as in the mental organization of the more developed individuals, the organization of the national mind will become more plastic, more deliberative, more purposive, less mechanical, and hence more prepared to meet emergencies. As the nation's activities become less undiscriminating and more integrated, its specialized parts may become less efficient. The executive organization in the form of government departments is guided by the deliberative organization where ideas play a part. The established institutions of a nation are its instincts; its customs are its habits; its deliberative organization is the centre of its ideas.

Just as the individual impulses become more integrated and harmonized as the idea of the self becomes more conscious to the individual person, so does the national mind become more integrated as the nation achieves self-consciousness. Such national integration denoting self-consciousness must be the result of natural evolution. For if national institutions are imposed, the executive organization may be efficient, but its deliberative organization will lag behind. A nation like Germany before the war is really weak, because it lacks capacity to adjust itself to novel situations and all-round development. Such a nation possesses the one-sidedness of an army.

Just as the will of an individual implies the recognition by that individual of an ideal of self, so does the will of a nation denote the existence of national self-consciousness. Without this recognition of self both individual and national action are merely impulsive. The unity of a well-developed nation, like the personality of a well-developed individual, is a higher form of unity than mere organic unity, because organic unity is true even of low forms of life. The unity of the national personality, like the unity of an individual, can be interpreted only in psychic terms. It is the "idea of the nation" that binds the individuals within the nation. The "idea of the nation," however, must not be interpreted merely as an idea, but, like the idea of the individual self, it is really a sentiment and includes also conative and affective aspects.

Again, just as the self of the individual is developed by communication with other individuals, so is the self of the nation developed by communication with other nations. All forms of international emulation powerfully enforce national self-consciousness. Communication with other nations tends to initiate a spirit of self-criticism favourable to progress. The rise in recent years of national self-consciousness among

peoples, in which we find the key to many recent events, is due mainly to greater ease of intercourse between nations. Loyalty to the nation, more than any other form of group-loyalty, lifts men above their personal egoism because the nation alone, perhaps with the exception of the church, can appeal from a long heroic past to a long and contingently noble future. This loyalty, however, is not incompatible with membership in a larger international organization, for the idea of human unity and responsibility of each nation is a dominant current idea.

An act of national volition properly so called is an act undertaken by all for the good of the whole after due collective deliberation in the recognized channels of deliberation. (The good of all is different from the good of the whole nation, because the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and because the nation has long continuity of existence, including a long past and a long future.) In fact, a majority of a particular nation, as in the case of Belgium, may prefer extinction for the good of the nation as a whole. While the general idea of the good of the whole nation must be in the minds of all, the choice of definite means must lie with the majority in the national deliberative organization established for that purpose. The submission of the minority to these decisions is free as long as it accepts the existing organization. The more developed nation becomes a "contractual organism," each citizen freely co-operating for the good of the whole, and each conscious of the idea of the whole. It is one in which the individuality of the citizen gives best expression to national unity.

In France, and especially in England and the United States, an approach is being made to the reconciliation of individuality and collectivity. In these nations the executive organization is subordinated to the deliberative. The deliberative organization is composed of the formal organization of the

national parliament and the informal one of public opinion. Both of these allow the persons who are most imbued with the "idea of the nation" to exert their influence. Of the formal organization the English House of Commons is the best example. Its membership is composed of those who display the greater consciousness of the national self; out of this select body a small number is chosen of still more select persons to guide its deliberation. This fact, together with the existence of two parties, the rise of the Cabinet, the impartiality of the Speaker, and other traditions, prevents haste and assures that each proposal is given due attention. Underlying the whole machinery is the tradition that Parliament must voice the national will. The informal organization of public opinion also secures the prestige of the best minds. Public opinion tends to approach the opinion of the best minds because "the moral sentiments are essentially altruistic, while the immoral and non-moral sentiments are in the main self-regarding." [20] Thus even the selfish leader can accomplish his aim only by appealing to the altruistic motives of the public, while the great moral leaders find in the elevation of popular ideals a congenial sphere of activity. Through the formal and informal organizations of deliberation the best minds, the minds most conscious of the national will, mould popular ideals. The ideal organization is one which permits the best minds to exercise their greatest influence. Thus defined, public opinion is not the mere sum of individual opinions, but the expression of the moral judgment of the national mind as defined in each particular issue by the moral leaders of the age.

Professor McDougall's doctrines may be subjected to a many-sided analysis. Most psychologists will agree that the field of psychological theory is unfortunately as encumbered with arid and highly speculative discussions as the field of politics.[21] One is inclined

to ask the cynical question: What last accredited psychology should the writer on politics accept? No doubt the psychologist can return the compliment to the writer on politics. The construction of political institutions would indeed be a simple task if the social reformer could take a text-book on psychology and say: "This is human nature." Apparently Professor McDougall's claim that psychologists alone may unlock the bolted door of social knowledge is rather ambitious.[22] At least, so eminent a psychologist as W. H. R. Rivers made no such claims.[23]

At any rate, certain discussions raised by Professor McDougall have a relation to politics, and hence merit attention here. In his psychological doctrine we find a forcible expression of the prevailing anti-intellectualism, and it undoubtedly has the value of stressing certain inherent tendencies which the monistic and intellectualist psychology of politics of the past century has neglected. His procedure has the additional merit that it emphasizes the fact that man is psychologically, as he is biologically, continuous with his animal past. Yet it should be pointed out that from the standpoint of our purpose most psychologists, and especially Professor McDougall, are subject to the basic criticism, around which other objections may be grouped, that the human personality is a unit, and its dissection into rigid compartments is unreal and of little use for social speculation. Although for the purposes of study it is permissible to separate the human mind into its various constituents, yet it should be remembered that it is erroneous to conceive human nature merely as an aggregate of distinct hereditary tendencies. When a man acts his whole being is engaged and not a part of him.

Any particular act of an individual or of a group cannot thus be interpreted in terms of one or of several isolated instincts. The "war-mood," for

instance, cannot be correctly explained by reference to alleged single impulses.[24] "But war is not merely a recrudescence of the instinct to kill. It is doubtful whether this is an original instinct of man, for the hunting habit appears to be acquired, and the nearest relatives of man appear to be social rather than aggressive. What happens is that the war-mood exploits archaic instincts which have survived in us though in a modified form."[25] Each act of an individual or of a group is thus the result not of any particular alleged primitive instinct, but of fused and transformed impulses. Human motivation is complex, and cannot be correctly explained by alleged disparate, innate, and primitive tendencies. Present human nature is, then, not a collection or a balance of distinct original impulses, for "the hereditary tendencies are not self-subsistent, but determine and modify one another so that they appear in man in a fused, truncated and aborted form."[26]

Further, Professor McDougall's mode of analysis tends to make an unprofitable distinction between character and environment; that is, between nature and nurture. For the student of the social sciences there is little value in the statement that the family is based on the sex instinct, and that private property is based on the instinct of acquisition. It is more important to know how these instincts issue in society. How they issue depends upon individual experience and the social tradition. All that we can assume is that there are in man certain inclinations; but, and more important, the direction they pursue depends upon social conditions and individual standards. Thus the conduct of men is little determined by primary instincts as alleged to have existed prior to the social tradition. As Dr. Ginsberg declares, "We must look to the individual as a whole in relation to his environment, and in that whole the inherited propensities must be regarded as mere potentialities

whose concrete filling is supplied by the social environment or by the individual's own experience." [27]

Again, Professor McDougall's treatment of disinterested action is another example of the fruitless method of tracing human action to a specific impulse. As has been stated, Professor McDougall derives all altruistic impulses from mother-love. To do that he gives to this term a very wide and general meaning. This monistic attempt to explain altruism is as unreal as the more ambitious pretensions of Bentham and Bagehot. Trotter is guilty of a similar fallacy by attributing all social impulses to the "herd instinct." [28] When man was conceived to be wholly self-regarding, resort was made to fear,[29] sympathy,[30] conscience,[31] or greater pleasure [32] to explain those of man's actions that were other than self-regarding. Since, however, we believe that man is essentially a social being, the problem of why man has social impulses offers no different kind of problem than that of why man possesses any kind of impulses.[33] Social actions are not in their nature more derivative than any other type of action. Why man acts in a social way offers a problem no different from that of why he acts at all. The origin and evolution of all human action, whether for self or for others, depend upon the same biological factor of survival-value. How any particular individual acts in a particular society depends upon innumerable factors. Man's social conduct, as in human behaviour in general, is determined not only by his hereditary equipment, but also, as already mentioned, by his intelligence and the social tradition.

In this connection it is worth while pointing out the relation between the rational and non-rational factors in human nature, as some aspects of Professor McDougall's analysis may tend to obscure it. Instincts, Professor McDougall says, are "prime movers" of human action; reason merely furnishes the means to ends indicated by instincts. Hume had the identical

idea when he declared that the office of reason is to be the "slave of the passions."[34] In Professor McDougall we see the reaction from Benthamite intellectualism, swinging perhaps too far in the opposite direction. It is obvious that there is no distinct line between instinctive impulses and those that are intelligent; and both Professor Wallas[35] and Professor Hobhouse have shown us that not only our instincts, but also our intelligence, have a hereditary basis. "We inherit," states Professor Hobhouse, "not only capacities for sensation and emotion, but also capacities for distinguishing, analysing and combining them. We have opposed intelligence as the work of the individual to instinct as the product of heredity, but intelligence as a capacity is also hereditary. The propensity to inquire, and the methods of analysing and comparing used in inquiry, all have a foundation in the hereditary structure."[36]

We view the *rôle* of reason in human life not in the light of a force superimposed upon, or external to our instincts, but rather an integral part of the self.[37] With "pure" instincts, as is the case of some actions of animals, the response to stimuli is achieved in a prescribed manner, and the end or purpose of the action unrecognized. With man such actions are few, if they are ever present. With most human actions the responses to stimuli are plastic, and not uniform, and the purpose of the act is recognized. Intelligence makes particular responses less mechanical and more varied to suit the special conditions, while the ultimate end is more definitely grasped and more inclusive in its scope. With adult individuals the ultimate purpose may be so comprehensive as to include all the varied and manifold activities of a lifetime. The goal of reason is to achieve a harmonious integration of the various impulses of the self in accordance with a coherent purpose. Intelligence is then not separated from, or subordinate to, or following after, instincts,

but working with instincts, modifying them, and finally aiming at accomplishing a synthesis of our diverse tendencies into a rational whole. We conclude thus that man—the political animal of social theory—is a being whose primitive impulses have been in the course of his career altered and fused, who innately reasons and feels, who is both selfish and altruistic, and whose hereditary endowment is subject to wide variation in accordance with individual experience and the social environment. It is no doubt serviceable for Professor McDougall to point to certain innate tendencies which affect human conduct in society, but as a complete explanation of social phenomena such a method is totally inadequate.

Criticism of Professor McDougall's doctrine of the group mind need not detain us long. For our purpose it is merely another version of idealism. Professor McDougall himself states that the only difference between his theory and idealism is that the idealists believe in collective consciousness.[38] The criticism which Professor Hobhouse has given of idealism in his *Metaphysical Theory of the State* is also in the main applicable to Professor McDougall's doctrine.[39] We agree, of course, that a social aggregate is a psychic phenomenon, that there is something more in a group than the mere sum of isolated individuals, that a group may continue to exist while particular individuals may change. We are not compelled, however, by these admissions to accept any belief in an over-mind.[40] Society is psychic, in the sense that it exists only in the minds of individuals. If a well-organized group may obtain a reaction different from and superior to the sum of the reactions of detached individuals, it is because the individuals enjoying this relation react differently when they are deprived of this relation. A society may exist for a long time, but the tradition of its existence is carried on only by, and is realized only

through individuals. If it is true to say that a group is more than a sum of detached individuals, it is also true, in a more real sense, to say that there is more in any individual than his relation to any particular group or the sum of all his social relations. This is so not only because the conception of an individual isolated from all human relation is a pure abstraction, but also because there is a residue locked within the human personality and not disclosed in any or all of his relations with his fellows.

The value of Professor McDougall's theory of the "group mind" lies in the fact that it stresses the obvious truth that a coherent social group such as a nation or a church is not a mechanical association composed of an artificial union of individuals, but a mental network of human relationships which vitally affects the lives of its component members. Yet it should be noted that unless we use the terms "social mind" or "social will" with caution they, like the related expressions of "social organism" or "general will," may befog the nature of human relations. They, indeed, frequently tend "to lay the intellect at rest on a pillow of obscure ideas." The chief practical difficulty of Professor McDougall's theory is that it over-emphasizes the unity and solidarity of social groups and therefore obscures the individuality of their human units. Hence Professor Wallas suggests that we use the term "organization," [41] but such a term, as applied to a nation or a church, overstresses the rational participation on the part of each individual. Professor Hobhouse, on the other hand, names the web of plural relationships in a society a "social mentality."[42] However, there is no objection to the use of phrases like "group mind" or "group will" if we are conscious that we apply these expressions in a metaphorical sense only. Through the poverty of language we may be forced to include these phrases, but we should always be conscious of their limitations.

Since we do not accept the theory of a group mind, we cannot for the same reason accept the doctrine of a "national mind" or "national soul." We agree that the sentiment of nationality is psychic and that the nation is a powerful human unit. That is, a certain population, owing to various factors, may feel a common like-mindedness among themselves which differentiates them from others. In such a sense the national group does not offer a problem different from that of the economic group or religious group. We agree that the sentiment of nationality is a strong, perhaps the strongest, factor of modern times. Hence, obviously, the whole problem must be dealt with by the statesman and publicist. Further, we fail to see that unity, that singleness of aim, that solidarity which our author appears to attribute to the more developed modern nation-states.[43] Only an efficient army approaches that unity. We do not minimize the form of human grouping which is designated as national, but we also feel that appeals to "national soul" frequently, in writers less profound than Professor McDougall, screens intellectual sloth.

Furthermore, Professor McDougall's discussion of the national group obscures the distinction between the state and the nation, and it is therefore in place to point out the difference between them. The nation is tradition, culture, and sentiment. The state is order and organization. The state is as old as civilization; the nation is a comparatively recent human grouping. It is preferable that the lines of the state and the nation should coincide just as it is preferable that the nation should be economically self-subsistent. The first condition is frequently unattainable; the second is seldom possible. Professor McDougall regards the British people as the most perfect example of national group solidarity. The actual facts, we submit, hardly justify such an analysis. The British people have until recently included four

distinct nationalities. The Irish of Southern Ireland have constantly protested against their inclusion in British unity. Now Great Britain embraces three nationalities—English, Scotch, and Welsh. The recent rise of a distinct cultural consciousness in Scotland and Wales has been generally admitted. The present movement for devolution is undoubtedly encouraged by the concomitant development of nationalism in the constituent parts of Great Britain.[44] In fact, to an eager Welsh nationalist British nationality has no existence. To most Englishmen Wales makes no emotional appeal. Great Britain is undoubtedly a territorial political state comprising within it three distinct peoples. There also exists among these peoples a vague but, perhaps, merely political consciousness of British unity. It is questionable whether such consciousness deserves the romantic and mystical glamour with which Professor McDougall endows it. Nor must we forget that Britain includes communists to whom the economic class is the only cohesive force. It includes also guild socialists who recognize in the vocational group the strongest human unit. To a devout British Catholic the international authority of the Catholic Church is more binding on certain questions than the command of the British state. A British conscientious objector or a pacifist, in the most crucial moments in the life of the British state, relies on his own conscience and defies external authority. To obscure existing discords by appeals to transcendental harmony offers no solution. Our problem may be simplified if we bear in mind that the state is a society of societies embracing within it economic, religious, and national groups.[45]

Professor McDougall's glorification of public opinion and of parliament, coming as it does from a distinguished psychologist, is indeed remarkable. We are again in the region of the metaphysical hobgoblins of Rousseau's "general will," and the "wise legis-

lator," and their relation to the British Parliament and an election like that of 1924 is indeed remote. Perhaps this is another example of the unfortunate tendency of the "Tories of contemplation" to confound the "is" with the "ought." We are, however, more inclined to believe that Professor McDougall's attitude is the inevitable result of dealing with the "idea" of public opinion and the "idea" of parliament rather than with the less pleasant facts. It is undoubtedly true that English democracy can better be studied from the top of a London bus than from the files of the British Museum.

Unfortunately, Ministers of the Crown are frequently as prosaic as stockbrokers. Thus, for example, we would hardly be justified in regarding Lord North or Addington as perfect embodiments of the national consciousness of their respective periods. One may recall in this connection the statement attributed to an old Whig, who in the days of Disraeli and Gladstone remarked to an old Tory, "While your party is dominated by an unscrupulous adventurer, mine is led by a dangerous lunatic." It was the late Lord Morley who referred to the House of Commons as a place where one can neither work nor rest. Nor has recent experience been more encouraging. Thus in 1918 when the "idea of the nation" could logically be assumed to be most forceful, since the state experienced a significant collective triumph, the result of the act of common deliberation as shown in the election of the same year was just in this very respect disappointing. Thus J. M. Keynes quotes with approval a friend who characterized the members of the House of Commons then elected as "a lot of hard-faced men who look as if they had done very well out of the war." [46] In referring to the same Parliament E. T. Raymond, the former editor of the London *Outlook*, said [47]: "The present House of Commons is the richest and least intellectually distinguished in

history." "The one predominant and vastly over-represented type is the not specially scrupulous man of new wealth." Nevertheless, we are not sceptical of the contribution of psychology to politics, for both Professor Wallas and Dr. Rivers[48] have shown us that Professor McDougall's analysis is not typical of the "newer" psychology.

We interpret the nature of public opinion as being, in the words of Professor Hobhouse, "a miscellaneous congerie, of impulses driven hither and thither, out of all which there will emerge through reams of controversy some tangible result."[49] Who, for instance, can unravel the tangled mass of thought and emotion that combined to determine the result of the "Hang the Kaiser" election of 1918? Whether a particular action, which is supposedly backed by this complex force, is good or bad, no abstract principle will suffice to show. With regard to parliament, it is quite obvious that one of the main causes of the present discredited state of political democracy is the imperfect condition of representative assemblies. That a writer of a "scientific work" should fail to perceive it is indeed curious.[50] We cannot here follow up the discussion whether a policy of devolution, or a change in procedure, or a reform of the upper chamber will, singly or in combination, remove obvious evils in legislative assemblies.[51] But it is certain that glossing over the difficulties will not solve them. Glib idealizations of their friends are as threatening to parliamentary institutions as the one-sided superficialities of their enemies.

While Professor McDougall is a Platonist, Professor Graham Wallas is obviously an Aristotelian. His approach is both synthetic and inductive. It is to the "Mean" of Aristotle that his conclusion is directed.[52] Social reform is possible, but it will come more from a change in methods of solution than from a change in institutions. What is necessary is

rigorous thinking and the application of Baconian methods to politics. We can understand him best, therefore, not as a special pleader, but as a diagnostician from the standpoint of a definite psychology. This diagnosis, which in *Human Nature in Politics* (1908) is applied to the mechanics of government, is broadened in *The Great Society* (1914) and *Our Social Heritage* (1921) to include the more general problems of our over-complex society. If his logic is at all tempered, it is when he pleads with a sustained eloquence for more, of what Aristotle called, "affection" among men. In this case he hopes psychology will be of service, since, as the French say, "to know all is to forgive all." [53] The mass of enormously interesting detail derived from Athenian democracy as well as from London electioneering with which his books abound, testify how deep study is enriched by activities unconfined to the lecture-room. Here we shall limit ourselves to his psychological theory and its application to political theory and administration.

We have seen that to Bentham man's actions are governed by a rational calculation as to consequences; that to Professor McDougall, on the other hand, human conduct is in the main determined by instinctive impulses, with reason playing a subordinate *rôle*. It may be perhaps correct to say that between these two views Professor Wallas follows a middle course. To him human nature is the totality of inherited dispositions. These dispositions respond to stimuli. All dispositions may be divided into two complex classes, instincts and intelligence. But it must be remembered that there is no clear demarcation between instinctive and intelligent dispositions. As we ascend the scale of intelligent dispositions we find an increasing degree of consciousness and plasticity. Curiosity, trial and error, thought, and language are predominantly intelligent dispositions, and are as natural to man as his more instinctive dispositions. Man

inherits the tendency to think under appropriate conditions as he inherits the tendency to fear. Thinking is natural to man. The shepherd and fisherman instinctively fall into aimless and undirected thought. The dispositions which man has inherited from a remote past require stimulation, but civilized life does not always offer the proper stimulation; hence the nervous strain of a "baulked disposition." The task of civilization is to create harmony between man's nature and his environment. Love and hate are both natural dispositions, but while the future stability of society requires that the love of our fellows be strengthened, the disposition to hate no longer retains the survival value it had before.

Our non-rational dispositions are unstable, and offer no criterion to social improvement. Herein lies the danger of the contemporary anti-intellectualism. The only hope is in securing "the triumph of human reason." Civilized society was made possible by offering to the impulse of thought the proper stimulus, and deliberately guiding its processes. Man's inventiveness in finding solutions to the many ills of our complex life will be stimulated if we improve the art of thought. The methods which will improve thinking, "if we take the natural powers of any individual thinker for granted, may be classified as his material circumstances at the moment of Thought; the general mental 'attitude' which more or less consciously accompanies his Thought; and his relation to the particular subject-matter of his Thought."[54] Efficient thought obviously requires comfortable physical surroundings and some guarantee of the necessities of life; this may demand more definite social support of those who do the thinking for society. A stimulating environment, as, for instance, the absence of a Censor, aids the mental attitude of thought. The exactness of statistical record should accompany the more limited, but also more vivid,

facts of memory. At the moment of thought we must concentrate on the problem at hand and apply rules of logic which will secure a quantitative analysis of social facts. The problem of exact social thought is obviously complicated, since the material is inexact and the emotions of the thinker may distort his conclusions. But mankind must learn to look before it leaps, and hence will be able to leap further in safety. Nor does this view involve any opposition between our emotions and our thought, since our emotions will assist thought by offering richness, variety, and intensity. But we must also remember that thought itself has its own appropriate emotion—the passion of pure contemplation.

It is when we turn to the institutions of democracy that we find great disparity between the actual exploitation of "non-rational inferences" and the intellectualist assumptions of eighteenth and nineteenth-century philosophers of democracy. Indeed, we are struck with the gullibility of the masses of men. The difficult art of capturing majorities is largely an affair of manipulating our sub-conscious mental life. Names, images, and symbols which have acquired emotional value are glibly exploited by the politicians. When we vote for a particular party, our decision is not based on a rational weighing of impartial facts, but rather because the name of a particular party or a particularly clever poster arouses our emotional impulses. Our elections tend to be veritable floods of mass suggestion. By a deliberate effort of mental suggestion, we are made to vote for a particular issue without even being conscious of the nature of our mental process.

The remedy lies in the gradual extension of the sphere in which intelligence can play a greater *rôle* in politics. Man does think, and knowledge is still power. We must heighten the play of reason in the management of our common business. This question

involves the more serious problem of how to restore the declining faith in parliamentary democracy. Our ideal should be to make the casting of a vote as much based upon the impersonal weighing of scientific evidence as the decisions of a jury. Reform in electoral machinery must aim at substituting for the old logical and rigid view of human nature a psychological and quantitative view. We must not exaggerate the task that each voter can properly perform. An extension of education may place the management of political parties in the hands of those who possess civic consciousness rather than under the control of busybodies. We should do everything possible to stimulate on an election day the sense of responsibility and the seriousness of the occasion. Proposals like proportional representation assuredly overstate the logic and interest of most voters; the limitations of both of which, it is encouraging to note, are being at present generally recognized.

But our psychology of politics must undergo a considerable change. We must frankly recognize the complexity of human nature. We must forget glib half-truths about uniformities, and concern ourselves more with individual or group differences. Vague abstractions about the actions of man in masses must be replaced by a recognition of the uniqueness of the human personality. In spite of the erroneous ideas which academic politics has inculcated, all men do not respond equally to the same stimuli. After we have recognized the richness of the human unit, we can then arrive at scientific data by quantitative classification of fact. Our point of view must be inductive, and our final conclusion must take into consideration all possible qualifying factors. Only when we extend to politics the dominion of cause and effect can our conclusions be valid. What effect do several elections in one year have on the interest of the voters? What size of a legislative chamber is best conducive to

effective discussion? What effect will good health, or old age pensions, or wholesome surroundings have on those who may apply for Poor Law assistance? These and other questions can best be answered by diagrams illustrating degrees of variations. Statistics, curves, verifiable data must become the entities of our political reasoning. The problems with which ministers and commissions deal are not subject to rigid affirmations or negations, but resolve themselves into questions of "more or less." Only when we break up wholes into parts, only when we seek for quantitative solutions to quantitative problems, and only when we are cognizant of all modifying factors can we ever arrive at verifiable answers.

When we turn our psychological analysis to the governmental machinery, we find great discrepancy between structure and function. The human mind has failed to develop proper forms of co-operative thought to keep pace with the growing complexity of social life. The present forms of thought organization are largely vestiges of a simpler society. Our Committees, our Municipal Councils, the House of Commons, are not true to their ostensible purpose of group deliberation. At best they merely offer a clash of party wills. If thinking is done at all, it is in forms of organization more in harmony with the limited capacities of the human mind—in small groups of party leaders or of individual members, in correspondence, in interviews between members and responsible officials. Effective discussion has so far been possible in the Cabinet, where party solidarity and a selected *personnel* is the rule. But even here the situation is precarious. The pressure of complicated problems, a greater heterogeneity in its membership, the rise of a third party, may transfer effective deliberation from the Cabinet to the Prime Minister or to a bi-partisan coterie. Any reforms which aim at improving the capacity for deliberation of these institutions must of

necessity recognize the complexity of legislative problems and the existence of forms of impersonal means of communication. The House of Commons may be forced to diminish its membership, make greater use of committees, and abolish the Committee of the Whole House. The House of Lords, the function of which is revisory, must assume rather the nature of a Royal Commission. The Cabinet will, among other things, have to rely more upon the work of its own committees. In the case of municipal bodies, greater efficiency demands reduction in size and the inauguration of methods of work which will be more true to their real function as critics of the public officials.

The expanding functions of the state necessitate consideration of the possibilities of creative thought on the part of public officials. A psychological examination of the organization of official thought would reveal many hindrances to intellectual effectiveness. We must also face the problem of how to prevent in the civil service the rise of a narrow professionalism, which no doubt would be accompanied by a feeling of suspicion of officialdom on the part of the masses. Then there is also the problem of encouraging originality in the expert and defining his relation to the administrator. In the case of the chief administrators, greater concentration and deliberation are possible than in that of members of the House of Commons. Here revision and experience enable decisions to be reached after due consideration has been given to possible alternatives. The difficulty, however, is that the "official atmosphere" is deadening to originality. The experience of the official is necessarily specialized, and the spirit of conservatism strong. The result is efficiency in the management of details with infertility in invention of principle. To "humanize" the civil administration, it is desirable to offer motives and greater opportunities for thought to the officials. It has been suggested that administra-

tive officials should hold public investigation of some public matters, that they make oral reports to Parliamentary or Cabinet Committees, or that the published Reports of Departments should be signed by their authors, all of which would tend to substitute the personal interest of the official for the impersonal organization of office.

Discussion with regard to "the social question" relates to the method of organizing the will of the state. The basis of organization in the future may be a synthesis of the three proposals of individualism, socialism, and syndicalism. Each one alone offers no adequate solution. That of individualism alone is ineffective, because there is no longer any assurance that accumulation of property in the hands of private persons will coincide with social values; syndicalism will undoubtedly give rise to competing guild selfishness; and before we make any appreciable improvement in the machinery of parliamentary democracy it would be precarious to allow that expansion of the functions of the state which socialism implies. Hence what is most desirable is a compromise which will guarantee the special interest of trade or profession, the welfare of the community as a whole, and a legitimate satisfaction of the instinct of private property. Bodies in control of economic and educational enterprises may with advantage contain a minority of members representing the professional interest. The second chamber of Parliament may rightly be based on functional representation. Thus it may be possible to have the organization of the will of the state based upon the general interest of territorial propinquity and the special interest of the occupational group.

The views of Professor Wallas have been subjected to various comments. An idealist, for instance, can find no fault with his sensationalist psychology.[55] Thus, when Professor Wallas says that the action of masses in politics is mainly influenced by suggestion

and impulses, and not reason, he makes, it is claimed, a false distinction between sensation and reason. Man's existence is not in a world of meaningless sense impressions, but rather in one of more or less meaningful objects. The barest consciousness of self implies a recognition of self and not-self. There are no pure sensations. Every sensation is charged with meaning. Man's world is not a string of undifferentiated objects, but rather a conscious comparison of objects. A name does not represent, as the nominalism of Professor Wallas implies, a bundle of sensations, but the qualities of objects as conceived by reason. It is the function of reason to find the common principles as manifested in things. Thus, when an idealist says that political institutions are the embodiment of reason, he does not mean to imply that they are entirely the product of a deliberative process, but that, as we look back upon the development of institutions, we recognize the evolution of a rational scheme of human life. Without the immanence of reason, no organised social life is conceivable. Nor is it claimed that the conduct of the individual man in politics is always governed by conscious deliberation, but merely that his conduct is subject to a rational explanation. He may be misled by pernicious appeals, but even then he is following a course of action which he believes to be reasonable. In this light, the state is the expression of reason in the sense that reason is dominant in its processes, and that political life presents the evolution of, or the groping for, reason.

Again, when Professor Wallas declares that an unstimulated disposition gives rise to the strain of a "baulked disposition," [56] he has perhaps unintentionally allowed the use of his name in the support of a false notion. It is obvious, and Professor Wallas recognizes it in his *Our Social Heritage*, that because man has inherited certain impulses from a remote past, it does not mean that he must satisfy them in

the present society.[57] In fact, it may be quite necessary that some of our tendencies should be crushed out. The exigencies of a common complex life may demand the sacrifice of some of man's impulses. The emphasis should be placed not on the satisfaction of our primitive impulses, but rather on their harmonious integration. Not that mortification is in itself valuable, but it may be desirable to sacrifice an inferior want for a superior. Our goal should be the good life, and the good life must involve adjustment in the scale of our wants.

A similar criticism may be offered to the definition of liberty given by Professor Wallas. Liberty, he states, is "capacity of continuous initiative."[58] It is an apt phrase, and has therefore been frequently quoted. Yet its aptness does not conceal its imperfection as a full statement of the problem of liberty. It assuredly does not indicate the goal of initiative. Suppose an individual's initiative be directed to the playing of his musical instrument at midnight. To take a more serious case, the initiative of a homicidal madman finds satisfaction only in the practice of his mania. Professor Wallas may reply that his definition implied human impulses directed to channels in accord with the standard of civilized decorum. Even then the problem is far from solved, because the content of social standards is not easily ascertained. The only solution we can suggest is that offered by the pragmatic test. It is well to remember, however, that attempts to hide the intricacies of our question behind a subtle phraseology must fail.

Further, those who are fascinated by well-rounded social systems find fault with the method of approach followed by Professor Wallas. His philosophic outlook is a *vue d'ensemble;* his survey is imperial. Such a view is not conducive, it is held, to a profound analysis of any particular segment of knowledge. It may be an exaggeration to urge that Professor Wallas has

applied a quantitative measurement to the existing world and found it wanting, but has created nothing to take its place. Yet his more philosophic political speculation can be summarized by the statement that he believes that there is something good and something bad in all proposed solutions.[59] While the specialists sacrifice comprehensiveness, they at least explore well the possibilities of one field. The future will perhaps belong more to those ardent spirits who are consumed by a passionate one-sidedness than to those who construct universal syntheses. Those who argue that truth lies somewhere midway lack that concentrated vehemence which arouses fierce hatred or sublime veneration. Rousseau and Bentham are remembered, while the names of innumerable compromisers are forgotten. Between Paine and Burke there is no room for a third party. In politics it is Aristotle alone who, from the dizzy heights of a universal "altogetherness," has achieved that permanence which lesser men cannot obtain.

However, we would be blind indeed if we did not recognize that Professor Wallas has made an eminent contribution to politics. Bagehot's analysis a generation ago and the publication of Professor McDougall's *Social Psychology* in the same year with *Human Nature in Politics* testify that our present author was not the first or the only writer to expose the fallacies of the past political psychology. Yet in the detailed application of contemporary psychological knowledge to the concrete institutions of the democratic state Professor Wallas is a pioneer. The Benthamites assumed a few deducive principles about human nature, and on this foundation they built a political theory. Professor Wallas, on the other hand, has brought to bear on politics an inductive method, the wider social experience of realized democracy, and a truer psychology than that of the Benthamites. In applying his scientific analysis to the actual results,

he discovered that they discredit early assumptions, that there is wide diversity between the politics as taught in the schools and the politics actually in existence, and that our politicians are not Benthamites, for they are better students of human nature than our past philosophers. Our elections, he found, are, in fact, organized exploitation of human emotions by skilled manipulations. Parliament is actually not a deliberative assembly, but a will organization. Our civil service system encourages officialdom and disregards human motives. In measuring the field of government by the test of results he has laid bare the wide discrepancy between fact and theory. It is dispassionate science annihilating empty theorizing, false idealization, and facile assumptions.

A knowledge of the imperfections of the contemporary state has not made Professor Wallas distrustful of democracy. If tests and measurement can uncover fallacies, they may also secure reform. Here, in fact, is another aspect of his contribution to political realism. Improvement will come only when we apply not meaningless dogmas, but verifiable data. We can have reason in the management of the state only if we do not over-simplify the problem. He warns us against hasty generalizations. Whether a particular proposal will work depends not upon an unfounded belief in the omnipresence of rationality, but upon manifold relative factors, which can be observed only by a concrete study. He has thus turned our emphasis from mere forms to consequences. We are no more interested in formal democracy, but in concrete effects on human life. Thus, for example, proportional representation and direct legislation, which have made so wide an appeal to the unscientific politics of the past century, may now be regarded as questionable media of reform when tested by their effects on the voters. We are now suspicious of analogies, for, to take an illustration, conclusions which may be valid

of the public services of Manchester may be inadequate when applied to those of Philadelphia, for the concrete conditions of the two places differ. We must have more reason in politics, but reason assumes not glib phrases, but the pragmatic test and the experimental method.

It is a hopeful sign of our time that Professor Wallas has exercised considerable influence. His three books have made his name indispensable in the literature of politics.[60] In fact, few contemporary books on politics make no reference to him. If it is a commonplace nowadays to recognize the *rôle* of the irrational in politics, it is because he has done so much to elucidate them. His psychological penetration opens up a fascinating field, in which further explorations will no doubt make additional discoveries. His appeal for a quantitative approach to political phenomena must surely bear greater results in the future if our path to a better society is to be less obscure than at present.

Again, another point, of a more general nature, to which his books have carried our attention, is that the extension of the social scale has created disharmony between human capacities and the social environment. With kindly tolerance and sympathy, he has observed the havoc wrought in the lives of many individuals by the impact of a complex social life. In this field his books, especially his *Great Society*, came to some with the force of a revelation. Like all acute books, they made coherent what many vaguely felt to be true. He has found that the original dispositions of man are frequently thwarted, giving rise to that sense of discontent which not only vitiates the fundamental purpose of the state, but threatens its very existence. Assuredly we are now treading on the broad highway of the problem of human happiness. Yet if the state is to be organized so that man may live well, the problem of human contentment cannot be neglected in any theory of the state. Professor Wallas has

shown us that such an approach must embrace a reconciliation between human nature, accustomed to a simple, free, and rural society, and the wider dimensions of our urban, regimented, and industrial civilization.

It is also correct to say that his failure to present a nicely rounded political system is the result of a firm belief that there is no one-sided solution of the riddle. It is because he sees not too little, but the whole. As an admirer of Aristotle, he is not oblivious of the fact that progress is a painful process, and that, therefore, it must be pursued piecemeal. If man is to scale the heights at all, he must first be sure of his skill as a climber. Hence he suggests the method of social advance. Truth, unfortunately, is not the special possession of any single school of reformers, but, if ever discovered, it is found in pieces only, and it is these tiny pieces that he attempts to assimilate. Meanwhile, to Professor Wallas, as to Plato, but with more than Plato's tolerance, the Minister of Education must become the most important public functionary.

In conclusion, it may perhaps be of value to recapitulate briefly some of the aspects of psychology in relation to politics which our discussion has developed. Apart from the general fact that contemporary psychology carries to the realm of mind that continuity between man and animal life which the Darwinian hypothesis made inevitable,[61] our discussion may be summarised under the following heads: First, the Benthamite psychology is discredited, thus removing a stumbling block to social effort. Second, the state, like any other human association, is a psychic phenomenon—that is, its life depends upon its existence in the minds of individuals. Its structure cannot be understood by any metaphor from biology or mechanics. Third, the individual separated from social relations is a pure abstraction. The political application of these three points tended to strengthen

collectivism. We must also mention certain limitations of the psychological approach. First, the mere enumeration of instincts or dispositions does not solve the riddle of personality. Second, there is little justification and merit in the doctrine of a social or collective mind. Third, psychology, like biology, is concerned only with facts, and not with values. The student of politics will do well to remember that, while a knowledge of human nature is a necessary preliminary, he must not confine his knowledge to any single text-book on psychology or, for that matter, to text-books of any kind. He must beware of the writer on politics who is imbued with any particular and rigid theory of human nature. In fact, the more he retains his mental balance, the more will he realize that claims that this or that proposal is "against human nature" are generally prejudiced and always unscientific.

## CHAPTER III

### THE IDEALISTS: JONES AND WATSON

When Emerson said, as Figgis remarks, that "there is nothing new and nothing true, and nothing matters," [1] he was not perhaps thinking of political theory. Yet a perusal of the history of political ideas is a painful drudgery, because it reveals few new aspects to give it freshness. There is a sense of despair as system follows system, with the fundamentals still unsolved. Throughout the ages different choruses repeat the same tunes. It is undeniable that all theories of the state find their origin in the first book of the *Republic*. If, to take some examples, Bentham restored the Sophists, Green restored Plato. It is less undeniable that Aristotle's *Politics* is still the best text on the subject, yet the monotonous repetition of sameness is perhaps the chief characteristic of a history of political ideas. Why such poverty? Is it because truths are eternal? Or that, while quantity changes, quality remains constant? Or that the great Greeks saw it whole when the world was half finished? Whatever the cause may be, the fact is apparently unquestioned. If thought progresses at all, it progresses in a circle. By reaching the English idealists, we have rounded the circle, and we are on the high road to Greece.

Yet the old wine is put into new bottles. The thought may be old, but the setting and application are new in each case. It is obvious that Locke [2] used an old theory in an appeal from a sovereign king for a supreme parliament, while Bentham used old weapons in an appeal from the same supreme parlia-

ment for a sovereign people. The same is true of the idealists—from Plato to the present-day writers. No matter how much they may speculate about the state in the abstract, it is the concrete state of their age that they have at the back of their minds. It is undeniable that Plato's theory is the outgrowth of a city-state, which combined the functions of both the Prussian State and the Mediæval Church. Aristotle's *Politics* is as much a product of its Greek *ethos* as the dramas of Euripides. Rousseau may be (what Mrs. Grote wrote of J. S. Mill) "a wayward intellectual deity," but he is also a "citizen of Geneva" and a *philosophe* of the Enlightenment. Kant undoubtedly felt the leaven of the new French ideas. Nor is Hegel's hypothesis of the "altogetherness of everything" free from the imputation of attempting to vindicate in the name of reason institutions which were threatened by the same French ideas.[3] T. H. Green obviously speaks in an England of a large landless proletariat. In our own day Sir Henry Jones bears as definite witness to an England torn by violence of class, as Professor Watson does to a world shocked by the Great War. The idealist "moves with the larger march of human destiny," as he necessarily must.

It may, therefore, be pardonable to review briefly the *milieu* of English idealism. Progress is said to result from a succession of opposites. Idealism was the reaction from the principle of utility. It was heralded by the indignation of Shaftesbury, by the rise of international socialism, by Carlyle and Ruskin.[4] Benthamism seemed to cope well with the abuses arising from the tributes levied by a feudal aristocracy, from an unrepresentative parliament, from an atrocious judicial system. It was, however, less conversant with the evils of capitalism, which it had helped to create. It was rather blind to the fact that it is iniquitous to treat unequals equally. It was too anxious to protect all forms of property to recognize

any distinction between property which serves human needs and that which is the expression of malicious power. It was too anxious to safeguard the individual to appreciate the value of organization. It seemed, unfortunately, to justify that deplorable tendency which made "business" a selfish pursuit rather than a profession. It also over-stated, apparently, the worth of material comforts at the expense of less tangible satisfactions. To all these tendencies idealism was a counter-movement.

The underlying hypothesis of the idealist outlook is not difficult to summarize. We shall state it in an emphatic, and hence perhaps questionable, form in order to stress its reaction from the principle of utility. Although there is wide divergence among the various adherents of that doctrine, yet their variations are only on the same theme. We may, therefore, rightly refer to them as a school of thought. To an idealist, the unity that exists among rational beings is more significant than their discords and differences; for their unity is derived from the universal or absolute, which is constant, while their differences result from comparatively inconsequential and shifting multiplicities.[5] In the all-comprehensive survey of our idealist, the distinction between individuals is blurred. He sees only man in the aggregate, and the human aggregate which he stresses is that which forms the state—which he holds to be the truest manifestation of the universal spirit. It is the same universal spirit which makes the individual rational, and hence social. With regard to the state, he places his emphasis less on its various acts or actors than on the broad fact that its purpose is to fulfil the aims of the general will, which is the associated rational wills viewed collectively. Since what is most true and permanent in individuality is best expressed in the universality of the state, the freedom, the rights, and good of the individual are best achieved by fostering the ends of

the state.) Thus the individual for whom Paine, Bentham, and Spencer have pleaded does not exist for the idealist, since the individual realizes himself only in, and through, the state.

In T. H. Green's full exposition of this doctrine we notice the influence of a long line of thinkers from Plato, through Rousseau and Hegel.[6] Bradley and Bosanquet are Green's disciples. With Green, Bradley agrees with the necessary coincidence between the individual and the state. The individual's self-realization is conceivable only in terms of his social relations. His station in the state is the summation of his relations. Consequently, the individual achieves his greatest growth when he fulfils his station in the state well. In Bosanquet, Green's guarded idealism takes a turn more akin to Hegel. To Bosanquet, my real will is best expressed when it conforms with the general will. The general will finds its fullest development in the state. Hence, by obeying the state, I follow my deepest wishes. The state is conceived as the "sole organizer of rights and as guardian of moral values."[7] Other writers continue the same tradition. Sir Henry Jones and Professor Watson, while not as eminent as Bradley and Bosanquet, nevertheless throw light on contemporary thought.

The substance of Jones's ideas is found in four lectures entitled *The Working Faith of the Social Reformer* (1910). In these Jones does not pretend to give a fully developed theory of the state. He presents merely his philosophic position and its application to some questions of social relations. The book expresses an idealist's attitude to the state. In *The Principles of Citizenship* (1919) Jones has somewhat amplified the ideas presented in his earlier book. This book bears the impress of the stress of the war. Yet it is a fine restatement of the idealist position, and its discussion of the sphere of state action indicates how far the idealist political theory of the present day has

moved from T. H. Green. Since the philosophic position of our author constitutes the core of his political thought, it may be excusable to venture timidly into the abstract.

Briefly, and therefore perhaps incorrectly, his metaphysical doctrine is this. The relation between man and the world is not that of exclusion, but of mutual inclusion. Man lives in the world, and the world lives in him. "*Its* phenomena are *his* thoughts." [8] It is the nature of reason or self-consciousness to identify itself with its content. In apprehending the world, it becomes man's character. Yet while the world is internalized in man, man also externalizes himself in the world. There is an objective order which presses its existence on man and which man, by subsuming, reinstates. Thus, when man makes the world a part of himself, the very existence of the world is enlarged and enhanced. There is thus no distinction between man and the world, but both are spiritualized. Between self and not-self there is unity in difference.

The manner in which Jones applies his view to man in the state is obvious. The dispute as to the relative importance of character and environment is, therefore, futile. The relation of man to his surroundings is thus not of exclusion, but of inclusion. Character and environment are merely two different aspects of the same thing. Their development is concurrent. In man's relations with man the family is the most complete example of the identity of self with not-self, and, at the same time, of the "other" with the self. Here "mine" and "thine" are merged in a single unison. The family offers to the state an example of how perfect liberty can find its realization under perfect authority. Again, morality becomes "*a process of giving individual form to universal principles.*" [9] There cannot be any distinction between private and public good, because for the individual moralization is possible only when he allies himself with the uni-

versal law of goodness. Rights of the state and of the citizen can be claimed only in the interests of all rational beings, and hence their preservation is possible only by the identification of these rights with universal purpose. A right to private property, for example, is not founded on individual appropriation, but on social recognition. This recognition identifies its private and universal aspects. The recent extension of state interference demands a new interpretation of the social and personal nature of property. To speak, therefore, of individual interest as opposed to social interest is meaningless.

The state, to Jones, is an association of free wills, the consummate achievement of rationality. It is the supreme example on a large scale of a relationship between rational beings which is one of inclusion, and not exclusion. Only in the state does the individual find his true worth. The social nature of man demands his realization in the state. But that state is best which makes such complete realization possible. The state is the synthesis of individual wills, but its security depends on the effective freedom of its citizens. There is no antithesis between order and liberty; both grow and develop together. A well-organized state is the greatest guarantee of the growth of individual personality. "Our mother, the State," is thus not a barren phrase.

Consequently there is no issue between the individualists and socialists—between the defenders of "private rights" and those of "state interference." By expanding its activities, the modern state has restored individual liberty. "If a state maintains an army or navy or a judicial system, or runs a penny post; if a municipality manufactures gas, cleans the streets, or runs the tramways; it is surely only because this is the most effective way of securing safety, justice, comfort and convenience for the individual citizens."[10] Are there no conflicts between

individual and social ends? If such conflicts arise, it is because either the individual, or the state, or both, are imperfect. What is important, however, is not to place the individual as opposed to the state, but "that the particular purpose of the individual can best be judged in the light of its significance for society, and that a public end can best be judged by its value for the particular citizens." [11]

Are there no limits to state activity? "The principle which I believe to be true, and which we have to put to the test is, put as pointedly as I can, That the State may do *anything* that makes for the good life of its citizens, and nothing else; and that the citizens may claim anything that makes for the same good life, and nothing else—always bearing in mind that the good life is a common good, the well-being at once of the individual citizen and of the State." [12] In accordance with his principle, there are, then, to Jones, no limits to state action. If the state, he continues, is to have the fullest development of the human faculties of its citizens, it must create the conditions under which mere potentialities may find effective expression. Thus, to take some illustrations, the state may undertake the education of the citizen, but in the administration of this function it must regard the citizen as an end in himself, and must inculcate love of truth and critical capacity. Since the state and the individual alike are both means to the Absolute Good, therefore only in just wars has the state a right to demand the sacrifice of the lives of the citizens, and both the state and individual have the right to judge whether a particular war is just or not. If the individual is convinced that a particular war is wrong, he should refuse to support it; in fact, he may then even fight against the state. With regard to freedom of speech and of the Press, the clash of opinion which toleration allows is usually the best means of suppressing falsehood. The pacifist may

thus stand by his conscience, but he is no more a martyr than the man who dies for his faith. The right to property must not be considered as an empty right, but must be coupled with the opportunity of enjoying it on the part of the masses. This implies the right to work. We should recognize the principle of the positive and creative function of the state in industry, which is the inevitable corollary of its moral mission. In his battle for effective freedom, the worker should realize his responsibility to the state as a whole, and not merely to a class. Yet the best way to make him deserve our confidence in the management of industry is to endow him with that responsibility and, at the same time, to inspire him with the consciousness of a common good.

A criticism of Jones would perhaps take the following form. Do not his views show an apparent confusion of state with society? Thus, he refers to the state as "being the organized will of society to the common good."[13] The difference between society and the state is not merely a distinction in name, but has importance in concrete application. Thus any analysis of the network of associations which compose society shows that the state is merely one will-organization among many. In fact, there is no discussion in Jones of the relation between the state and other groups. He does mention that the work of trade unions should be encouraged, that churches can best administer the religious function of society, and that, in order to prevent the dangerous extension of state power, the management of industries may be left to the industrial organizations.[14] But his discussion as a whole fails to consider the place of groups in the modern state, a recognition of which is a major contribution of current political thought. To Jones, the state is still the complete repository of the organized social life of man, but contemporary political pluralism has shown us that man's social life is not monistic, but

pluralistic.[15] The distinction between state and society is a discovery of recent days; failure to recognize the difference will hinder clarity of thought.

Our author is free from the tendency of idealist writers to confound the ideal with the real. Nor can he be accused of merely offering an obscurantist defence of the existing *régime*, a criticism applicable to some idealist writers. We submit, however, that realistic politics are more fruitful of reform than political idealism. As far as we are concerned here, the difference between idealism and realism is a question of method. The idealist obtains his political principles from a study of the nature of the state as a concept of the mind, while the realist studies states as concrete political facts. Not that a statement of norms as social goals is irrelevant, but, we believe, constant attachment to facts is most serviceable in the study both of facts and of ideals. Thus such a study would undoubtedly discover what Jones neglects, that, unless we have a theory of administration, it is dangerous to invest the state with increased power.[16] It would further suggest the difficulties of applying the right to work.[17]

Again, the idealistic method undoubtedly lends itself to confusion. Thus, to take some examples, Bosanquet's idealism, when applied, offers merely philosophic defence for the political theory of Lord Hugh Cecil,[18] while, we may add, Professor McDougall's related theory of the "group mind" merely throws a psychological gloss over Mallock's theory of naked class rule.[19] With Green and Jones, on the other hand, the applications are wholly different. The realistic method is at least free from double meaning. It is the frequent obscuring of the ideal and the real, of the abstract and the concrete, of the fusion, or perhaps the confusion, of everything into the vastness of reason that is the most critical defect of idealism. That idealism is double-edged Jones recognizes.

"Hence," he declares, "it is like the bat, the victim of both birds and beasts."[20] What idealism gains in comprehension it no doubt loses in definiteness.

Yet one may fairly suggest that Jones was concerned chiefly in presenting an attitude of mind. In this attitude of mind lies the ultimate value of his books. He offers to us the humanism of T. H. Green, matured by the experience of another generation. While the importance of the individual is duly stressed, his books may with justice be taken as a defence of a socialized state. The idea that man "is born, nourished, developed into individuality within the social matrix" is a capital thought. Social effort needed the emphasis which preceding writers gave to private. While the Benthamite doctrine claimed that state action is bad unless proven otherwise, the view presented by Jones justifies the conclusion that social action may be good unless proven to the contrary.

A fully developed theory from the idealistic standpoint is Professor Watson's *The State in Peace and War* (1919). It is an analytical and historical interpretation of the theory of the state. Professor Watson acknowledges his special debt to Green, Bradley, Bosanquet, and Caird.[21] He is a follower of Kant, however, rather than of Hegel, of Green rather than of Bosanquet. Hegel he absolves from all blame, stating that Hegel considered Will, and not force, to be the basis of the state; the deification of force in Germany he attributes to Haeckel, Nietzsche, and Treitschke.[22] Presumably idealists can follow Hegel without any blemish. His exposition of sovereignty and international relations deserve detailed treatment, as it shows the effect of contemporary theory and fact. His idea of sovereignty obviously reveals the influence of the criticism of Laski,[23] while his views on international obligations attest to the strain of the Great War.

The state, Professor Watson suggests, possesses

relative, and not absolute, sovereignty.[24] Each group, such as a church, a trade union, or a family, is in its own sphere independent of the state. (Only when these groups overstep the boundaries of their particular spheres must they be subordinated to the relative sovereignty of the state. Each group, then, is equal with the state in being supreme in its own sphere. The general will is expressed not only in the state, but in all other groups and institutions which manifest human association.) "In two ways, therefore;" Professor Watson says, "the State is sovereign: firstly, in that its authority extends to all the citizens without exception; and secondly, because it is the supreme authority for the settlement of all disputes between the Church and other organizations and individuals."[25] The sphere of the state is limited to the function of harmonizing conflicting claims of individuals and groups.

This view of sovereignty deserves some comment. If the state has only relative sovereignty, then by implication other groups have relative sovereignty also. This means, of course, that there is no sovereignty. The older conception of sovereignty implied that the state is supreme, and that other groups exist at the will of the state.[26] According to Professor Watson's view, we have a number of equal and co-ordinating groups, each group carrying on a special function, and each supreme in its own sphere. Professor Watson recognizes the difficulty when he states, "In truth no institution is sovereign. The relation, for example, between Church and State is not one of subordination, but of co-ordination."[27] This definitely implies that there is no sovereign state.

Again, his doctrine of sovereignty is untenable when concretely applied. For concrete purposes it is more important to define what authority has the power of decision in cases of disputes between groups and individuals than to discover the ultimate source of

authority of those functions which each group exercises, and which do not come in conflict with outsiders. The functions of these separate groups are surely not subject to rigid demarcation. Hence the sources of disputes are manifold. If the state has the power to decide these disputes, the state is sovereign, not relatively, but absolutely; if the state has not, then it has no sovereignty. Whatever authority has the power to decide in disputes is the sovereign. There cannot be any half-way analysis. It must be accepted *in toto* or discarded completely.

Further, Professor Watson's theory of the state is really pluralistic, and not monistic. The full monistic conception considers the state as the fullest expression of realized will, the summation and source of all authority. It is the completest embodiment of the collective purpose.[28] It is "the guardian of the whole moral order." In Professor Watson the state is dethroned from this august position. The state becomes a *liaison* officer between different but equal groups. Each group gives expression to a separate phase of social relations. Presumably, too, a particular group may seldom need or touch the state. Can such a society be conceived to be a unit, with a collective will and collective purpose? There are, indeed, a number of passages in his book which show that he is not yet freed from the terminology of monism, as, for instance, "the State is the totality of institutions by which the common weal is secured."[29] How can a state with relative sovereignty, which is exercised on occasions only and existing alongside of other co-ordinating bodies, contain the "totality of institutions"? It appears that such passages are inserted at the price of consistency to satisfy a discredited monism. It is justifiable to assume that the unity of the state, which it has been the task of the idealist school to maintain, is now denied by a disciple of the same school.

Perhaps the difficulty arises from the fact that Professor Watson does not make a clear distinction between the state and society. Indeed, he is inconsistent in the use of the term "state." In some cases it is used to signify the "totality of institutions"—that is, society proper. In other cases the state is used in a narrower meaning as merely the harmonizer of conflicts between equal groups. "We may, if we please," he states, "call other institutions the Community, not the State, but things are not made different by attaching to them different names." [30] But his conception of the state possessing relative sovereignty, functioning among equal and co-ordinating groups is surely not identified with the complex of relationship which the term "community" or "society" denotes.

Professor Watson not only confuses state with society, but also state with government. Thus he says, "it [the state] is the highest institution for a political purpose, but not the only institution even for that purpose. Subordinate to it are municipal councils, provincial, government and other organizations." [31] However, the central and municipal authorities do not constitute the state; they are merely the agents of the state. The state is a territorial society organized to achieve certain things in common, and is thus composed of governors and governed. The government consists of all the persons and institutions, both central and local, authorized to carry out these functions. In continuing the same subject, Professor Watson states: "The central government, representing the final will of the citizens, so far as it is made explicit, is the final authority for determining the functions of the decentralized bodies, though the complete will of the citizens expresses itself through all the organizations of society." The central organization may not voice the will of the citizens any more completely than does the local one, nor has it always

the power to regulate them. It is not true of states with federal governments. Whether a particular government is centralized or decentralized is merely a difference in the means of achieving the aims of the state, but government is wholly distinct from the state. The United States of America, France, and the Russian Soviet Republic are all states, with their governments diversely organized. These distinctions are not merely "a matter of terminology," but are essential to clear thinking on politics. If Professor Watson had grasped this truth, his analysis would not have been marred by ambiguities.

The distinction between state and society deserves fuller treatment. Society consists of the complicated network of groups and institutions expressing human association. Most of these groups have an existence distinct from the state. Their basis and origin are not grounded on the decrees of the state, but on the manifold needs of human nature. The relation of individuals in any one group or that between group and group is mainly based on will. The state is one group among many. It is also the harmonizer and regulator of these groups and the court of appeal in case of disputes between them and individuals. To guarantee impartiality and efficiency, the state of the future will, perhaps, more formally adopt open representation of groups instead of the obscure method of the present state. The decision of the state and the degree of its interference with the functions of the groups or of individuals depend not upon any abstract *ipse dixit*, but upon general acceptability. The power of the state is limited not by any legal or metaphysical sovereignty, but by obedience.

In a way, however, Professor Watson's difficulties also reveal his merit. His theory of the state undoubtedly shows the influence of recent movements. He does recognize the importance of groups. In fact, his very inconsistency is an illustration of his realiza-

tion of the complicated nature of the problem of human association. He does not screen difficulties behind the veil of a subtle phraseology, which perhaps cannot be said in behalf of all idealists. If the old Hegelian metaphysic is perhaps inconsistently blended with the new psychology, still the gain in truth more than compensates for the loss in logic. The idealism of Professor Watson is different from that of Bosanquet, and just because it is different, it is perhaps more true. Idealism is making a *rapprochement* to the facts.

On the international obligations of states Professor Watson's view is less debatable. Here we recognize the influence of the generous impulses of recent days. Here in particular he shows that he is a follower of Kant and Green rather than of Hegel and Bosanquet. Ideas of humanity, he says, give us a higher law than the law of the state. Civilization is in the partnership of all states, and is enriched by the special contribution of each.[32] (No state may impose its particular culture on other states, because no single state can embody all human possibilities, and because culture cannot be forced upon the unwilling.) War is an anomaly, and is not inevitable. A federation of states with a definitely constituted authority will complete, and not supersede, each state by giving expression to the solidarity of mankind. To this concert all states and peoples must be admitted, and international conduct must be tempered with charity and compassion. The less developed peoples must be considered as wards, with their elevation as the only guiding principle of statecraft. The ultimate end must be to bring them within the pale of civilization. Such views are not incompatible with love of country. They are only incompatible with that brutal realism which establishes a contradiction between love of country and the solid interests of humanity. ✓

Professor Watson's (views on international politics

are not unique; they nevertheless are "setting to music the tune that is haunting millions of ears." They are salutary ideas, and bear repetition. The views that the nation-state cannot be taken as the ultimate criterion of right and wrong and is not the final step in social evolution is fundamental. If redemption is to come to a distracted world, it will come in part because such views are embodied in a text-book on the theory of politics. The conception that the nation-state, more than a church, or trade union, or a family, is the summation of all our loyalties is as untenable as the closely allied idea that the basis of law is the command of a sovereign. In fact, the more we realize that the positive law of a state is grounded on "a sense of right," and not on the order of the political sovereign, the less distinction is there between the laws of the state and the sympathies and affinities derived from the "consciousness of kind" in a common humanity. Only when such views as voiced by Professor Watson become universal is there hope for a humanity that is now brooding over its cruel fate.

A vigorous indictment of idealism comes from the pen of Professor Hobhouse. In his *Metaphysical Theory of the State* (1918) he enlarges upon the criticism given previously in his *Democracy and Reaction*.[33] Bismarckian *realpolitik* and its aftermath are considered by Professor Hobhouse to be the practical counterpart of Hegelian theory. Hegelianism is viewed as the enemy of mankind.[34] It is thus in the spirit of a crusade that the book is written. Professor Hobhouse's attack is directed entirely against Hegel and his nearest English follower, Bosanquet. It is as acute a criticism as is extant in recent political theory.

As mentioned before, the theory of Bosanquet, after Hegel, was based upon the following premises. The real will of each citizen is alone expressive of his true individuality. The real will is identified with the

collective general will. The general will is best realized in the state. Hence obedience to the state is self-imposed, and therefore free. Professor Hobhouse denies the validity of the whole thesis. My real will—that is, my rational will—he says, is only my ideal, and my less permanent desires and impulses are as real to my present self as my rational will is to my reformed self. Further, the identification of my real will with the general will not only neglects the obvious truth that rational wills may clash, but also obscures the fact that my experience is limited to my own self only, and is not shareable. My act is my own; the object of the act alone may be participated in by others. Again, to believe that state is the summation of the general will is to confuse the state with society. The state is *a* society, and not society. The state, like any other group, is built by the co-operation of innumerable individuals, and is not the embodiment of a single, unified general will. In its development impulses, conflicts, stupidities, and accidents play as great a part as coherent rationality. Will, in the sense of reasoned social purpose, is present only in the minds of a few, and is thus not general: what is general is a vague and incoherent sense of social unity, and is therefore not will.

From the idealistic theory as enunciated by Hegel and Bosanquet there follow, according to Professor Hobhouse, certain deplorable tendencies. It is argued that idealism, "instead of seeking to realize the ideal idealizes the real."[35] In the words of Hegel, "the insight to which . . . philosophy ought to lead us is that the real world is as it ought to be."[36] Oppression, misery, injustices, are part and parcel, then, of the "rational whole." Disagreeable facts are thus brushed aside as not relevant to the superior claims of reason. The assumption of idealism is that the ideal state is not to be obtained by a process of hard effort, but actually exists. The consequence, according to Pro-

fessor Hobhouse, in line with Hobson,[37] is that idealism is one of "the tactics of Conservatism." In the case of Hegel, this superfine logic meant, in reality, a justification of the Prussian monarchy; in the case of Bosanquet it means the social philosophy of the Charity Organization Society. Such a view is deadening and fatal to progress. To view the state as having already reached the zenith of its development is not philosophy, but satire. At present we may have only the germs of a better future. The present is merely a point of departure. Not only is advance possible, but such advance should be the faith of all socially minded men.

Moreover, to Professor Hobhouse, the idealists' view that "there is no organized moral world" has tended to undermine honesty and probity in interstate relations. Hegel believed that states, in their relations between themselves, are placed above a moral criterion, that the end of the state is a sufficient guide to conduct, and that war is a justifiable means of enforcing state ends. Bosanquet declared that the state "has no determinate function in a larger community, but is itself the supreme community; the guardian of a whole moral world, but not a factor within an organized moral world. The moral relations presuppose an organized life; but such a life is only within the state and not in the relations between the state and other communities."[38] In these and similar passages Professor Hobhouse sees the germs of the unfortunate tendencies which ultimately resulted in the Great War. To him the root fallacy of such a doctrine is that it identifies morality with legality and not with man as a moral agent. Man, being a moral personality, must accept moral responsibility in his relations with other men, irrespective of state lines. The idealist view also fails to recognize the innumerable ramifications and connections which have developed beyond state boundaries, and which testify

to the growing unity of mankind. The difference in the relation between persons of the same state and persons of different states is not of kind, but merely of degree. The absence of definite machinery for the adjustment of disputes between states should indeed spur on our efforts for the establishment of such machinery. In this Professor Hobhouse sees another instance of the confusion by idealists of the ideal with the real.

Furthermore, the tendency of idealists to magnify the state means to Professor Hobhouse an unquestioned sacrifice of individuals to institutionalism. The interest of the state is severed by a specious logic from the interest of the millions of individuals whom it may contain. For Hegel the state contains "all the worth which the human being possesses—all spiritual reality he possesses through the state"; [39] while to Bosanquet the state is "a complete idea of the realization of all human capacity." [40] The state is thus exalted as a mystical transcendental object, the glory of which is conceived as an end in itself. To such an august institution the individual owes only duties, but can claim no rights from it. In every age such views offer a bulwark to authority. To Professor Hobhouse the life of a group—of which the state is only one example—may be "more or other" than the totality of individuals as they would be if detached from the group. Yet this difference is due not to the fact that a superior entity is created, but to the co-operation of individuals. The whole is just what the co-operation of the parts makes it, and nothing else. Consequently, if the individual is to be judged by the contribution which he makes to the state, the state must also be judged by the opportunities which it offers to the human units within it. The ends of the state must never be abstracted from the fortunes and lives of individuals within it.

It may be in place to add some relevant comments

which Professor Hobhouse's effort calls forth. It is perhaps true that Hegel and Bosanquet, consciously or unconsciously, served the interest of reaction. Professor Hobhouse recognizes that this was not the case with Green. One may add that it was also not true of Plato and Kant. In fact, it is to be remembered that the most significant radical of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx, found in Hegelianism his philosophic affinity. Is not socialism, in a sense, as logical a deduction from idealism as acquiescent conservatism? Undoubtedly an unguarded idealism is inclined to confound the essential with the existing. To be sure, realism, with its close kinship with facts, is more productive of reform than idealism, which, unless especially guarded, tends to clothe institutionalism with awe and mystery. It is perhaps no accident that Bacon, Locke, and most critics of to-day are realists. To idealists Aristotle long ago indicated the necessity of not sacrificing discordant actualities for the roundness of a system.

It may be well in this connection to mention that the defence that idealism deals only with the "pure" instance is not to the point.[41] If by "pure" is meant a construction of the imagination, then the books of Hegel and Bosanquet should be relegated to the same category as the Utopias of More and Bacon. This, however, was surely not the intention of their writers. But if by "pure" is meant a realizable ideal toward which the present must strive, then to be effective the present must remember the lessons of experience. In fact, the perfect can be achieved only by the selection of the good from the bad. This can be accomplished only by the application of experimental methods to politics. Such an approach will reveal the non-rational and discordant elements in the past and present career of the state. It will also bring to light the additional truth that the state in the concrete means a body of finite, fallible officials, who may rule

by virtue of the stupidity, or inertia, or egoism of incoherent masses and competing classes; that the electoral majority, which alone gives concreteness to the "general will," may have been obtained by methods in which the art of deception played a major *rôle*. That human development, when viewed in wide perspective, is subject to a rational analysis, is a proposition which we may without much dispute accept from the idealists. This admission, however, does not premise that a state or any other particular institution is a complete embodiment of reason, and hence sacrosanct. The more rational order of the future will come only by a skilful selection of the rational elements from the irrational in the present order. Only by pursuing a ruthless dissection of actualities—the method indicated to us, at least, in part by Professor Wallas—can we attain that harmony which for the present must remain a mere hopeful goal.

As mentioned before, Professor Watson absolves Hegel from the blame for the worship of force in Germany. In fact, he considers that the doctrines of Haeckel, Nietzsche, and Treitschke, which were the true defence of the Prussian state, were in the nature of a reaction from Hegelian idealism. It may be well to bear in mind that idealism, when transplanted to England, did not result in the deplorable consequences which are frequently attributed to it in Germany. It is perhaps more correct to affirm that conscienceless conduct in interstate relations was a universal malady, and that, as Professor Hobhouse observes, owing to certain theories and facts, Germany succumbed most easily.[42]

Professor Hobhouse is correct in asserting that in the case of Bosanquet, following Hegel, the reaction from Benthamite individualism swung too far in the opposite direction. Yet the solid achievement of English idealists is that, unlike the Benthamites, they appreciated the value of organization. From T. H.

Green to Professor Watson we have a series of influential writers who stressed the necessity of regulated life. They viewed associated life not as an external imposition on the individual, but as essential and vital to his nature. The Benthamite belief in a mechanistic state and an abstract individual was replaced by the restoration of the doctrine of the social mission of the state and its spiritual functions among interrelated individuals. The view of negative liberty—which did not serve the needs of the great masses as life grew more complex—was replaced by the doctrine of positive liberty, which exhorted the state to create freedom. The idealist conception that the state is an exalted partnership consecrated to the realization of the good life implied that for the masses this ideal can be effective only by state assistance. Houses for the houseless, education for the untutored, medical aid for the sick, assistance for the destitute, state-aided insurance to help the needy in time of crisis, were some of the means used to make this partnership in the state a definite reality. The logic of the Benthamite state was undermined, as there gradually developed the frank recognition that even "in the long run" there is no necessary coincidence of reward with merit, and that indeed the lives of the great masses are a series of disappointing short runs. When the "accident of an accident" of birth overwhelms, except in rare instances, all the combined force of individual integrity, perseverance, and unremitting effort, the ideal of equality of opportunity required reinterpretation. Idealism furnished the creed of this new synthesis. It supplied statesmen and reformers with a working faith. In his Introduction to *Liberalism* (1902), by Herbert (now Sir Herbert) Samuel, Asquith wrote, "but with the growth of experience a more matured opinion has come to recognize that Liberty (in a political sense) is not only a negative but a positive conception. Freedom cannot be

predicated in its true meaning either of a man or a society merely because they are no longer under the compulsion of restraints which have the sanction of positive law. To be really free they must be able to make the best use of faculty, opportunity, energy, life." [43] Asquith undoubtedly had in mind more than mere enunciation of a principle. To idealism beyond a doubt is to be attributed a strong influence in the transformation from the state of Bentham to that of our own day.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE INDIVIDUALISTS: CECIL AND MALLOCK

In our last chapter reference was made to the criticism that the tendency of idealist writers to idealize the real serves to exalt unduly the pretensions of authority. However that may be, the writers that we shall now review do not deduce their conservative social outlook from metaphysics, but rather from religious sources. They are apostles of stability and special pleaders for the claims of the past. Tradition they hold to be precious, as it bears the maturity of age. Since the balance of sagacity is held to be on the side of the established order, a brief is formulated which is uncongenial to experiment. In this approach an anti-intellectualist psychology is also frequently implied. Man is conceived to be, after all, only a bundle of habits and instincts.[1] Each man's stock of reason is insignificant; he must draw upon the reserves of the species. In general, the field of reason in inventing new social expedients is limited. There is a good deal of brute nature in man. Institutions can do but little to remedy man's elemental ills. The existing arrangement works fairly well. It would work still better if man's nature were more sound. Why disturb a precarious structure?

The origin of this view is to be found not in Hegel, but in more immediate British speculation. Its modern sources may be traced to the reaction from the French radicalism of the Revolution. Thus Burke, the chief philosophic exponent of that reaction, recognized the social order as resting on a delicately adjusted equipoise; those who tinker with it do so at their

peril. Its foundations are divine, and therefore, when we cannot comprehend its inscrutable processes, it is our dutiful obligation to revere them.[2] Later, during the latter part of the last century, when an attitude of distrustfulness of democracy was made familiar, this doctrine found frequent iteration. Thus Bagehot thought that, if the English Constitution is to inspire reverence, it must be adorned with magic arts and elaborate ritual.[3] To Sir James Stephen, the most salient principle of social order was not liberty, but authority grounded on religious sanctions.[4] To the sombre conservatism of Maine, democracy was an unmitigated evil; the less of it the better. He thus suggested means of checking its imperfections.[5] More recently, Dicey felt anxious and frowned upon popular movements.[6] At the present time two writers—Lord Hugh Cecil and W. H. Mallock—may be considered as typical of those who continue a similar tradition.

In Lord Hugh Cecil (*Liberty and Authority*, 1910, *Conservatism*, 1912, and *Nationalism and Catholicism*, 1919) we have a theory of the state which is definitely grounded upon a religious basis. Political principles, he believes, must be referred back to a normative standard, and this criterion is offered by the Christian religion. This relation between church and state necessitates establishment and endowment of a particular church as a formal act of recognition, even when a portion of the state dissents from the recognized church. This principle implies also that the child in the state schools shall be offered religious instruction in that particular faith which the parent of the child may demand. The citizen, as a Christian, should alleviate suffering, but he should remember that material conditions do not affect the spiritual life very much, and that social ills are mainly rooted in the ills of man's nature. Each individual possesses a spiritual element which is outside the sphere of the state. "The authority of the State may be at every point challenged

and required to justify itself according to the law of God." Unlimited obedience to the state is a negation of conscience, and with it of morality. The state frequently expresses the worst of human passions, and to subject the individual to it would turn an echo into an oracle. The conscientious objector who appeals from the state to his conscience ought to be exempted from service without any penalties attached to such exemption. Only when men recognize their obligations to a universal Christian society will the idolatrous worship of the nation-state end.

The justification of private property, when not acquired by fraud or violence, lies in the simple consideration that it is wrong to deprive any person of his possession. Social well-being may be a good ideal on which to create a new society, but it cannot justify existing property. Desert, too, offers no criterion, since there is nowhere any correspondence between reward and ethical merit. Economic rewards depend merely on "the law of supply and demand." Nor can land be considered as being in a distinct category. When the state interferes with private property, it must deal with social classes with the same consideration as it deals with individuals, nor can it make such demands which the conscience of an honest man could not accept. Since no standard of merit is possible, the state, in levying taxation, cannot distinguish between different forms of property. The attempt to apply in taxation a confused notion of desert would merely offer a pretence for the spoliation of the rich. Only when the revenue derived is used for necessary functions, such as justice and police, and when the rate of taxation is not too high, can heavier burdens be placed upon those best able to bear them. However, taxation used to benefit special classes must be levied on the entire community with no discrimination.

"Liberty consists in being able to obey your own will and conscience rather than the will and conscience

of others." [8] It implies the freedom to choose between the good and the bad, and to do those acts which others may deprecate, thus enabling the development of that self-imposed discipline upon which virtue rests. All hindrances to liberty are evils, and are justifiable only when they avoid greater evils. Social reforms that involve interference, even when necessary, must be cautiously scrutinized. Thus, enforced temperance will make England temperate, but neither moral nor free. Compulsory state education, even if estimable, has undermined the voluntary discipline and education of the home. Even if a majority of the parents cannot afford to offer education to their children, yet the community may still gain more when a few rise by their own efforts than when many are forced up by state assistance. Compulsory military training cannot be upheld on the basis that it inculcates discipline, as it does not train self-development, but merely obedience and subordination. Social reforms like relief of the poor and old age pensions are acts of communal charity, or of expediency, or of gratitude, but not of justice, since the state never promised such relief. Any claim on the basis of justice entails the erroneous notion that in the mutual relation between the individual and the state rewards can be equated with merit, and that a standard of desert is attainable. It is desirable to abolish poverty, but this cannot be achieved by impoverishing the rich. Rich men frequently offer an example of munificence to the community. State regulation of industry may be desirable in some cases, but such regulation must not hinder the training derived from voluntary agencies, such as trade unions. The state must act for the common good, certainly, but in such action it must follow the path of prudence and experience, and must never inflict any injustice upon the innocent, since no good act can atone for a wrong.

What constitutional reforms are needed? If the

Crown is not to fall into contempt, it must begin to play an important *rôle* in the state.[9] As an independent force in politics, the Crown would be a good check on the evils of party organizations. More immediately, however, is needed such a reformation of the House of Lords as will make it a more effective check. Such changes must alter its august character as little as is consistent with the attainment of a non-partisan membership, and with due regard, at least in part, to the hereditary principle. As regards the House of Commons, it is necessary to rescue its independence from the grip of a knot of party politicians and organizers. An appeal to the electorate by a referendum in the case of the more important bills which are rejected by the reformed second chamber may offer a needed check on the rashness of a party clique, since the people are of a conservative temper. Relief from congestion of the business of the House of Commons can be best attained not by federalizing the United Kingdom, with a separate Parliament in each constituent part, but by a change in the machinery of the House, such as, for example, a greater use of committees. All constitutional reforms must be made in a spirit of preservation, and not in one of reckless innovation.

The politics of Lord Hugh Cecil assume certain challenging principles which we cannot accept without serious qualifications. He is correct in referring political conduct to a spiritual standard, but this, however, does not imply the establishment and endowment by the state of a particular church. The spiritual foundation of the state must conform to the civilized conscience as developed by ethics and philosophy, and must therefore be above diverse claims of sects and dogmas. If all the citizens of the state belonged to the same religious body, the difficulty would then be the practical one of divorcing the religious activity from the political. In the modern

state, however, we discover no such homogeneity in religious belief. Actually we find modern communities divided into various churches, each one possessing a particular ritual and doctrine. Again, some of the inhabitants of the state profess no allegiance to any supernatural authority, and are just as entitled to the consideration of the state, since membership of the modern state is not based on religious qualification. In such circumstances the official recognition by the state of a particular church is not merely the recognition of religion, but of a particular type of religious observance—which form may be detestable to a portion of the community. Would Lord Hugh Cecil be equally enthusiastic for the endowment in England of the Roman Catholic Church in place of, or in addition to, the Anglican? Churches in the modern state are best conceived as voluntary bodies organized for the fulfilment of a particular function. The relation between such bodies and the state offers a problem no different from that of the relation of any other functional body to the state.

Furthermore, any official connection between church and state is harmful to both. Each has a distinct sphere. The function of the state is concerned with the external life; that of the church is entirely concerned with the internal life. Any fusion of the two aspects tends to vulgarize religion and confuse politics. The religious attitude is the most singularly individualistic and personal, and is entirely foreign to the machinery of external compulsion which the state exercises. Churches can best fulfil their functions when left alone. Religious instruction can preferably be offered not in the state schools, but in church schools under the direct supervision of the church. When the individual finds that his duty to the state conflicts with his duty to his church, he must, as Lord Hugh Cecil says, follow the dictates of his conscience.

Though Lord Hugh Cecil believes that the state

must be grounded on religion, yet, curiously, in the vast realm of property he overthrows entirely any standard of ethics or religion. He realizes that greed and malice motivate economic activity, but he makes no attempt at a spiritual reconstruction.[10] The only connection, to him, that property has with morals is that it is unjust to deprive the owner of his possessions, and that the individual Christian should offer personal charity to the needy. Not only does he fail to find a moral law governing the use and acquisition of property, but he denies the possibility of obtaining one. Yet it is the function of political philosophy to find such a criterion. Lord Hugh Cecil has shunned the responsibility. G. Bernard Shaw, it should be noted, also recognizes the difficulty of finding a just equation between reward and merit, and hence, unlike Lord Hugh Cecil, he proposes distribution on the basis of absolute equality.[11] To Lord Hugh Cecil, however, mere possession is a sufficient guide—a purely non-moral standard.

Social well-being, declares our author, is a good ideal on which to organize a new society, but not a justification of property as it actually exists. Why should we not attempt to mitigate the evils of the past? Why should we not modify a system which has no relation to religious precepts? There is no sound reason for divorcing economic affairs from ethics. Even the reflections of the ordinary man suggest that property derived from the sale of harmful drugs, from prostitution, from gambling, from the publications that cater for a love of hatred and scandal, is in a different category from property obtained from desirable sources. R. H. Tawney has fruitfully applied the ideal of social well-being to the existing economic order. He suggests that property must be in accord with the fulfilment of social obligations, and not with the mere maintenance of individual rights; not private rights, but social duties must govern

ownership.[12] Lord Hugh Cecil realizes that the productive process is an involved social mechanism. There is no reason why the social nature of property should be confined only to its production. Property, we urge, should be instrumental to social purposes. All forms of property must be projected on that plane. The criterion of social function is more consonant with social happiness than that of mere possession.

The crux of Lord Hugh Cecil's doctrine of liberty is its value to the will. Liberty to him is non-interference with the self-imposed discipline of the will. He is correct in emphasizing the advantage of self-discipline, but this does not assume that the will should be left to operate in a vacuum. It more properly postulates opportunities for the training of the will. The will is not static, or constant; it is elastic, and responds to its conditions. Just as the environment is a reflex of the human will, so is the human will a reflex of its environment. Thus an unregenerated denizen of Whitechapel, if transplanted to Kensington, may transform it into another slum, but he may also be regenerated. In fact, in the interest of the development of the will, we may, for example, justify temperance on the ground that the sale of intoxicants undermines the will by giving it no chance of effective assertion. The justification of state education is even more emphatic. Education enlarges the horizon of the child, opening new vistas of development. Compulsory military training is undesirable since, as Lord Hugh Cecil realizes, it does not train the will. It is the recognition of the importance of positive encouragement to the will that lies behind recent collective legislation. It is undoubtedly true that "the soul of improvement is the improvement of the soul," but if the soul is to improve, it is necessary to offer it a congenial environment.

Lord Hugh Cecil makes a number of statements which epitomize the nature of his social outlook.

Rich men, he suggests, are socially desirable, since they offer examples of charity to the community; if a few rise by their own efforts it is more valuable than if many are aided to rise; taxation which is used for purposes of social reform must not be placed on the rich alone. In such ideas we find the crucial difference between Lord Hugh Cecil's attitude and ours. We may say without any disrespect to his talent that his attitude is essentially a class outlook. He is, indeed, as class-conscious as a proletarian agitator. He prefers to retain present society on its individualistic basis, although tempered with personal charity. He prefers to retain an aristocratic class, schooled in virtue and munificence, on top, although he would leave the channel open, in order that some of those below may reach its charmed circle. We, however, visualize a different order of society. We conceive a community as engaged in a joint effort to achieve the good life for all. Thus we conceive taxation when used for social reforms as not taken from one class and given to another, but merely a form of applying common resources for common purposes. Opportunities for development, we hold, should be open to all, not merely by the removal of class or religious barriers, but also by educational and economic encouragement. The few who would rise without such aid will still retain their superiority, but the level of all will be raised. We judge a society not by whether a few in agony and suffering rise to the top, but whether the opportunities for regeneration are within the reach of all. Our ideal does not imply an equation between "Quashee Nigger and Socrates and Shakespeare," but, in fact, postulates an appreciation of diversity and differentiation—a diversity based on capacity and aptitude and not on accident or impossible obstacles. We prefer a society in which there are no poor on which the rich may exercise their virtue. If "history is a good aristocrat," it does not prove that any class may

be entrusted with superabundant power. Rich men may use their wealth for charity, but they may also use it to corrupt their own souls, public taste, and public institutions. In short, our goal is "a society of free men and women, each at once ruling and being ruled."

In Lord Hugh Cecil's doctrine we discern how a conservative writer attempts to escape from the pursuit of a state dominated by a property-less majority. This is also evident in his suggested constitutional reforms. He desires a system of checks and balances—a Crown with powers revived to check the democracy, a reformed second chamber to check the House of Commons, and the referendum as a check on the impetuosity of party organizations. His proposals, however, are not free from difficulties. He stresses the evils of party oligarchies, but he does not suggest how to cure the ills themselves. He apparently relies upon a reformed second chamber and the referendum to remedy them. He does not touch upon the question of how to reform the parties from within. He desires that the Crown should participate more actively in the affairs of state and still remain non-partisan in character, although he realizes that this reform will not be attainable in the immediate future. Yet it will be difficult to combine a more vigorous royal activity with an impartiality which will satisfy all political parties. The Crown will be most secure if it confines itself only to ceremonial duties.

He suggests, further, that the reformed second chamber should be constituted, at least in part, on the hereditary principle and should act in a non-partisan spirit. Yet a chamber that is based, even if partially, on heredity will naturally lean to the party that advocates stability. This may be an advantage, but it will be hard to convince the radical party that the chamber is genuinely non-partisan. Lord Hugh Cecil does not enlighten us about the functions of that

second chamber. This problem of functions is important, because it involves the fate of the whole machinery of cabinet responsibility.[13] Will such a chamber have the power to reject money bills? Yet a chamber based in part on heredity would hardly be entrusted with that power. He considers a second chamber purely in the light of a check on the House of Commons, but as a matter of fact its functions as a chamber of revision are as important as its functions as a chamber of rejection. Lord Hugh Cecil suggests that the more important bills which are rejected by the second chamber should be submitted to a referendum for a final decision. But which bills are the more important is a question on which honest opinion may well differ. Who is to have the authority to designate which bills are the more important? Again, the more important bills will include treaties, emergency measures, and complicated financial proposals —legislation rather unsuited for decision by a referendum. He desires the referendum as a check on political parties, yet to bring out the popular vote requires organization.[14] What is to prevent the political parties from playing the same *rôle* in a referendum vote as in a general election? If the people are gullible at a general election, they would be also gullible, although perhaps to a smaller extent, at a referendum campaign. The referendum may also impair cabinet responsibility. Unless we are sure about our alternative, any proposal that weakens concentration of responsibility is a questionable departure. The more important bills will then be decided by a referendum, but how will a dispute between the two chambers relative to the less important bills be decided? He suggests greater use of committees to alleviate the congestion of business in the House of Commons. Yet it will be difficult to reconcile an effective use of committees with cabinet responsibility. The complicated nature of the entire problem indicates

that a constitutional reformer must examine the direct and indirect consequences of his proposals on the system as a whole.

As stern an individualist as Lord Hugh Cecil is W. H. Mallock, but, unlike the former, he does not, in his *Limits of Pure Democracy* (1918), trace his social views to a religious source, but rather to the verifiable facts of Nature as he conceives them. From the evidence of science he deduces the doctrine that "the oligarchic principle permeates every domain of life," and therefore the limits of pure democracy are narrow. Pure democracy, he states, means the participation in the government of the country "of the equal influence of every man in virtue of his manhood alone." Its principle is, "One man one unit of influence." It is thus a form of government based upon the co-operation of the residual faculties which are the common lot of the average mass of men, after deducting the superior minority from the top and the sub-normal minority from the bottom. The general will is the sum of the influence of all average men when reduced to this common denominator, which each average man possesses by virtue of his humanity. It is the totality of the unanimous, identical, and spontaneous wills of the equal human units which form the constituents of the state. But only on the simplest subjects has the average man a will; on composite questions the will of the average man is a practical nullity. On complex questions the people, as a collection of equal units, possesses only a vague something, the energy of the more capable few alone makes possible the emergence of a coherent will. Only when a group of oligarchs moulds this vague popular desire, gives it concrete shape, elicits it by arts of persuasion, is a workable decision reached. Nor is it true to affirm that, while the masses have a definite will as to ends, they cannot formulate the concrete details. Of ends, welfare alone is an end in itself. The wish, not will,

for welfare is general, since each man equally aims at his welfare. However, the translation of the wish of each into a practicable general will and the reconciliation of the wish of each with the wish of others is indeed the all-embracing task of the ruling oligarchy. The reaction of the masses to the leadership of the minority is, nevertheless, not inert and passive, but active and responsive. Still, without the action of the oligarchy, government, except of the most primitive and simplest societies, would be impossible.

In relation to industrial production, the principle of pure democracy finds its expression in the Marxian doctrine that the productive capacity of the average mass of manual labourers is equal, and that the greater efficiency of modern industry is due to improved processes ascribable to the average intelligence of the labourers themselves. This is not true as applied to the complicated technique developed during the past century. The increased efficiency of modern industry is due to the distinct mental labour of an intellectual oligarchy. Owing to the superior direction of this industrial oligarchy, the subordinate mental workers, as well as the labourers themselves, have become more efficient. In the present economic *régime* the share that each individual or class receives is, in the main, an index of what he or it contributes to the total product. Socialists themselves now realize that there is a general accord between the income and the productive efficiency of the individuals and classes of each generation. Hence the attempt is now made, as, for instance, by G. Bernard Shaw, to apply the principle of pure democracy to distribution, demanding absolute equality of income of each individual in virtue of his manhood and irrespective of his contribution. As the failure of socialistic experiments testifies, such proposals erroneously assume that industry can be managed when the stimulus of preferential gain is replaced by a social sentiment.

The basis of oligarchic authority in social life rests not on the will of the people, but on Nature. The people, if it so chooses, can obstruct all forms of rule, but as soon as positive and constructive effort is undertaken, the rule of the political and industrial oligarchy inevitably emerges. If the people desire the material and non-material satisfactions which they could not obtain for themselves, they must obey the rule of the few. The many thus derive a benefit from the rule of a few, and unless they do so, they will have no reason for submitting to oligarchic authority. The justification of the rule of oligarchy is founded on the benefit which the people derive from that rule, but the rule itself is not derivative from the will of the people. Whenever the masses violate the principle of oligarchy, experience quickly re-enforces its truth. Thus "in any great and civilized state *Democracy only knows itself through the co-operation of oligarchy*, or that the many can prosper only through the participation in benefits which, in the way alike of material comfort, opportunity, culture and social freedom, would be possible for no one unless the many submitted themselves to the influence or authority of the super-capable few." [15]

Yet the unabated agitation for pure democracy testifies to the need of reform. Such reform postulates that each worker should receive at least a minimum wage sufficient to defray the necessities of life, contingent, however, on his exercise of due diligence. This wage must include not only the value of the product which the worker could produce when working independently, but also additional supplements to compensate for the worker's lost independence and to insure the stability of the present oligarchic system by offering the wage-earner a stake in its maintenance. All above the minimum wage must depend upon varying excellence. It is also necessary that the worker should be guaranteed the security of which the industrial system

deprived him. This can be done either by unemployment insurance or by statutory provision of the right to work. The wage-earner is also entitled to receive from the employer that regard for his self-respect which is due to him as a moral being, but he must on his part grant to the employer that compliance which his functional position demands. The worker is further entitled to equality of opportunity to rise above the average mass. Consultation with the workers in matters that concern their interest—not in the details of technique—and the submission to them of data showing the relation of their wages to the value of the product are essential. Education, too, in impartial economic statistics will liberate the wage-earners from suspicion and make them capable of comprehending the relation of their available share to the total wealth. With adequate material compensation and scientific data the vague longing for absolute equality, now inflamed by resentment, will lose its appeal. The workers will then feel contented with the existing oligarchic order. The fomenting of discontent by appeals to the impossible expectations of socialism will then be difficult. With a knowledge of actualities, discontent due to a morbid imagination will be weakened, and its attention fixed on the choice of the real income and the non-material satisfactions of life which are in their operation democratic. These proposals are rational since, unlike those of the socialists, they rest both on justice and self-interest.

For a reply to Mallock from the standpoint of a socialist, we refer to two pamphlets by G. Bernard Shaw—*Socialism and Superior Brains*[16] and *The Case for Equality*. For those of us who neither believe in the labour theory of Marx, nor in the doctrine of absolute equality in distribution of Shaw, nor in the theory of the natural equality of man, Mallock raises some problems but disposes of none. That exceptional ability is the possession of a few is, indeed, an admis-

sible proposition. To argue that the ability of these few is in itself the reflection of a social process would involve us, as Mallock mentions, in a barren dispute as to the relation of the Many to the One.[17] For practical purposes we may assign the invention of the telephone, of the turbine engine, of the aeroplane to the special gifts of individuals. There is also only one Shakespeare, one John Locke, one Darwin. Of all those who in the last generation turned their energies to public life Gladstone and Disraeli stood out pre-eminently. Disraeli was not superior to J. S. Mill: only as a parliamentary leader was he superior to him. Mill was superior to Disraeli as a philosopher. To unravel the intricacies of a budget requires the expert mind of a civil servant. Such statements are indisputable commonplaces. The doctrine of the natural equality of man has had a pernicious influence on politics, as, for instance, in the practice of rotation of office and the spoils system. However, when we deny the doctrine of the natural equality of man, we do not commit ourselves to any particular political theory.

It is to be noted that Mallock does not suggest that we replace democracy by another form of government. In fact, to him, whatever system is adopted, oligarchy will inevitably arise. Democracy can exist in name only. He does, however, fail to note the evils of selfish oligarchs. He assumes that these natural oligarchs will be benevolent despots, but, as a matter of fact, they may not be so. A Napoleon, an unscrupulous financial oligarch, a malicious newspaper owner, may be more dangerous to society than a million half-educated malcontents. In the special field of politics the parliamentary constitution is the best check yet invented on the domination of oligarchs. Obviously, as Mallock points out, oligarchs still flourish, but they are nevertheless compelled to bid for popular favour, and other oligarchs compete with them. Of course,

the check operates only imperfectly, and how the democracy can best control the executive, the oligarch in office, is a recurrent problem. The same form of check may also be applicable to the field of industry. Mallock declares that consultation with the workers in matters that are close to them is essential, but not in matters of industrial technique.[18] In politics we do not expect the average voter to unravel a budget, but we do grant him the power to elect representatives. Mallock does not make any distinction between politics and industry. He sees the oligarchic principle in both fields. Yet surely the oligarchy is less checked in industry than in politics. We are not suggesting that the parliamentary system can be transferred to industry. The principle, nevertheless, of the necessity of rigid control of the oligarchy in order to prevent the abuse of power is applicable to industry as well as to politics.

Liberty is a subject which Mallock does not explain. Perhaps, like equality, he considers it a form of sentimentalism. The basis of oligarchical authority is derived, he declares, not from the people, but from Nature, and this rule is justified because it benefits the people.[19] The oligarchs apparently are also to have the power to decide what this benefit should be. His ideal commonwealth would be one in which a group of benevolent oligarchs govern unchecked a well-kept multitude. The Bolshevist rule in Russia he suggests to be the most signal example of the failure of pure democracy.[20] The Bolshevists have established not democracy, but a class dictatorship of fanatics; Mallock desires a class dictatorship of the super-competent. That the passion for liberty is not universal is a grim reality. The vast masses prefer good government to self-government, and through sloth and ignorance allow power to pass out of their hands into those of a party clique. Still, the principle of liberty will outlive a contemporary eclipse, and the

present movement to extend it to new fields testifies to its vitality. In contemporary social theory, we shall notice, suggestions are offered to preserve liberty by federalism.[21] Perhaps Mallock would question the utility of its preservation.

The problem of leadership is a vital problem in a democracy. How best to attain it touches upon the complex question of human motivation. In relation to industry this question is of special importance. Mallock has settled it to his own satisfaction. He finds oligarchs controlling all forms of activity. The oligarch in politics and pure science finds reward for his talent in public esteem and the exercise of his creative faculties, and demands from society an income only to defray the cost of the ordinary comforts of life. The oligarch in industry is a different sort of a *homo sapiens*. He demands as a reward not only esteem, power, and the exercise of his creative faculties, but also a financial return much above that of the scientist and the Cabinet Minister. But is there a special reason why rewards for conspicuous capacity in industry must take the form in a monetary increment, while rewards for special attainments in other fields take the form entirely in non-material satisfactions? Further, if a special monetary reward is necessary to call out the energy of the industrial oligarch, must it be ten times the reward of the oligarch in politics and pure science? Will not three times be sufficient? The fact that a few misguided fanatics have gone off to the wilderness to establish a New Jerusalem, reaping the failure which they deserve, does not throw light on this question. Nor does Mallock's discussion offer a solution. Even if it be necessary to place industry in a different category, it should still be the aim of social philosophy to stress service rather than material gain. The force of opinion, it should be noted, is powerful in determining the course of conduct, especially when it is remembered

that this divorce between industry and other fields of action is in itself due to the public opinion of the past century, which was no doubt stimulated by the prevalent political economy. That political economy, Mallock himself realizes, had a deplorable influence.[22] Yet, to him, the attempt to diffuse a social sentiment is perhaps a delusion and a snare.

Furthermore, a writer who believes in the special *rôle* of oligarchy ought to explore how society may obtain it. Mallock's book may be taken as a defence of the principle of the "Open Career for Talent." He realizes the necessity of the right to rise and the removal of artificial inequalities.[23] He explains what the right to rise means, but he does not explain how it may find concrete expression amidst the vast existing inequalities in opportunities. If the state is to obtain the best available talent for leadership, it must adopt a better method than the mere choosing by each individual of the right parents. The right to rise involves state action in an effort to equalize opportunity so that society may not be deprived of talent which, without the removal of obstacles, would not rise to the top, nor be misled by stupidity which, but for the "accident of an accident," would never rise. The attempt to achieve it effectively predicates a social transformation. Of such an effort Mallock would hardly be an enthusiastic supporter.

Mallock's own suggestions for reform indicate his limited outlook. Present unrest he ascribes as largely due to socialist agitation, thus showing his confined social vision.[24] He does not suggest any improvement in the political constitution, feeling apparently satisfied with its oligarchical operation. He does imply, however, that politicians should be less modest in proclaiming to the multitude their own inherent superiority.[25] Inherited property, he himself declares, cannot be attributed to the ability of the owner, yet he makes no suggestion that the community should,

wholly or partly, appropriate it.[26] Mallock is deeply anxious that reward should approximate to merit, yet when he is faced with a gross example of an unearned reward he has no proposal to offer. In fact, the only tangible suggestion he makes is that the wage-earner should be given a material bribe, which in itself, he thinks, will be sufficient to transform him into a cheerful supporter of the existing order. He does realize the significance of the psychological factor in industry and the necessity of reconciling the "good will" of the wage-earner, if the present system is to be maintained.[27] Most of his discussion on this question he devotes to means of making the mind of the wage-earner impervious to socialism. He does not treat the question of whether the workers are entitled to feel the joy of creation in their work. He would perhaps consider such a subject as another essay into sentimentalism. The few alone are susceptible to the joy of creation. He suggests that the workers should be furnished with impartial statistics, so that they may possess the means of understanding that they are fairly paid.[28] Yet, if the wage-earners are to have confidence in the statistics submitted to them, the oligarchic principle will have to be seriously modified. Trade unions are apparently not to play any part, since their interference would hinder the oligarchic principle. Will the minimum wage be settled by parliamentary enactment or by the munificent judgment of the oligarchs? For the completion of the lives of the individual workers Mallock relies upon non-material satisfaction in arts and science, which the workers can obtain themselves;[29] but if the average mass is to appreciate such enjoyment, a vast extension of free education is essential. In brief, to Mallock, as long as the masses are well-fed, thanks to the special efficiency of the select few, the super-competent can then disport themselves undisturbed.

## INDIVIDUALISTS: CECIL AND MALLOCK

Both Mallock and Lord Hugh Cecil advocate as rigorous an individualism as some of the radical writers that we shall review in some of the ensuing chapters.[30] As individualists they are all hostile to interference with the life and conduct of the individual, and recognize in individual growth the sole criterion of the worth of institutions. However, the radical individualists consider the existing state and property as stumbling blocks to individual liberty, and hence favour socialism and a decentralised state as the necessary conditions of freedom. No individual, they hold, is outside the pale of salvation, and, in order to offer to all opportunities to grow, they suggest a vital reconstruction, with property as the centre of such a transformation. The conservative individualists, on the other hand, aim at safeguarding the superior individuals or class against the inferior and propertyless mass. Their individualism is the expression of their solicitation that the chosen few shall be spared from interference by the unregenerate many. They desire to perpetuate existing inequalities, since inequality is the order of Nature; development is possible only for a select class or eminent few. They regard the present individualistic *régime* as the consummation of the processes of ages, and hence recognize in socialism a subversive doctrine.[31] The issue between the two groups of writers is as old as political speculation. It was the underlying issue between Burke and Paine, Hegel and Marx. Whether the ideas of the one or of the other predominate is of great moment to the future of civilization.

# CHAPTER V

## THE COLLECTIVISTS: THE WEBBS AND MacDONALD

A DISTINCTIVE feature of the nineteenth century is the rise of the masses to political and economic consciousness. It is no exaggeration to affirm that before then the vast majority of human beings that peopled the earth were used as means rather than ends. If history took note of them at all, it was only to pass judgment upon an occasional outburst of their pent-up rage. The Oriental Empires which first demonstrated the possibility of political organization on a large scale reveal an oligarchy of priests and kings at the top, with an undifferentiated, amorphous mass underneath; and in the so-called Athenian democracy power was confined to not more than one-fourth of the population. Nor was the situation improved during the chequered history of Rome. The march of armies, the revolutions and counter-revolutions that constitute the troubled history of Western Europe, meant to the masses no more than a change of masters. Even in the England of the eighteenth century not more than fifty thousand out of the total population had an articulate voice in the management of the common business. The last century alone shows the awakening of this *enfant terrible*.

The religion of this new force in politics is socialism, and, if we follow out the analogy, Karl Marx is its high-priest, and *Das Kapital* its first and last Testament. Like most religions, socialism is a fanaticism to its devotees and anathema to its enemies. Any dispassionate witness who has observed socialist gatherings, whether in London or in some middle-

western hamlet in the United States of America, cannot fail to note the fervour and consecration, the emotion and passion, which this belief appears to be capable of arousing. This doctrine of the collective ownership of land and industrial capital has apparently restored to the disinherited, or at least to its more aggressive section, that faith and hope the inculcation of which was supposed to be the special function of the supernatural religions.

The dawn of modern socialism in England coincided with the advent of the Industrial Revolution.[1] Hall and Gray, Thompson and Hodgkin, a generation before Marx, anticipated the main thesis of economic socialism. The Ricardian foundations provided an obvious basis from which to assail the new industrialism. For, as related to the facts of working-class life, it was not capitalism—as enunciated in the accepted texts—but socialism alone which promised to some to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Owen, indeed—the founder of the socialist movement in England, though not the originator of its doctrine—was less concerned with economic premises than with alleviation of suffering. His mind was pre-Darwinian, and it was on the basis of a belief in the simple nature of social problems that he sought to found communist oases in the vast desert of capitalism. Yet his was also a practical mind, for no one did more than he for the co-operative movement and factory legislation. In the middle of the century the Christian Socialists, under Maurice and Kingsley, recognized in socialism an affinity with the precepts of the Master. Karl Marx spent his most active life and wrote *Das Kapital* in England. It was English blue-books which furnished him with deadly ammunition for his onslaught. Yet his direct personal influence on English socialism was not noticeable to any appreciable extent until the turn of the century. *Das Kapital* is one of those rare books which appear

to become more potent with every fresh attack made upon them. Its thesis is that the new order will inevitably succeed the death agonies of a class-riven society. The writings of Marx influenced Morris and Hyndman. Morris was an artist who believed that competition perverts man's creative faculties. Hyndman was more mundane. He took it upon himself to popularize the Marxian faith and give it effectiveness through organization. Thus while capitalism never lacked philosophic defenders, its less numerous enemies were not less vociferous.

However, for socialism in England as a well-developed body of doctrine exercising influence on the course of events and not as a theory of isolated writers, we must go to the group of men and women who organized the Fabian Society in 1884 and five years later issued the famous *Fabian Essays*. The Fabians are British citizens who have been well trained in the machinery of democratic politics and to whose mentality the idea of catastrophism is foreign. Their appeal is not directed to any particular class, but to all those who strive for the gradual amelioration of existing evils. Fabianism is best understood not as an offshoot of Karl Marx, but as a continuation of the traditions of a more mature John Stuart Mill and the implications of the idealism of T. H. Green. Indeed, it recognizes in socialism merely an extension of organized common action and democratization of institutions characteristic of the last two quarters of the nineteenth century. It is socialism in this form that appeals to so many eminent contemporary British men and women. Since its organization the Fabian Society has served as an intelligence division of the serried forces of social democracy. It publishes books, investigates special problems, and places its special knowledge at the service of those who apply reforms. We may gain an understanding of the doctrine of the Fabian Society when

we analyze the views of some of its more eminent members.

Our survey of present collectivist thought in England begins with a dramatist and ends with an active politician. G. Bernard Shaw has arrived at socialism *via* an æsthetic reaction to existing unpleasantness, while Ramsay MacDonald,[2] the philosophic leader of the Labour Party, has reached the same destination through the broader path of biology. Both reveal the close alliance in England between culture and social service. The other writers that we shall consider are Sidney and Beatrice Webb, perhaps the Benthams of Fabian socialism.[3]

No survey of contemporary English thought, no matter how summary, can be complete without some attention to the social views of Shaw, not only because he is perhaps the most brilliant contemporary thinker in England, but also because almost since the inception of the movement he has been a most indefatigable protagonist of Fabian socialism.[4] Shaw's own life has given the best confirmation of what is perhaps his most salient doctrine—the necessity of the absorption of the individual in the Life Force of his time—and to him this Life Force as applied to social activity is socialism. A mass of pamphlets testify to his tireless zeal.[5]

The most sustained writings of Shaw on socialistic theory are still his two chapters in the *Fabian Essays*.[6] An exposition of his views as presented there, even if brief, will give an understanding of the early basis of Fabianism. As a socialist Shaw is struck with the obvious fact of the existence of poverty among the masses. Writing in England, where the monopoly of the land in a few hands has always been an acute problem, which at that time, owing to the writings of Henry George, was especially brought to the public eye, Shaw notices that few landowners derive huge fortunes without effort on their part. Poverty of the masses and land monopoly are different aspects of the

system of capitalism.[7] Under capitalism it is individuals, and not society, that derive the advantages from the caprices of nature. The possessors of the more fertile land or land in a superior location derive huge incomes solely by virtue of possession and not by virtue of service. What is true of the ownership of land is true also of the whole field of property. Those who do no useful work receive fortunes, while those who do the actual work of society eke out a miserable and precarious existence by being dependent upon the idlers. "The modern form of private property is simply a legal claim to take a share of the produce of the national industry year by year without working for it."[8] Socialism is concerned, then, among other things, with a more just distribution of incomes. This implies public appropriation of all unearned incomes, part of which can be distributed in wages to the actual workers and part in general public functions. But this proposal does not involve a violent social change. A catastrophic transformation, even if desirable, would fail to achieve its purpose. It merely supposes an extension of the principles involved in the Income Tax (1842) and Factory Laws, correlated with a gradual extension of collective enterprise.

However, if "the State may be trusted with the rent of the country, and finally with the land, the capital, and the organization of the national industry,"[9] it is necessary to perfect its machinery. Its inefficiency is not an inseparable element of its organization. It will be necessary, of course, to democratize the source of its power. Its machinery can be made more adaptable to its greater tasks. The municipalities, too, can become vital centres of governmental activities; their new tasks will require efficient local civil servants. The House of Commons may indeed confine itself only to central problems, leaving local questions to the municipalities. It may, in fact, become merely the organ of federated municipalities. The unit of the

state must be the individual, and not the head of the family. With the removal of class conflicts public opinion will really represent the expression of a homogeneous body, and not the confused voices of competing class selfishness that it represents at present.

If this imperfect presentation of the views of Shaw represents an early phase of Fabian collectivism, the more recent works of Sidney and Beatrice Webb will serve to define the present attitude of moderate collectivists in England. In his *Towards Social Democracy?* (1916), Sidney Webb reviews those tendencies during the past seventy-five years which substituted for individual enterprise the organized collective action of the state or of private organizations of producers or consumers; socialism he views as merely a continuation of these same tendencies.[10] In summarizing recent movements, he says: "Thus, in all directions and throughout the whole civilized world, we may distinguish, as the dominant characteristic of the social movements of the past three-quarters of a century, an ever-growing elaboration of organized common action."[11] To Webb, this practice is the logical corollary of extending to industry that principle of self-government which is the essence of democracy. Just as the constitutional development of the government of England implied a gradual check on the power of the one or the few for the sake of the nation, so does constitutionalism applied to the shop and factory involve a limitation of the will of the individual owner for the sake of "democracies of hired men." Tyranny, whether exercised by king or employer, is the negation of democracy.[12] The concentration of economic power in the hands of a few necessitates a new interpretation of freedom. Socialism is thus the culmination of the principle of self-government in social and economic relations. "For it is just the conscious and deliberate substitution, in

industrial as well as in political matters, of the collective self-government of the community as a whole, organized on a democratic basis for the individual control over other men's lives which the unrestrained private ownership of land and industrial capital inevitably involves, that constitutes the central idea of socialism." [13] It is thus a reaffirmation of the principles of eighteenth-century philosophers of democracy to new relations with which they were entirely unfamiliar. More specifically, socialism in England aims at the "Fourfold Path": the gradual extension of collective ownership and management, whether national or local, of land and industrial capital; the expansion of collective supervision over the land and industrial capital still left in private hands, in order that each individual involved in those industries shall be guaranteed a "national minimum" of subsistence and comfort; the gradual removal of existing gross inequalities by heavy taxation of rent and interest; the provision of the "national minimum" for all classes—such as the children, the aged, the infirm, and the unemployed—that cannot obtain it for themselves.

Socialism, further, predicates a belief in the unity of society. This implies the substitution for the family group of the individual as the human unit in the state. It empowers the state to check and supplement the will and condition of the parents when they conflict with the development of the child as an intelligent member of the state. It means also the social and political emancipation of women. The denial of the doctrine of *patria potestas* is in harmony with the recognition of the state as an inseparable partnership of individual men, women, and children. The state as a corporate unit must secure for the individual such a desirable standard of life as is compatible with the aims of civilization. The policy of "let things alone" has proved harmful to corporate interests.

But the individual, too, has a definite function to fulfil and duties to administer.

Nor does collective enterprise involve any limitation of individual energy. Indeed, the sure test of all collective action is whether it increases individual initiative. "If by Personal Liberty we mean the practical opportunity that we have of exercising our faculties and fulfilling our desires—and nothing else is worth the name of Freedom—the seventy-five years between 1840 and 1914 witnessed an aggregate increase in popular liberty probably unparalleled in any previous century." [14] The establishment, for instance, of compulsory elementary education does not abolish the superior advantage which the industrious have over the lazy; it means merely that the energetic have now a greater opportunity to exercise their superior initiative. That governmental action is not inimical to voluntary activities is well shown by the fact that an expansion of governmental action in a particular sphere was invariably accompanied by the increase of activities in the same sphere by voluntary co-operation. Greater social undertakings coincide with an increase in individual responsibility. Nor does the state universally rely upon criminal law to enforce such responsibility. The state in many cases merely guides and assists the individual to make the proper choice. Thus the establishment of public hospitals and employment agencies does not limit freedom of choice to individuals, but it merely assists the individuals to be healthy and employed. It then becomes more disagreeable to be unhealthy and unemployed, and the responsibility of the individual to be healthy and employed is enlarged. Thus law is actually the mainstay of "the higher freedom of collective life."

In *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (1920), Sidney and Beatrice Webb offer a detailed plan for the government of Great Britain under socialism. It is thus not a sketch for a state in

the abstract, but for a definite particular state. Nor is it a plan for a Utopia in the sense of being an ideal creation, but rather a workable scheme, shaped in accordance with the trend of development. We shall review their treatise in some detail because, we suggest, it is the richness of details, especially as applied to the management of socialized industry, rather than the central thesis of the book, that testifies to the sagacity of the authors. Further, it is specific and troublesome detail, and not pleasant generalizations, that are pregnant with latent possibilities. The book is a fine restatement of the theory of Fabian administration, and it undoubtedly shows the influence of recent criticism.[15]

As many others do, the Webbs begin their analysis of political democracy with a discussion of its imperfections. These they attribute, among other reasons, to our fallacious theory of representation, and hence to the faulty structure of our political institutions.[16] Our political state does not make direct use of existing democracies of producers and consumers. Our political democracy is based on the assumption that it is sufficient to represent the elector as a human being; but such representation is meaningless and ineffective. A human being is a bundle of relationships. In order to have true representation we must take cognizance of the fact that the elector has no will as a man, but he has a will in connection with a definite relation. The architect of a political edifice must give consideration to four aspects of man: man as a producer, man as a consumer, man as a citizen with a political interest in defence, police, and justice; and man with a social interest in maintaining and perpetuating a particular type of cultural and economic civilization. A constitution, then, must provide for a man's representation not simply as a human being, but as a human being under four separate aspects.

Such a principle will involve an overhauling of the

structure of the state. The structure of the present state, largely in consequence of our false theory of representation, is a veritable caricature of its functions. Its present anomalies testify to its limited origin, and not to contemporary needs. It originated as police power, and its democratization was in response to a special class seeking checks upon the king and his advisers. At the present time we find that not only have the original political functions of justice, police, and defence been enlarged, but a multiplicity of new social duties has been added. The state has now become virtually the national housekeeper overwhelmed with a hypertrophy of new activities. Not only has the volume been enlarged, but the diversity of its manifold activities has increased. The state is now undertaking not only a greater volume of activities, but a host of new and varied enterprises which were formerly done by individuals or left undone. Yet we have failed to make the structure of the state conform with its changed function. Nor has our attitude to the state been altered. We still regard it as a policeman when, as a matter of fact, it is actually a vast administrator of national industries and services. Traditions and discipline which may be applicable to the functions of the state as the maintainer of justice and police are entirely incompatible with its administrative functions. What is necessary is to divorce the political functions of the state as the maintainer of police, justice, and defence from its social functions as the guardian of a particular type of civilization.)

For this purpose it is essential not only to grant wide powers to municipalities and voluntary groups, but also to have two equal and co-ordinate Parliaments, one Political Parliament and one Social Parliament. The members of both Parliaments may be equal in number, are to be fully paid, expected to give their full time to their work, and elected from geo-

graphical constituencies. The two Parliaments may differ in procedure, in terms of office of their members, and in day of election, in order that the issues may be kept still further distinct. The executive officers of the Political Parliament, jointly responsible to it and with the power to dissolve it, may consist of a Prime Minister and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Justice, Defence, and Dominions. The executive officers of the Social Parliament are to consist not of a Cabinet of ministers jointly held responsible, but of committees of its own members without collective responsibility. It may thus have committees of finance, of health, of education, of transport and communication, of mining, of economic and social research, of general purposes, and of any other national industry taken over from private owners. The members of the Social Parliament are to be elected for a fixed term of office, and not subject to dissolution except by a majority vote of its own members. The powers of each Parliament are to be defined by statute; authority of final interpretation of the statute is to be placed in the law courts, which may also declare any act of the Parliaments not authorized by the fundamental statute to be unconstitutional, although a joint session of the two Parliaments may overrule the decision of the court. Decisions of one Parliament which may affect the other—as, for instance, a commercial treaty with a foreign state ratified by the Political Parliament—will have to be settled by joint committees and conferences. The national budget will be prepared by the Social Parliament, to which the Political Parliament will submit the list of its own expenditures. The Social Parliament may offer objections to the total of expenditures, but not to its details; differences in finance between the two Parliaments which cannot be adjusted by conferences will be disposed of by an aggregate vote of the two Parliaments. In case of any deadlock in the joint session, an appeal may be made to the

electorate by referendum or by double dissolution of the two Parliaments. To facilitate agreement, the committee on finance may be a standing joint committee. Any change in the fundamental statute would also require a vote of the two Parliaments in joint session. Each Parliament is to have a single chamber, but each may elect a committee of experts to revise its acts and to correct errors and inconsistencies.

In the management of the national industries attention should also be paid to the varied aspects of man, man as consumer, man as producer, and man as citizen. In each industry questions of general policy will be in the hands of an appropriate committee of the Social Parliament, but decisions relating to current administration will lie with the industry itself. For the control of industries there will thus be no need for ministerial responsibility. In each industry there will be a special department which will have no relation to the current administration of the industry, but which will be required to communicate with the corresponding committee of the Social Parliament, to inform it whether its policy is actually carried out, and to institute and apply scientific methods, comparative statistics, and exact auditing. The current administration of each industry will be in charge of a tripartite National Board composed of the representatives of the management, of the consumers, and of the manual and clerical vocations. Each industry will also be divided into districts, each in charge of tripartite District Boards, which will be held responsible for the execution of the policy of the National Board in its own district, but to which the National Board may grant a certain degree of autonomy. Each establishment will also have Works Committees composed perhaps exclusively of the representatives of the employees, and these committees will be empowered to discuss grievances and make suggestions, but not to change standard regulations without the

consent of the District Board and National Board. Appointment will be made by special Boards which will work in conjunction with the schools and, when the case requires it, with professional associations. In appointing and promoting superior officials, the employees will be consulted. Boards in charge of discipline will also contain representatives of the employees involved. For collective bargaining there will be Joint Boards composed of the representatives of the management and of the particular vocation involved. With the establishment in each department of a system of measurement and publicity—the popularization of the data of science—disputes will not be difficult to adjust. There may also be voluntary committees, either of consumers or of technicians, for the purposes of criticism and suggestion. The National Board must submit its annual budget to the committee of the Social Parliament, which will then exercise its control of general policy by the "power of the purse. There must be the utmost publicity and research in every angle of management of the industry.

Under the scheme outlined individual liberty will be safeguarded. The Social Parliament cannot make any alteration in the criminal law without the approval of the Political Parliament. The dangerous principle of the supremacy of the existing Parliament, which in practice means the omnipotence of the Cabinet, will be replaced by two co-equal Parliaments, with their powers definitely prescribed by a fundamental statute. Again, since the social and political functions of the state are separated, a dispute between the employees and the management of a particular department will not be interpreted as now in the nature of a political rebellion, but in the true light of an industrial disagreement. More than all that, a socialist state will rely upon the authority of measurement and publicity. Science will replace whim, or fancy, or *amour propre*. The organization of knowledge, and the establishment

of corps of experts to test, weigh, and measure all the ramified activities of the state will in time substitute for the authority of men the acid test of evidence. "The deliberate intensification of this *searchlight of published knowledge* we regard as the corner-stone of successful Democracy."[17] While the scheme suggested here is apparently complicated, it is really more simple than the bewildering confusion of capitalism. It should also be remembered that an involved structure is the price we pay for liberty.

In the reorganization of local government we must make a clean sweep of the prevailing medley of areas, functions, and authorities. A socialist state will aim at reviving the local spirit which capitalism has destroyed. Local differentiation will offer a counteraction to monotonous uniformity. The functions of local authorities can be extended to include as much as one-half of all the industries and services. A Local Councillor should be elected from each ward; he should be amply paid and should be expected to give his full time to the work. Different local services may require different areas for their most efficient administration. The area of one service may be one ward, while that of another two or more. The Councillors of the wards affected in a particular service will constitute the governing council for that service; they will thus determine local rates, fix price of service, adopt annual estimates, and execute the functions which the Social Parliament may delegate. Each Councillor will be required to hold occasional meetings with his electors in order to hear complaints and suggestions. In each ward a number of additional representatives may be elected to sit with the Councillor in the Ward Council only. Questions of policy should be in the hands of Councillors, but the current administration will be in the hands of a board composed of the Councillors and of representatives of vocational groups. There will also be, as in case of

the national industries, Joint, Appointment, and Discipline Boards. A federation of local authorities will discuss common problems and institute committees for municipal research. The system of Grants in Aid may be continued, but there will be no need for a Local Government Board; a commission in charge of local boundaries can be established. The Social Parliament, through its proper committees, will see that the prescribed "national minimum" is maintained by local authorities; it may also make suggestions through its bureaus of research. But local authorities may impose taxes or confiscate private property only as prescribed by the Social Parliament, nor may they create a crime without the sanction of the Political Parliament. The Minister of Justice will supervise the enforcement of criminal law and the protection of life and property.

In the socialist state there will be ample opportunities for individual and group initiative. Socialization merely predicates that industries and services shall be operated for the purpose of use and not for private profit. Whether a particular industry or service shall be managed by the central organization of the state, or by the municipality, or by consumers' associations, or, when desirable, by the producers themselves, will depend upon relative circumstances. The state will indeed encourage the creation of voluntary consumers' associations. But such associations must return economic rent to the nation, allow representatives of vocational organizations to participate in their management, and be subjected to the policy of "national minimum" and measurement and publicity. Unless there is a special reason to the contrary, any other voluntary association organized for the purpose of stimulating personality will be encouraged to develop. Vocational associations like trade unions and professional associations will thus play an integral part in the state. These vocational associations will

elect their representatives on the various boards, will develop "subject associations," and vocational ethics. However, the determination of the qualifications to pursue a particular vocation and the right of a new vocation to develop out of an old one cannot be left exclusively to members of the vocation. The right to strike will be granted, but there will be less occasion for disputes than now. There is no need for a vocational parliament, because the national interest can be best represented by citizens in the capacity of citizens and not as members of vocations. There will be objection to "living by owning," but not against a single craftsman or professional man or group plying a trade independently or risking a new venture. Payment for services will be adjusted on the basis of substantial equality, but functional expenses and privileges will be allowed and some disagreeable vocations will be made more attractive by special inducements. The state will not aim at establishing a dead level of economic equality, and private property in homes, furniture, books, interest upon savings, and limited testamentary dispositions will be allowed. The bulk of the capital for the maintenance and extension of industry will be derived from provisions from year to year rather than from borrowing. "What we visualize is a community so variously organized, and so highly differentiated in function as to be not only invigorated by a sense of personal freedom, but also constantly swept by the fresh air of experiment, observation and verification. We want to get rid of the 'stuffiness' of private interests which now infects our institutions; and to usher in a reign of 'Measurement and Publicity.'" [18]

While Sidney and Beatrice Webb are continuing the traditions of John Stuart Mill, Ramsay MacDonald is a disciple neither of Mill nor of Marx, but of the biological theories of Darwin and Spencer. He reaches socialism by taking a comprehensive view of

society, and this view is definitely biological. Society is an organism and its evolution is governed by the laws of life and not of mechanics. Socialism is in the line of its evolution; it is indeed the expression of its organic unity. Society being an organism, the obvious deduction is that the modification of its structure and function which socialism will involve cannot be accomplished by methods which are "short and sharp," but rather by those which are slow and sure. The only feasible course is that "which creates the new society in the bosom of the old as the butterfly grows in the chrysalis." Thus in MacDonald we have another exponent of evolutionary collectivism. In his *Socialism and Society* (1905) he views society as a biological whole, and in his *Socialism and Government* (1909) he applies his view point to the state, while a later book (*Socialism: Critical and Constructive*, 1921) presents his more germane specific suggestions.

"I accept," he states, "the organic type of organization as that to which Society corresponds in its essential characteristics and also as that which is most fruitful as a guide for political experiments." [19] Like a living organism, the social organism has a definite form. Just as in a living organism the different parts form a unit owing to a certain relationship between them, so are the different parts in society held together by the relationship of laws, customs, and traditions. Again, just as a living organism preserves its identity after the individual cells have been replaced, so does society through its laws and traditions retain its distinct self through numerous generations of individuals. Traditions and customs testify to the self-consciousness of society. The political organ is the nervous centre of society; it directs and co-ordinates its activities. Ideas are its nutrition, and with their assimilation there follows a change in its functions and structure. Society is an organized

system of relations in which each unit has a definite function to fulfil. Like all forms of life, society develops by a constant process of differentiation and integration of functions, necessitating a more complex structure. As the cells in a living organism, so do the individuals in the social organism derive their life from the more complete life of the whole.)

("Socialism marks the growth of Society, not the uprising of a class. The consciousness which it seeks to quicken is not one of economic class solidarity, but one of social unity and growth towards organic wholeness." [20] Under capitalism the essential oneness of society is marred by the race for private favours. At present the parts are badly adjusted and the functions are imperfectly carried out because the good of each part and not the good of the whole is taken as guide. "Land, capital and labour; the producer and consumer; the worker and the instruments of work—are all opposing functions in Society." [21] But capitalism is merely an interregnum between feudalism and socialism. Already in the accumulated mass of collective action do we see a recognition of the unity of society. We recognize now a greater co-ordination of the various parts to serve the interests of the whole. Socialism aims at the completion of this process by a vast organization of mutual aid. But our journey to the socialist state of the future must be gradual. Those who propose cataclysmic changes regard society not as an organism, but as a block of wood to be fashioned at will. They are as unscientific as those who believe that any form of life was specially created.)

Socialism implies the political state. "It [the state] is the organized political personality of a sovereign people—the organization of a community for making its common will effective by political methods." [22] It is not society, because society includes all human relationship. Nor is it merely an aggregation of indi-

viduals, but an integral whole. It operates through individuals, individuals being regarded not as distinct atoms, but as links between its past and its future. It derives its authority from the general will and not from the inchoate wills of separate individuals. Its constituent parts are individuals considered in their capacity of citizens, and not as members of a particular vocational group. All final authority must remain with the state, since it alone represents the interests of the whole community. It cannot grant to private organizations an opportunity to endanger the interests of the community. With it alone must rest the final power to adjust functions and groups. Its task is to establish such conditions as will grant to the individuals the greatest self-development. There is no conflict between state action and individual liberty. Under capitalism liberty is empty, because power over the conditions of its effective operation is centred in the hands of a few. The state cannot confine itself to the mere removal of hindrances, but must guide the individual to realize himself. But if the individual has rights, he also has duties and functions. Indeed, the problem of the position of the individual in a complex social life can best be considered not from the standpoint of any doctrine which regards conflict between individual liberty and organized common action as necessary, but from the standpoint of how to obtain the greatest personal initiative consonant with the greatest co-operative efficiency.

But reconstruction is necessary in order that the state may properly achieve its more amplified task. While proportional representation, initiative, and referendum, if practised to a limited degree, may be advantageous in preventing tyranny disguised in the forms of democracy, yet they will be of little avail without the active intelligence of the electorate. Hence the enlightenment of the electorate should be a paramount duty. While functional representation

is in itself an insufficient basis on which to build the structure of a state, yet the participation of the workers in the management of industry is both feasible and desirable. Self-government in industry and the avoidance of the dead hand of bureaucracy must be our guiding principles in the socialization of industry. We may observe both principles if in each industry we take as the unit of organization the self-governing workshop under the control of the workers and the management, joined into districts and co-ordinated with the administration of the entire industry under a National Council composed of the representatives of producers, scientists, and consumers. The supply of certain services may be left to voluntary consumers' associations. The community as a whole, through the state, must always retain the ultimate authority in industry.

The state must adopt a radical policy of territorial devolution reaching from the largest to the smallest civic unit. Each civic unit can become a school for the training of civic pride and of a healthy participation in the affairs of the larger divisions. Each civic unit should be encouraged to develop local variety and to experiment in new methods. Local governing bodies can be relieved from much of centralized control from Whitehall. Housing, land (within their own areas), recreation, courts for limited purposes may profitably be left with local authorities, who may also be given a wide discretion in education. With regard to the counties, their special traditions and historic divisions should be maintained, and wide powers given in regulating their educational, social, and judicial functions. Devolution must also be applied to national units, such as Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Here an awakened national consciousness and intelligent citizenship may go hand in hand. Ultimate authority must, however, remain with the Imperial Parliament. The federation of self-

governing states within the Empire may find in a representative body, distinct from Parliament, a consultative organ. The electoral constituencies of the Imperial Parliament should be so arranged as to coincide as far as possible with the self-governing civic area. A Second Chamber composed of men experienced in government, whose function will be not to share in legislation, but to revise it and advise the House of Commons, may be of value. Or, a Second Chamber may be organized as an economic Council of State, whose duty will be to co-ordinate the industrial activity of the state and act as a link between the political state and the industrial state. Perhaps the function of revision and that of economic co-ordination may be combined in the constitution of the Second Chamber. The House of Commons should, however, retain final authority. Thus, by democracy in the workshop, by self-government in the local civic units, by industrial co-ordination in the Second Chamber, and the retention of ultimate power in the community, we may succeed in obtaining that relation between the head and parts which will be neither deadening to initiative nor destructive of organized common action.

Our review of collectivist thought reveals a rich field for reflection. We have noted that the socialist conception of society is "organic." This is clearly shown in MacDonald, but all socialist theory is grounded upon a comprehensive view of society in which each individual is to find his appropriate place in a general scheme of assigned duties and regulated services. Collectivist literature abounds with terms like "social organism" or "social mind." We have already mentioned why the use of such terms, unless applied with caution, will not aid clarity of thought.[23] It should, however, be pointed out that socialism is a logical corollary of the theories which such expressions imply. Plato's communism was a logical conclusion derived

from his idealist premises.[24] Karl Marx could justly claim in Hegel his philosophic foundation. The biological theories of Spencer exercised influence on English socialism. Both Mrs. Webb and MacDonald found in them a point of departure for their socialism. Both, indeed, were more consistent than Spencer himself as the advocate of an exaggerated individualism, or than the idealist defenders of the philosophy of the Charity Organization Society.[25] Once we assume society to be a collective whole, socialism can reasonably be deduced as the application of that principle to economic life.

As a consequence of that conception, the strongest objection to socialism has always been from the standpoint of liberty. Would not a centralized authority offer a standing threat to freedom? As applied, however, to the moderate socialism we have considered, such an allegation has largely lost its force. As we have seen, the only right of the individual which our writers would limit is the liberty to own property above a certain amount, and such limitation is defended on the same principle that the rules of the road check the liberty of vehicle drivers.[26] Every other substantial form of liberty which the individual now enjoys would be preserved, and, the socialist claims, extended in a collectivist state. Recent facts and criticism have made our writers appreciate more the "stuffiness" of a centralized bureaucracy, the danger that it offers to individual liberty, and the desirability of limited vocational self-government. Hence, their plan of socialization of industries and services includes proposals for territorial devolution, economic federalism, representation of producers and consumers in administration, and the application of the data of science. The contention between a moderate individualist and a moderate collectivist must rightly be not the spurious issue of liberty or private property *versus* socialism, but whether parti-

cular extensions of socialization on the lines indicated are consistent with capacity for wholesome initiative which is the best test of freedom. The issue is then projected on to a quantitative plane and becomes arguable. Any other form of discussion is as futile as prescribing pills for earthquakes.

We must further absolve our writers from the usual socialist fallacy of being specific in the criticism of capitalism while vague and indefinite in constructive suggestions. Our writers combine a comprehensive view with a massive richness of detail. The proposal for a socialist constitution by the Webbs is a veritable storehouse of concrete suggestions. Their fruitful plan for socialization of industries and services is backed by minuteness of detail. It is, indeed, this fact, particularly as regards the control of industry, that proves the sagacity of the authors. MacDonald, too, moves with the same ease from general principles to specific applications. If our political institutions are to keep pace with the vastness of their functions, we shall ultimately have to accept our selections from the varied proposals which our writers offer. It is, we may suggest, in proposals for definite political structures and not in futile elaboration of the obvious that advance in socialization is at all conceivable.

No discussion of socialism can be complete without some reference to human motivation. It is, indeed, a point most frequently made when the subject is approached. It is a common charge that the operation of a socialist society involves a state of altriusm above what is actually experienced in ordinary social relations. As applied to our authors, this charge needs substantial modifications. Their experimental method prevents them from relying upon unwarranted assumptions. Our writers do not expect any psychological revolutions. They do not depend upon impossible altruism.[27] They rely merely upon an extension of the professional spirit from scientist and teacher to

the managers of industry. "The work of making boots," suggests R. H. Tawney, "or building a house is in itself no more degrading than that of curing the sick or teaching the ignorant. . . . It should be at least equally free from the vulgar subordination of moral standards to financial interests."[28] They point, too, to the increasing number of salaried administrators of the trade unions, the co-operative societies, the municipalities, and of the Whitehall offices from whom the spirit of service is expected, and, for the most part, obtained. They further suggest that the theory that the production and sale of commodities are not subject to communal interest was a doctrine unknown in the Middle Ages. The mediæval conception, for instance, of a "just price" predicated that industry was imbued with a sense of service. The prevailing contrary belief is only a comparatively recent "morbid obsession." It is an assumption heralded by the advent of the new industrialism and popularized by certain misconceptions of the accepted economics and ethics. Socialists generally regard human nature as malleable, and therefore also claim that a society in which mutual aid will be generally assumed will be more likely to stimulate personal sacrifice even in that field of activity which present society has all but placed outside the pale of obligation. On questions of human nature it is dangerous to dogmatize. Who can confidently uphold an antithesis?

Yet fully to achieve this goal as regards the masses it is incumbent, we submit, to institute an appropriate scheme of political education. This subject, however, our authors barely touch upon. It is commonplace to note that more important than the reformation of political institutions is an improvement in the intelligence of the mass of the electors. It is less commonplace to develop a definite plan of civic education. Yet if democracy continues to be merely, as Shaw mentioned, a substitution for the corrupt few of the

incompetent many, the situation is discouraging. If Bobus insists upon electing Bobissimus, political reforms will little avail. Collectivism, especially, depends upon an active civic enlightenment. Yet it is a realization of the absence of such awakening derived from direct experience that makes Professor Wallas suspicious of collectivism.[29] Without such consciousness any construction of a political edifice must inevitably be as futile an effort as painting lilies. MacDonald bears witness that socialists are beginning to appreciate this fact.[30] There should be, however, a book on education in the socialist state parallel with the constitution of the Webbs.[31] If such a book is to be helpful, it must be ruthlessly concrete.

A problem closely related is that of research in social phenomena. The realization of the need of expert study of social data is an encouraging aspect of contemporary social thought. We have noticed how Professor Wallas argues for the application of quantitative analysis to the machinery of politics.[32] The Webbs apply it to the whole field of socialist administration. In their state, we may recall, the Social Parliament will have a special committee on research, each industry will have a bureau of experts to inspect and report, each vocational organization will develop "subject associations" to further experimentation, and the federation of municipalities will have a special body of scientific examiners. In fact, our authors assume that the ultimate authority in their state will rest not with this or that person or group, but with the verifiable data of social science. The current emphasis on tests and measurements is, perhaps, on the one hand, a reaction from the facile generalizations of political idealism and, on the other hand, the result of a realization of the complicated maze of functions of the modern state. Moreover, it is realistic politics with its suspicion that the union of political theory with metaphysics tends to confuse and obscure

politics. We believe that the study of social cause and effect is the best safeguard against the conservatism of a bureaucracy, the inefficiency of well-meaning busybodies, and the *amour propre* of wilful officials. This certainly does not postulate a dictatorship of the illuminati as Wells proposed in his *A Modern Utopia*.[33] It merely aims at flooding the path of democracy with light. How best to stamp out tuberculosis? What wage is necessary for the minimum of civilized existence? How can any particular public service be made more efficient? Such problems are obviously best answered by statisticians and technicians. What is true in these cases is true also, although perhaps less obviously so, of numerous others. A corps of experts must assist the administration of a democracy.

However, we find the proposal of the Webbs to create two co-equal and co-ordinate Parliaments unacceptable. The difficulty of dividing the issues, and hence the structure, of government makes all such schemes unfeasible. The long history of the bicameral plan has shown how impossible it is to keep the two chambers on a basis of parity. The evidence from federal governments and from the division of functions under the presidential system is none the less decisive. We venture to suggest that, after a brief period marked by delays and deadlocks, one Parliament will gradually become the predominant partner, in which case there will be no division of function. Or, still more likely, joint sessions will have to be constantly used; and this implies that for the disputes in finance, especially, which presumably would also be the most critical issues, there would be no division of functions. Such a procedure may become not only the normal, but the permanent, method of solving financial differences between the two Parliaments. It must also be remembered that deadlocks which even a joint session will fail to settle may become frequent, and if a double dissolution followed by double election is

relied upon to decide the dispute between the two Parliaments, the advantage of separate elections in order to separate the type of issues will be done away with. Or, if a referendum is resorted to in order to decide the dispute, we are falling back upon a method notoriously unsuitable for settling a complicated issue in finance. In their *Industrial Democracy*[34] the Webbs have themselves shown the imperfections of the referendum as a piece of governmental machinery. We conclude, therefore, that this particular proposal elaborated by the Webbs is of questionable utility.

Their scheme of local government is also open to a vulnerable attack. They have created numerous separate bodies without the provision of any responsible authority to co-ordinate and supervise. Such a scheme can only result in confusion. Especially with regard to finance is the necessity for a definite co-ordinating authority evident. The regulation of local government from some central or regional source must be of such a nature that, while parochialism and inefficiency are prevented, local pride and initiative are not sacrificed. The plan of our authors is admirably suited to encourage local variation, but, we urge, at the risk of local anarchy. However, their realization of eliminating the " great unpaid " and of the urgency of creating areas which shall coincide with the altered character of their services point the right road to reform.[35] The problem of administrative areas requires inventive social engineering. To the discussion of that problem the Webbs offer, at the least, a suggestive point of view.

We are conscious of the problem of our overburdened parliaments and the imperfect psychology of our political representation. For the profound elucidation of that problem, students of politics must be indebted to our authors. They recognize that a human being is a complex of relationships, and that diverse relationships require diverse treatment. This is, indeed, also

the lesson of contemporary psychology.[36] We submit that the proposal of MacDonald for an extensive system of devolution, coupled with an Economic Council to act as Second Chamber, is perhaps a fruitful remedy. Devolution will offer some relief to Parliament, although in a homogeneous country like Great Britain the functions that can best be served by the central authority are more numerous than in a state of greater sectional diversities, such as the United States of America.[37] An Economic Council acting as a Second Chamber, and subordinate to the First Chamber, may lessen both the volume and heterogeneity of the duties of the political and supreme chamber.[38] It should be based mainly on functional representation. Undoubtedly, the apportionment of membership in such a Council to the various groups and the adjustment of its relation to the political chamber are weighty difficulties. Yet they are not insurmountable, and, if we follow Dr. Finer, German experience proves that they are not insoluble.[39] We fail to see any good reason why the teeming mass of voluntary democracies of producers and consumers should not be employed in the service of the political state, except in a timorous and round-about manner. The very preservation of democracy would seem to require a broadening of the base of its traditional structure.[40]

The historic *rôle* of the liberal collectivist movement in Great Britain, of which our writers are to-day the foremost representatives, is easily discernible. Its most salient contribution to the thought and emotion of men is an emphasis on service derived from its theory that society is an exalted partnership. Its teaching is as fruitful in fostering social obligations as that of the Philistine political economy was to the contrary. Collectivism was both a cause and an effect of the growing feeling of social solidarity. The socialism of the Webbs, MacDonald, and Shaw is the

resultant of the same forces that gave rise to the protests of Ruskin and Carlyle. It helped to strengthen collective responsibility more than contemporary idealism and psychology did. The collectivist movement marks the strongest reaction from an empty liberty and an abstract individualism. Its gospel is a liberty that invigorates but does not harass; an individual stimulated by free participation in the service of a well-balanced state.

But the contribution of liberal socialism to the public life of Great Britain is even more tangible. It has been well said that every state gets the type of socialists that it deserves. The collectivism of England is undoubtedly as much the product of the parliamentary institutions of England as the communism of Russia is the product of the absence there of any parliamentary traditions. Still, the leaders of liberal socialism in England well deserve the esteem of their generation for having harnessed socialism to the service of constructive reform and for aiding the liberalization of institutions, thus continuing the traditions of Mill and Gladstone. They have formed a valiant intellectual vanguard in the campaign to make life more wholesome for the friendless and the needy. By permeation, by independent investigations, by influencing parliamentary and municipal enactments, they have made possible a greater realization of the hopes of the masses. How fruitless socialism in England would be if it had followed Marxian traditions! If the British leaders had become Marxian, they would have wasted their energies in helpless rage or in hatching impossible revolutions. If a communist revolution had broken out in England, it would have been undoubtedly briefly crushed, bringing destruction in its wake and discredit to the whole progressive movement. By following British traditions, the leaders, by their moderation and concreteness, have brought down socialism from the clouds and applied it to the needs of English life. It is

this form of socialism that has obtained either the active support or sympathy of some of the most accomplished men of our generation—G. B. Shaw, H. G. Wells, Lord Haldane, Sir Oliver Lodge, Bertrand Russell—men who have carried the British Empire of art and science to the four corners of the earth. Prophecies may be futile in an age of flux. One hopes that, just as England was the pioneer in political liberty, so may it be the pioneer in Europe in the more perfect democracy of the future.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE PLURALISTS: I. LASKI AND RUSSELL

It has been observed that in a period when morals decay, ethical theory is assiduously studied. If this be so, it is because in periods of stress man searches for fundamental principles. What is true of ethics is true also of politics. The contemporary concentration on the theory of the state is mainly the concomitant of a realization of its imperfect operation. We have already noted some aspects of this dissatisfaction. The attack is many-sided. This is inevitable, because an age which has experienced such rude shocks will dare to distinguish the necessary institutions from the established. If ideas must compete in a free trade market, veneration for things that are hoary with age must undergo a remarkable slump. No aspect of the state, however, has been subjected to such concentrated fire as the theory of its sovereignty.

*Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem* is a doctrine strange to modern ears. Modern writers are more familiar with the form in which Bodin and Hobbes phrased it. Rousseau applied the same idea to the popular state, adding the familiar string of adjectives that adorn its illimitable omnicompetence. A little later Austin crowned sovereignty with judicial rigidity.[1] "There are, there can be no rights except the right of the State, and there are, and there can be no other authority than the authority of the Republic." [2] So said M. Émile Combes. He may never have read Hobbes or Rousseau, but he was faithfully applying their theory to the statecraft of the Third Republic. The state is thus conceived to be the

source of all liberty and all rights. In itself it is above all law. Individuals and groups must look to it for the charters of their freedom. When it does not specifically prescribe, it may condescend to allow by tacit approval. It alone, however, is the fountain of rights. It is in effect the All. This doctrine indeed, when reviewed in broader perspective, is another expression of that familiar search for unity in a universe of apparent multiplicities.

The theory is seductive. It is a convenient working hypothesis for the lawyer and the judge. The flood of dissent has developed into a torrent, however. From an increasing number of quarters the doctrine is being assailed. In the main the attack is centred directly on behalf of groups and only indirectly, but yet fundamentally, on behalf of individuals. Thus Maitland, following Gierke, has elaborated the legal theory of the "real personality" of groups.[3] Human aggregates, it is urged, exist in their own right independently of the state. They are merely accepted by the state, but not created by it. Maitland's view offers a convenient legal departure for the claims of vocational and religious bodies. In Belloc's "Distributivist State," to take another random example, we see a mediævalist reaction from capitalism and centralized sovereignty.[4] He favours a state of peasant proprietors, with property to be regulated by group organizations. The "discredited state" is experiencing an unmistakable eclipse. With contemporary criticism of the sovereign state from the standpoint of a defence of religious bodies, of the individual, and of vocational groups we shall deal in some detail.

The late J. N. Figgis (*Churches in the Modern State*, 1913) assails "the great State" on behalf of religious bodies. His plea is for a "free Church in a free State," but in pleading primarily for the right of churches, he is pleading also for the rights of groups in general. Figgis considers the "concession theory," which re-

gards associations as fictitious bodies created by the state, as dangerous to corporate freedom. It is an unfortunate application of the doctrine of the all-embracing sovereignty of the state. The *Kulturkampf* in Germany, the Law of Separation in France, and the Free Church of Scotland case in England exemplify the arrogance of the claims of an omnicompetent state to interfere with religious bodies. A church cannot be conceived as an association of individuals fostered by the state: it is a corporate personality whose existence is not derived from the state. "We have seen that the essential minimum of any claim we make for the Church must depend on its recognition as a social union with an inherent original power of self-development, acting as a person with a mind and will of its own." [5] It is a distinct entity entitled to corporate freedom and inherent power of self-development. Like the individual, it has a distinct personality, and just as the state may regulate individuals which it did not create, so has the church a spontaneous life which the state may regulate, but has not created. A church, like the family, is not the creature of the state. Its origin must be found in the associated life of man, and not in the *plenitude potestatis* of the state. It is a real corporate person, developing as naturally as the state itself, organized for a vital purpose, and, like the state, arousing among its members corporate pride and solidarity. As a distinct social entity the church is in fact anterior to the state.

Again, the theory of sovereignty conceives only two entities—the unrelated individual and the state which is alleged to gather within itself the complete social life of man. Such a doctrine is fallacious. The personality of the individual is not abstract, but is moulded and shaped by innumerable groups, and functions only through groups. The conception that the state expresses the complete sociality of man may have been true in the Greek city-state, but is no

longer true to the facts of contemporary life. "What we actually see in the world is not on the one hand the State, and on the other a mass of unrelated individuals; but a vast complex of gathered unions, in which alone we find individuals, families, clubs, trades unions, colleges, professions, and so forth; and further, that there are exercised functions within these groups which are of the nature of government, including its three aspects, legislative, executive, and judicial; though, of course, only with reference to their own members. So far as the people who actually belong to it are concerned, such a body is every whit as communal in its character as a municipal corporation or a provincial parliament." [6] Since the individual is properly understood only in terms of his relations with his groups, the problem of individual freedom is thus linked with the problem of the liberty of associations. The absolutism of the state is a standing threat to freedom. Only by a recognition of the church as well as other groups as distinct entities can we preserve freedom and escape the dead uniformity of an all-embracing state.

However, the claim of the church to self-development involves appropriate obligations. As the representative of the community, the state in relation to the church has definite functions to perform. Thus the state must demand evidence of its group life, such as its registration and its constitution. The field of property and contract and adjustment between groups must be in the hands of the civil power. The state has also the power to prevent groups from escaping common burdens like taxation. "The claim of the Church in matters of education is the claim that she shall be recognized as a group, in which the natural authority over its members extends to the provision of a social atmosphere; and this ought to be admitted, provided the requirements of citizenship in secular culture be provided and controlled." [7] The church must not

forget, however, that the state is a community with a heterogeneity of religions. "If we are to cry 'hands off' to the civil power in regard to such matters as marriage, doctrine, ritual, or the conditions of communion inside the Church . . . then we must give up attempting to dictate the policy of the State in regard to the whole mass of its citizens." [8] We have thus no right to appeal as citizens to motives and ideals which are peculiarly Christian. The morality of the church can be imposed upon its own members, but not upon the diverse citizens of the state. We must not confuse our capacity as members of the church with our capacity as members of the state. If Parliament should make a change in divorce laws, we have a right to urge that our members should follow the Christian law of marriage, but no further. We must grant to others that liberty which we seek for ourselves.

The plea of Figgis for the right of religious bodies implies a general theory of the state, although his doctrine is far from complete. When the activities between groups and between individuals are as interrelated as they are at present, we have a right to demand more detail than Figgis offers. We shall see later that Cole, who refers to Figgis with approval, declares that since the church is a spiritual society it need not be represented in the ultimate co-ordinating authority of the functional society.[9] But surely no distinct separation can be made between the spiritual function of the church and the secular functions of the state. Divorce, religious instruction in state schools, "establishment" are the problems that immediately come to the mind. Suppose an individual claims that since the state is a secular organization, "establishment" is subversive to its purpose? Suppose an individual maintains that religious instruction in state schools violates his civic liberty? Suppose there is a conflict between the church and state?

To which should the individual be loyal? Were the British authorities who abolished *suttee* in India right? A devout Indian, no doubt, felt that such action was interfering with the "inherent right" of his religious body. Was the government of the United States right in prohibiting polygamy among Mormons, to whom on religious grounds it was permissible? Such questions Figgis has left unanswered.

Again, the claim of Figgis is founded upon a just distinction between state and society. But once we postulate such a distinction we find, as Figgis found, that the church is merely one association among many giving expression to man's social nature. Hence the same freedom which Figgis desires for religious bodies should with consistency be accorded, for example, to vocational organizations. If so, what is the nature and limits of such freedom? What, again, should then be the structure of a reconstructed state? Would Figgis desire a government based, partly or wholly, upon functional representation? The guild socialists, who approach a theory of the state from the angle of the self-determination of vocational bodies, have at least explored the possibilities of a functional society. No such exploration is observed in Figgis. The advocate of the special rights of groups within the state must bear responsibility for any divisive influence which may follow. We thus have a right to demand concretely: what kind of a state do such advocates propose?

While the criticism of sovereignty by Figgis is mainly on behalf of the group, H. J. Laski is chiefly solicitous about the individual. The "inherent rights" which the former attributes to the group, the latter transfers to the individual. In a number of papers (*The Problem of Sovereignty*, 1917; *Authority in the Modern State*, 1919; and *Foundation of Sovereignty*, 1921), Laski has laid the foundations of a political

theory which, when the structure is completed, will offer a full philosophy of the state. His starting point is a denial of the theory of sovereignty. The claim, he suggests, that the state is omnicompetent is fatuously unreal. No one would argue, for instance, that the state should interfere with purely, religious ritual or with the privacy of family life. To suggest that what the state does not specifically prohibit, it therefore tacitly permits is otiose. Even in its accustomed sphere obedience to commands of the state is not at all a foregone conclusion. Especially at the present time do we find a greater questioning of its acts. Thus the railroad brotherhoods in America, the South Wales miners and suffragettes in Great Britain have defied and forced a sovereign state to comply with their demands. As a matter of fact, society presents us with numerous groups each dominant in a particular sphere. Nor is it ever certain whether in any clash between a special group and the state the members of that group will transfer their allegiance to the state. Thus a class-conscious member of a trade union will uphold his vocational group against a capitalist state, a nationalist will side with his national group against a hostile state, a member of a church may support his religious group against the secular state.' What we actually see in society is not a hierarchical structure with an all-inclusive state, but a federal structure, with the state functioning alongside many co-ordinate societies.

Further, the theory of sovereignty confuses legal with moral right. The state, we say, exists to make the good life possible. This general assumption, however, is of little value; more important is it to know whether the means used by the particular government is in harmony with the ideal purpose. Sovereignty of the state means for concrete purposes the sovereignty of government. We have, then, a right to question whether the acts of the government

coincide with the rightness of the end of the state. The history of government does not warrant too great confidence. Was the British state right in carrying on war against the American colonies? Was the German state right in invading Belgium? As a matter of fact, history demonstrates that the instruments of the state have constantly been used for class and selfish interests. Ultimate sovereignty rests with the individual. In any conflict between him and the state, or his group and the state, his conscience must decide. Does such a theory countenance anarchy? Injustice is worse than anarchy. No government is opposed without grievous causes. A state that cannot rely upon the complacent obedience of its citizens will be less likely to give cause for disobedience. Democracy is founded on the ideal of voluntary participation in the common tasks. Citizenship must become what Aristotle meant it to be, the capacity for "sharing in the administration of justice and offices."

If the enlightened will of the individual is to replace the executioner as the basis of our state, the citizen must be capable of exercising his responsibility. It will thus be necessary to give effect to certain individual rights. We may call, if we please, some rights "natural rights," but they are not eternal. They are rights which experience has shown to be valuable. They are, too, inherent in the growth of the human personality and not derived from government. The present revival of natural law indicates the need of a path to justice away from state interference. The value of Bills of Rights is that they secure certain guarantees beyond the whim of government. Thus "it is obvious enough that freedom of speech, a living wage, an adequate education, a proper amount of leisure, the power to combine for social effort, are all of them integral to citizenship."[10] To train the faculties of the individual, a vast experiment in education is essential. It indicates, too, an approach to an

economic minimum for all under which no person may suffer degradation. Government will still retain the power to will, but it will have to win support to make its will effective. Further, to safeguard the individual, a vast dispersion of authority is essential. At present only a few possess that responsibility which is the energy of the soul; the rest sheepishly obey Power must be deconcentrated by functional and geographical federalism. Each group in the state must possess sufficient freedom to realize its purpose. Administrative decentralization must aim to place power in those centres where the effects of its exercise are felt. With modern means of communication there is no danger of parochialism. It involves further that industry shall be democratized. This assumes the abolition of capitalist autocracy. Action of government in the administration of its functions must be subjected to law; the current doctrine of irresponsibility of the state breeds irresponsibility in conduct. Only by decentralization, by a co-ordinating structure, and by democratization of industry can we escape that perversion and sluggishness which concentration involves and regain our freedom in the tangled maze of our complex social life. Only then can we hope to kindle the interest of humble men and women in our common efforts, and arouse that spontaneity of thought and action which is so vital to the ideal purpose of the state.

Laski offers a theory of the state in contrast to that of the idealists.[11] Most idealists accept in the main a set of institutions, and attempt to harmonize the individuals with it; Laski, on the other hand, takes individuals and seeks to create such institutions as shall best serve their purpose. The glamour is removed from institutions and placed upon individuals. Laski's approach has this seminal truth. The criterion of the worth of institutions should be whether they contribute to the welfare of individuals. What are

institutions for if they are not conducive to the happiness of men? We should rightly be suspicious of any doctrine that attempts to absorb the individual in specious wholes. (Laski considers freedom to be the most vital element in the individual's life.) This does not imply a return to the anarchic individualism of a century ago, (but it predicates a reformation of institutions that will give most men an opportunity for creative freedom.)

Laski's writings have exercised notable influence in giving to the criticism of sovereignty that conspicuous place which it occupies in contemporary social theory. In English-speaking countries his name, more than that of any other writer, is associated primarily with an incisive denial of the sovereignty of the state. Sovereignty is another example of the attempt at *reductio ad unum.* (The full doctrine of an omnicompetent state—the doctrine, that is, which declares that the state is the source of all rights and is itself above law—is based, we urge, upon a forced unity, which only achieves its existence either by neglecting differences or, worse still, by suppressing them. In order to preserve our freedom amidst the prodigious vastness of the scale of our social life, an approach to a federal organization will, it appears, be urgent.) The doctrine of natural rights suffers from an unsavoury reputation owing to its chequered history. It is to be remembered, however, that, when natural rights are interpreted to be not aboriginal but, as Laski understands, rights which experience has proved to be vital to the human personality, there is surely greater validity in that doctrine than that slur of Bentham seems to indicate. Interpreted thus, natural rights are really psychological rights. The recrudescence of that doctrine shows the influence of the contemporary study of human nature.[12] It is also another instance of the present suspicion of the state.

More hostile to the state than Laski is Bertrand

Russell. His attitude is essentially Tolstoyan. Russell approaches a theory of politics (*Principles of Reconstruction*, 1916, and *Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, 1923) from a psychological point of view.[13] To Russell impulses, not conscious purpose, determine man's conduct. In the main, man holds those beliefs that accord with his impulses. The reasons which man offers are thus quasi-rational justification for the indulgence of impulses; actually man's conduct is governed by attempts to satisfy his impulses. Man's acts are directed not to the results which his innate tendencies involve, but to the mere satisfaction of these tendencies themselves. Two types of impulses—the creative and the possessive—are of basic importance. The creative impulses are concerned with art and knowledge, of which there can be no exclusive ownership; the possessive, on the other hand, are concerned with the acquisition of exclusive ownership. Material goods alone can be exclusively possessed; spiritual goods cannot. The possessive impulses involve taking things away from others; the creative impulses involve adding new things for all. Creation is a harmonious process; possession engenders conflict. Human nature is malleable. Impulses should not be crushed. It is the task of social institutions to direct them to healthy channels. "The supreme principles, both in politics and in private life, should be *to promote all that is creative, and so to diminish the impulses and desires that centre round possession.*" [14]

For the purpose of creative freedom the state is unsuited. Its essence is power. "The State is constituted by the combination of all the inhabitants in a certain area using their united force in accordance with the commands of a Government." [15] Its basis is authority and tradition, and is thus unfit as an instrument for the promotion of liberty. "The State and Property are the great embodiments of possessiveness; it is for this reason that they are against life, and that

they issue in war."[16] In external affairs the state uses its power for purposes of exploitation, and is limited only by fear of defeat in war. Its very efficiency as a power encourages international anarchy. A national state rests on tribal feeling, which is the root of patriotism. Patriotism is a false religion, since it lacks universality. The state attempts to confine human obligation to one segment of humanity. Our love for our own nation must be supplemented by justice for all peoples. The power of the state to command its citizens to kill and be killed is an unmitigated evil. In internal affairs the state protects the rich against the poor, while its very vastness makes the individual impotent. Here the power of the state is limited only by fear of rebellion or by the organized opposition of a strong group. Men obey the state because they fear anarchy within and aggression from without. The state thus assumes the *rôle* of the *Comité du Salut Public*. Of necessity the state alone must possess authority to use force, but all law and government are evils, and can be justified only because they prevent greater evils. The function of the state to preserve law is good, but law must be changed in accordance with changed needs, otherwise it merely perpetuates abuses, and the *régime* of law must be extended to include the world of states.

Freedom is the most precious political ideal, and freedom is capacity for creation. Each individual has a distinct principle of growth which, when distorted by governmental regimentation, makes the life of the individual flabby, dull, and exhausting. The impulsive actions of the individual, which are injurious to others, are mainly the result of attempts to block individual growth. "The most important purpose that political institutions can achieve is to keep alive in individuals creativeness, vigour, vitality, and the joy of life."[17] We should aim at harmony through differentiation, and not through mere aping of a uniform pattern.

For this it is necessary that we inculcate reverence, respect for our own inherent capacities and for those of others. It is also necessary to diminish our superstitious veneration for government. All forms of coercion hinder individual vitality, and can be justified only when they lessen the total amount of coercion. With the right sort of education, the use of force may be appreciably diminished.

In order to serve the purpose of freedom a reconstruction of institutions is fundamental. The capitalist autocracy in industry must be abolished. With capitalism will also go the fear and greed which it engenders. Its continued existence is inconsistent with creative life. Socialism is not only inevitable, but desirable. Care must be taken, however, not to substitute for the dictatorship of the capitalist the dictatorship of the administrator. A regenerated society must see an end not only to the evils of property, but also to the evils of power. Equalization of power must thus follow equalization of wealth. A social system must not only secure economic justice, but also the greatest possible development of the creative impulses. A vast dispersion of power by functional and territorial federalism is thus necessary. In all questions that concern particular minorities they alone should be given ample freedom to decide. Should Welsh children use the Welsh language in their schools? Such questions can best be left to Welshmen exclusively. All divergent actions can best be carried out by varied groups whenever such actions do not promote anarchy. Only by devolution can we escape the evils of concentration of power.

This implies the principle of self-government in industry. The interests of the consumers can best be represented by *ad hoc* organizations. The state cannot represent consumers, since when industry is concentrated in different sections the representatives

of these districts in the government really represent the producers. As a geographical body the power of the state should be limited, since it embodies the worst passions—love of conquest and hatred of foreigners. The state should retain ownership of land and industrial capital, determine prices and quantity needed of each commodity. It should also have power to prevent any particular organization from acting in hostility to the interests of the community. It may also have the power of making war and peace, tariffs, and foreign policy; but international questions like movement of population and apportionment of raw material can best be settled by specific functional organizations. Both producers and consumers may use strikes and boycotts to enforce their demands. With the abolition of capitalism the state will be neutral in disputes between organizations, and it may, therefore, demand arbitration, and then offer its decisions for the guidance of public opinion. The principle of organization should be self-government for each organization in those activities that concern it alone, and regulation by a neutral authority of those activities that also concern others. This principle is also applicable to affairs between states. The aim should be to encourage and foster individuality, and the organization of minorities is the best means to obtain the end. This, however, does not obviate the necessity of a public opinion which should revere liberty and prevent the use of economic power as a whip against rebellious natures. When the state punishes by its economic power it should be necessary for it to establish its case in a court of law. The ideal should be the minimum of interference compatible with the maximum of freedom.

In Russell we find the most emphatic expression of that demand for individual freedom which is a characteristic aspect of contemporary thought. His conception that the state is power is derived from his

underlying premise, but is none the less open to question. When the state was concerned mainly with the preservation of order it may then have been true to refer to it as power. The state, however, is no longer a glorified policeman, but is becoming virtually a national householder. When the state participates in industry, education, sanitation, and when it alone manages innumerable industrial undertakings, the conception of it as power is hardly applicable. Russell, as do other individualists, conceives the state as an external force, but such a conception is incorrect. The state is an organization which serves a definite human end. As the guardian of the interests of the entire community, it must possess power to co-ordinate various sections of the community and to carry out effectively those activities which are of interest to the entire community. Even in the use of force the state is not different from any other organization. A church, or a trade union, for instance, uses force too. The force which a church or a trade union exercises is a different kind of force from that of a state, but may be even more effective. The ultimate authority of a parent over a child may be said to be based on force, but the essence of parenthood is not power. It is in relations between states that Russell's doctrine is most applicable. Even in this respect the state does not differ from any other competing organizations when unchecked by a neutral authority. For instance, the absence of a central authority in the Middle Ages encouraged strife between guilds. With the establishment of a recognized international authority without, and a greater economic equality within, the state may then become a more effective instrument of freedom.

When Russell discusses freedom he has apparently in mind the freedom of the original artist from the conventions and traditionalism of his profession, or the freedom of the conscientious objector from con-

scription. Freedom, however, for the vast majority of men is a more intricate problem. It means, for instance, the freedom of the child from ignorance, the freedom of the consumers from adulterated food, the freedom of healthy persons from contagious diseases, the freedom of the wage-earners from exploitation. To obtain such freedom requires a vast organization. It is true that all organizations must minister to the welfare of the individual, but between the individual and his freedom there are obstacles to be overcome; and this can only be done by co-operation. For immediate purposes the state, more than any other organization, is capable of undertaking that task, although, of course, the state may with profit be widely decentralized. The type of interference with personal freedom which Russell abhors is chiefly due to public opinion, for which the organization of the state is only partially responsible. Thus, the state in America is not concerned with the religious beliefs of its citizens, yet public opinion is hostile to certain forms of belief. It is the rather narrow public opinion which is enamoured of uniformity and detests originality in all departments of life that is the great enemy of freedom. In fact, a strong state may be a protection for the individual against a narrow public opinion. Obviously, too, the public opinion of a small group, such as a vocational organization, may be just as hostile to creative effort as the public opinion of a large group, such as the state. Freedom, then, in our complex life implies co-operative effort in which the state must participate, while opportunities for creation depend upon other factors in which the state is not alone concerned.

Again, when Russell accuses the collectivists of not being conscious of the dangers of concentration of power; he surely has in mind the collectivism of a decade or two ago.[18] We have seen how the Webbs stress individuality, decentralization, publicity, par-

ticipation of the workers, in order to avoid the evils of power.[19] The collectivism that Russell criticizes is that older variety which was undoubtedly an enemy of liberty. Liberal socialists now recognize as emphatically as Russell the necessity of protecting and encouraging variation and growth. The issue between Russell and the Webbs, for example, is not whether liberty is desirable, but by what means it may best be obtained.

Russell's specific suggestions are far from complete. Are we to assume that the Cabinet, the Crown, the House of Lords, and political parties are to remain as they are? If not, what will take their place? Russell emphasizes the necessity of decentralization, but he has not suggested any plan of territorial regionalism. He has emphasized the danger of bureaucracy, but he has not mentioned how an expert civil service is to be recruited. What will be the specific function of craft organizations? It is to be noted that the interests between varied industries and between consumers and producers are interrelated, but Russell has not mentioned how mutual negotiation should be conducted. What control will an organization of consumers exercise over the management of a particular industry? Russell's suggestions for self-government in industry and for the organization of functional associations are, of course, realizable only after a long and gradual transition, for he recognizes the difficulties of a violent change.[20] For more immediate purposes, what is important is a greater participation by the workers in industry and a greater decentralization of the functions of the present state.

Our review of the doctrine of political pluralism has brought out a number of interesting aspects which deserve recapitulation. First, the theory of sovereignty, which declares that all rights are derived from the state, is denied. We have seen that Figgis attributes "inherent rights" to the group, while Laski

clothes the individual with natural rights. While the state is given authority to adjust conflicting rights between individuals and groups, to the individual, however, is given the power to decide whether the loyalty which the state may demand is deserved. Second, the emphasis is clearly placed on the individual; this tendency is especially observed in Laski and Russell. It is thus a reaction from the idealist attitude. The war has encouraged hostility to the state. Our writers are suspicious of institutionalism. They hold that the individual welfare is alone the criterion of the worth of institutions. Third, our writers conceive the individual not as existing in the abstract, but as having innumerable relationships with other individuals, and, as a result, forming various separate groups which express these manifold relationships. They have thus rediscovered the group and, by distinguishing the state from society, deny that the state includes the whole social life of man. They believe that each group should be independent in its own sphere, and that any reorganization of the structure of the state must make provision for a formal participation of groups in the common life. Fourth, they therefore favour a federal organization as the structure of the state. In order to prevent centralization and protect the special interests of minorities, they propose a vast functional and geographical dispersion of power. In those questions in which a minority, whether functional or territorial, has a special interest, it is proposed to give to that minority sufficient power to make final decision. The state is retained as co-ordinator of conflicting interests and fulfilling functions which no other authority can properly fulfil. Any dispute between the state and a special group will be solved by compromise and negotiation, with the state not in the *rôle* of supreme authority, but of *prima inter pares*.

To the theory of the state which the doctrine of the

pluralists leads we may subscribe. The conception of sovereignty which this approach demolishes is in most cases useless and unreal, and in some cases dangerous. The doctrine of a sovereign state, whether derived from monistic metaphysics or Austinian jurisprudence, is a broken reed to rely upon in the solution of our problems. We conceive, however, such phrases as "corporate person" and "real personality" of groups, as used by Figgis, in a metaphorical sense only. Such expressions assume a psychology which we have on a number of occasions questioned. Our realistic approach makes us suspicious, too, of any claim for "inherent rights," whether of groups or of individuals. Rights derive their validity not from abstract metaphysics, but from the necessities of a common life. An association of pickpockets has no "inherent right" to exist, nor has a trade union an "inherent right" to strike, or a church to practise polygamy. We recognize the community as consisting, in the phrase of Dr. Ginsberg, "of a series of groupings, partly coincident, partly divergent, and best represented as a series of circles some of which are concentric whilst others cut across each other."[21] Moreover, we know of no other device to replace the state as the regulative authority of the community.

We thus conclude with two propositions: first, the greatest development of group and local life, and second, the retention by the state, as the representative of the community, of co-ordinating power. We favour the fullest freedom for groups because only through them can the individual exist and develop, and because they offer protection for minorities. In the structure of the state which we visualize, the groups will possess more formal channels of expression than at present. Yet, just as the freedom of the individual involves limitation in the interest of social life, so does the liberty of the group. Unless we are to invite anarchy we must reserve for the state the

power of adjustment in the interest of the whole. This is not to recognize any necessary conflict between the groups and the state, since the aim of both should be to develop that liberty of the individual which is the "capacity of continuous initiative," but a realization that the interest of the whole merits pre-eminence. We conceive the state to be not an "altogetherness," but a federal organization, a *communitas communitatem*. The authority which any group, a church or a trade union, exercises over its respective members is not a different sort of authority from that which the state imposes. All authority must rely ultimately upon acceptance. When the force of the state is applied to limit the claim of a particular group, such action, undertaken with regret, must be justified not on any alleged basis of inherent sovereignty of the state, but upon a realization that the claim of the special group is inconsistent with the welfare of the community as a whole. The claims of the state never have deserved, and do not now deserve, a blank cheque. They must find their validity in a competitive market. In any conflict between his group and the state the individual, before making his decision, must bear in mind, however, that conceivably only the state offers security against the divisive forces in society.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE PLURALISTS: II. COLE

WHILE Figgis pleads for religious bodies, and Laski and Russell for the individual, the active leaders of the guild socialists concentrate upon freedom in vocational pursuits. Whatever may be their ultimate ideal of a guild state, for the accomplishment of their more immediate aims they turn to vocational bodies. Guild socialism finds its origin in the fear of a sovereign state, which fear was certainly stimulated by the practices of states during the war. It is the intellectual child of English Fabianism and French syndicalism. It attempts to pursue a *via media* between traditional collectivism and traditional syndicalism. It would place authority in the hands of democracies of producers and democracies of consumers. This newer radicalism represents a centre group in socialist thought. Its followers are Lamarckians rather than Darwinians, and, imbued with Marxism, presumably look upon catastrophic methods with less aversion than the older Fabians do. Its literature presents us with an English version of deep contemporary proletarian stirrings. We shall obtain a more detailed view of its doctrine by reviewing the theory of one of its chief exponents.

G. D. H. Cole is the chief active philosophic apostle of this new ferment.[1] Cole was originally a Fabian, but the danger of government by "a man behind a window" made him join the new movement. William Morris is his patron saint. Like most revolutionaries, Cole desires a restoration, and what he would restore is the mediæval society of societies. He has the

anarchist's love of freedom, and a sufficient irreverence for vested interests to demand an "objective" theory of rights. He gives the fullest expression to a demand for a federal structure of the state. The title of the book in which Cole presents the philosophic foundation of his new society is *Social Theory* (1920), and the title is important, as it marks a denial of the pretension of the state to embody within it the whole society.[2] In his *Guild Socialism Re-Stated* (1920) he formulates the more detailed structure of a guild commonwealth. Here we are mainly concerned with those aspects of his doctrine which properly come under our brief *résumé*. We shall thus confine ourselves to some of his underlying principles, and briefly to their administrative application.

To Cole, the widest sphere of social unity is the community. It is a centre of feeling, a self-contained, inclusive region of associative life. Society is its organized aspect.[3] Society is thus a complex of associations, but society cannot include the whole of the lives of the individuals, since the best elements of individuality escape organization. The principle underlying all associations is the principle of function. Individuals organize associations in order to fulfil a purpose which requires co-operative action for its attainment. "Every such purpose or group of purposes is the basis of the *function* of the association which has been called into being for its fulfilment."[4] The function of any particular association necessarily implies its relation to the general scheme of the community. "Social purposes are, thus, the raw material of social functions, and social functions are social purposes selected and placed in coherent relationship."[5] The criterion of any purpose, then, is whether it is essential to the completed life of society. For such judgment we must rely ultimately upon individual opinion. Of all associations the civic and economic associations of both producers and

consumers are the most essential. Function, then, and not an external source gives rights to associations.

The present state has been incorrectly interpreted to act as the sovereign repository of the whole associative life of men. Man's experience is not confined to the state, nor does his relation to the state furnish his most immediate and constant wants. Even if we consider force to be the basis of the state, the state is not the only organization employing force. The force used by a trade union or church, while differing from the force used by the state, is nevertheless as effective. If, to be correct, we take will as the basis of the state, we realise that the state is merely one association among many expressing will. Each association is properly sovereign within its sphere. The present state includes all persons within its territory, and all can claim membership of it. As an all-inclusive association the state can deal properly only with those activities which affect men equally. It should be concerned not with man's differences, but with their common interest. What activities can an all-inclusive association properly regulate? It cannot regulate the production of commodities, because production affects men differently. Coal-mining, for example, affects the miner in a more immediate way than other citizens. Even in consumption the power of an all-inclusive body should be limited, because the consumption of a good many commodities affects man in various degrees. Only in relation to the consumption of commodities in which all are equally interested can an all-inclusive body represent the interest of all consumers. In the case of the other commodities *ad hoc* bodies will be best. Nor can the state possess the power to co-ordinate various associations, since to entrust it with that power would make it the judge in its own case. There is thus left to the state only the power to interfere in

personal relations and in certain activities in international affairs.

The present state, moreover, carries with it the marks of its perversion by capitalism. Our present feeble attempt to inaugurate democracy in politics is frustrated by the existence of a system approaching slavery in industry. Not poverty of the masses, but slavery, is the curse of capitalism. Hence, when capitalism is superseded by freedom, and when society is organized as a federation of functional organizations, each one democratically controlled, there will be no place for the present state organization. The functions which an all-inclusive association may properly regulate, and which alone may rightly fall to the present state, will in a guild society be taken over by co-ordinating bodies more in harmony with the principles of freedom and function which will actuate that society.

Furthermore, the present state is a crude instrument for a guild society, not only because of its chequered career under capitalism, but also because it rests on an imperfect theory of political representation. Our theory is founded on the principle that individuals can be represented as wholes, which is a false principle. No man can represent another, no man's will can be represented by another. "It is impossible to represent human beings as selves or centres of consciousness; it is quite possible to represent, though with an inevitable element of distortion which must always be recognized, so much of human beings as they themselves put into associated effort for a specific purpose." [6] Representation, then, can be functional only, and not general. Not only in civic activities, but in all other activities must the principle of functional democracy be applied. Our defective omnicompetent Parliament must, then, be replaced by a structure which will co-ordinate varied functional representative bodies. Functional democracy will involve selection of those who are specially fitted by those specially

interested, which, coupled with the power of recall, will make possible a system under which capable leaders will be responsible to active members. Each person must have one vote for each functional association that he joins. "Instead of 'one man, one vote,' we must say 'one man as many votes as interests, but only one vote in relation to each interest.'" [7] Legislation by functional bodies based upon functional democracy offers the only escape from the *omnium gatherum* of the present state. Each association will have power to regulate its own life, and make rules binding its own members in its own special sphere. Each will also have the power of coercion to a limited degree. Society will then present a union of co-ordinated functional democracies. [8]

In accordance, then, with the principle of functional democracy, each industry in a guild society will be organized into a national guild and administered on behalf of society by the workers, including the managerial and technical force. The management of each guild will be decentralized, with the factory as the unit of organization. The leaders will be chosen by the workers, although, if some technical skill should be required from them, choice may be limited to those who have acquired a certain proficiency. The expert advisers will not be directly elected. The managers of wider units of organization, such as the district, or region, or nation, will be chosen indirectly. These managers will have the power of supervision and of representing the interest of the producers in conference with the representatives of the consumers. Their power, however, should be kept down as much as possible, in order to avoid centralization. As long as the conditions of the guilds are carried out, there will be room for local experiments, and, in some cases, producers' organizations outside the guild will be allowed to develop. Contacts between guilds will be settled by mutual conference, and where relations

are especially interwoven, by interlocking directorates, while a guild congress will represent the interest of all guilds.

The congress, too, will be highly decentralized into local and regional bodies. It will regulate the disputes between guilds, confer with representatives of consumers, adjust pay of different kinds of workers—which pay need not be equal, at least at first. Each member of a guild will be assured full pay as long as he is connected with that guild. There will be free choice of occupation and free transference from guild to guild, subject, however, to the prevailing economic demand. The same principle of organization applies to the more civic functions, such as education and health. There will thus be an education guild and a health guild composed of those who pursue the professions of teaching and medicine respectively. In the organization of the guilds the representation of craft organizations will be admitted.

The consumers, too, will be organized. The consumers must be differentiated into classes. Thus in "personal and domestic consumption" there is differentiation between consumers while in the "collective consumption" of, for instance, a commodity like water, the interests of all consumers are alike. There must, therefore, be appropriate councils to represent each respective group of consumers. These councils will also be decentralized with local and regional divisions. The councils existing in every locality will meet with the representatives of the guilds. It will be thus possible to have local, regional, and national conferences between representatives of producers and of consumers. There will be also appropriate councils to represent the civic interests in culture and health, and they, too, will confer with the appropriate civic guilds. The consumers cannot interfere with the direct and internal management of the industries, but only with quantity and quality of

commodities, their distribution and price, and other closely related matters.[8]

The power to adjust differences between associations and to represent the interests of society as a whole cannot rest with any particular association, but must rest with a body representing the essential functional associations. In such a co-ordinating structure the church must not participtae. It may co-operate with other bodies, but not be co-ordinated with them. It must have freedom to live its own spiritual life. It cannot conflict with other bodies, since its life is purely spiritual, while that of the others is material. The co-ordinating centre of the guild society will be the communes. The communes will be composed of the representatives of the consumers' councils and of the guilds. Thus the local communes will include representatives of the local consumers' councils and of the local guilds; the regional communes, of the regional councils and of the regional guilds; the national commune, of the national councils, of the national guilds, and, in addition, representatives of the regional communes themselves. The local and regional communes, however, will also include some territorial representation. Wide decentralization will prevent the rise of a bureaucracy. As the representative of the whole society, the commune, local, regional, or national as the situation may warrant, will possess the powers of co-ordinating various functional associations and also such duties which no other authority can exercise. Under the first type of powers will come, among others, a host of financial duties. Thus it will review the budgets of the guilds, supervise pay of guild members, income, price, allocation of capital, the banking system, and allotment of taxation to the various guilds. To it will belong the surplus profits of the guilds. As a co-ordinating body it will act as the final court of appeal in disputes between functional bodies,

and pass constitutional laws demarcating the respective spheres of such bodies. There will be judges, appointed by the commune from the qualified members of the legal guild, to interpret the laws, but their decisions in disputed points must be subordinated to the declarations of the commune. Under the second type of powers will come, among others, authority over questions of war and peace, colonies, boundaries, personal conduct, and property. International questions of a civic and commercial nature, however, will be dealt with by the appropriate functional bodies. The commune will also control the coercive machinery and exercise the ultimate power of coercion over individuals and groups. Thus economic boycott may be applied against a recalcitrant group. But the mutual confidence and consultation which a functional society will stimulate will make the application of coercion infrequent. The guild society will see a wide extension of decisions reached by mutual negotiation.

In case of any conflict between the co-ordinating authority and any particular association, the individual alone may decide what conduct to pursue. The co-ordinating authority may coerce, but such coercion is purely physical, not moral. There will be no excuse to call the individual coerced "traitor." It should be remembered that the loyalties of the individual in a functional society will be distributed. His membership of different associations fulfilling varied functions does not involve one loyalty being subordinated to another. In the present state the loyalties of the individual are considered to be subordinated to the one loyalty rendered to the state; and against the state the individual has no guarantee of being able to preserve his freedom. But when the loyalties of the individual are distributed, each single group will claim limited control only, and the individual will then have a better chance of preserving his freedom. The free-

dom of the individual is thus correlated with the principle of function. The principle of freedom implies that the idea of self-government should be carried to all departments of life, while the principle of function as the basis of democratic organization enables the preservation of such freedom.

In Cole's writings several aspects of contemporary social thought find their expression. Cole suggests a distinction between state and society. Society, he finds, consists of varied associations, each one fulfilling particular functions. The state is one association among many, and can claim no greater sovereignty than any other organization. In common with other writers, he has rediscovered the group, but he gives the most extensive exposition of the present movement for a federal structure of the state. His guild state will be virtually a federation of groups. Here, perhaps, we note the contemporary mediævalist reaction. Again, the principle of self-government in industry, which is such a characteristic feature of present-day proletarian agitation, is indeed the pillar of Cole's principle of functional democracy. The demand for the participation in the government of industry by the workers is now, perhaps more than any other factor, the cause of the increasing acerbity of the class conflict. In Cole we observe the most forcible enunciation of the theory of liberty as applied to industry. He stresses that satisfaction which men derive from sharing in the conditions that determine their lives. Viewed more narrowly, his doctrine is that of radical socialism, which recognizes the trade union world as an organ of revolt against capitalism and as the most effective means of attaining its ultimate supersession.

Cole denies the sovereignty of the present state, and the particular form of denial takes its root in his principle of functional democracy. It should be pointed out, however, that, while he denies the

sovereignty of the state, he does not deny the necessity of retaining unity in society. His guild commonwealth is co-ordinated. It is highly decentralized both territorially and functionally, but its unity is preserved by vesting ultimate authority in the commune. The commune, we may recall, possesses the power to act as an ultimate court of appeal in disputes between functional bodies, to pass constitutional laws, and to control the coercive machinery. The essence of a common authority is power to act in the capacity of ultimate jurisdiction; the guild society has such authority. Cole does not deny the necessity of having a co-ordinating body, although he denies the claim of the present state to assume such a *rôle*. The guild commonwealth is thus essentially a federated union of groups recognizing a common authority in the commune.

Still, the commune—local, regional, and national—will be, we submit, an imperfect co-ordinating authority, as its basis of representation will prevent it from being an effective assembly. The representatives of the consumers and the producers will come to its session not for the purpose of deliberation, but as delegates of a fraction of the community, to present its special and private will. Its meetings may thus result in a clash of wills, a battle royal of competing interests. It may merely perpetuate differences and stress dissimilarities. Such a structure cannot constitute an efficient thought organization, because it will lack allegiance to a common social purpose. At the best it may continue a precarious existence on a *régime* of balanced powers; at the worst it will be subjected to a succession of deadlocks, and Cole does not offer any provision for ending such deadlocks. Insincere compromises and log-rolling may replace genuine co-operative thinking. On problems that concern the consumers, the consumers should be heard; on problems that concern the producers, the producers should

be heard. Questions, however, that concern the community as a whole can best be dealt with by the representatives of citizens. The common fact of citizenship is the widest common foundation for the organization of a state. Citizenship alone can serve as the most inclusive bond, and it alone offers the basis for common co-operative deliberation. The structure of government may with profit include the representatives of functional interests in the form of a second chamber or a functional advisory council, but ultimate authority must rest with the representatives of citizens. What is essential is a reformation of the present basis of representation, and not its entire abolition.

The principle underlying the organization of Cole's guild society is the principle of function. If this means broadly that claims to rights by individuals and groups must find their validity in social purpose, such a doctrine, we hold, is undeniably sound. This, indeed, is the doctrine of the "objective" theory of rights of the school of jurisprudence, of which M. Duguit is the chief exponent.[9] R. H. Tawney has ingeniously applied this doctrine to the right to property.[10] Cole, however, uses the principle of function in a wider sense. To him, each guild, each consumers' organization, any association whatever, in fact, expresses a definite function, and hence is entitled to be represented in the commune. Nevertheless, society is not subject to any rigid demarcation of separate interests. Who are interested in coal-mining? The coal-miners have a special interest; but so have other producers using coal, so have the private consumers of coal, so have the consumers of the commodities the production of which requires coal, so has the entire community, so have future generations. Who are interested in education? The teachers, the students, the parents, the entire community, future generations —all are interested in education. It is true that in

some respects the workers in a particular industry or service have an immediate interest; but then, it is to be noted, in other respects other groups have a special interest. If that be true, the logical conclusion is to place socialized industry in the hands of the state under a system which will allow wide decentralization and the active participation of the workers. The state alone offers a workable common basis. When a socialist society undertakes the socialization of industries, we suggest that a tripartite scheme of control—a plan similar to that of the Webbs—representing the management, the community, and the producers, will be found most feasible.[11] The number of conferences, even under Cole's plan, between producers of related industries, and between consumers and producers, would in practice vitiate any rigid distinction on the basis of interests. The principle that the interest of the whole of society should be uppermost—which, broadly speaking, is what the doctrine of function postulates—is a better guide than Cole's theory of disparate freedoms.

While Cole and his colleagues and disciples tend to underestimate the unity that exists in society, they apparently over-emphasize the unity of vocational bodies. Thus S. G. Hobson, a co-leader with Cole in guild socialism, states: "The essential element in a National Guild is that it shall include all the workers, from the highest to the lowest. In the Legal Guild, therefore, every man and woman engaged on legal work, from the Lord Chancellor to the most obscure clerk, including all officers of the Courts, not omitting tipstaffs and bailiffs, must be received into Guild membership, with rights of maintenance in sickness, old age, and unemployment not less than in the industrial Guilds."[12] For the purpose of old age, unemployment, and sickness maintenance it may, perhaps, be desirable to regard the Legal Guild as a unit, but do not let us exaggerate the unity, either

spiritual, or intellectual, or even vocational, that actually exists between the Lord Chancellor and the court bailiff. The porter of a university college and the distinguished Professor of an endowed chair will both belong to the education guild, but in reality there is little homogeneity of interest between them. It is true that our distinguished Professor could not lecture if the porter had not beforehand cleaned his lecture-room, but so would he be without his breakfast if the Minnesota farmer and the Chinese tea-planter had not pursued their respective vocations. The unity that exists between the Professor and the porter is not much more intense than that between him and the American farmer or Chinese planter. Even if we take closer stages in the hierarchy of the education guild we find diversity in vocational technique and in general outlook. For example, most university lecturers live in a different intellectual world than most elementary school teachers. To most of them, too, the teaching of elementary subjects to young children is a closed mystery. These diversities in technique, interest, and outlook within the guilds are not necessarily allied with capitalism; they are rather due to essential difference in attitude and experience. Cole is somewhat conscious of the heterogeneity even within the guild; hence he favours due consideration to the special interests of craft organizations. Yet it is well to remember that to cover basic dissimilarities by a glib phraseology of "function" or "vocation," is as unreal as it is remote from profundity.

Cole's treatment of the *rôle* of the church in a functional society offers another example of the unreality of his approach. A church, he states, should have no representation in the commune, since its function is purely spiritual, while that of the other bodies is material. A church may co-operate with other bodies, but can have no voice in the commune. Obviously, as we have noted in the last chapter, no

rigid separation can be made in practice between the spiritual and material spheres. It is not necessary to refer to the history of the Middle Ages to prove that any close distinction must be futile. Suppose a church desires to introduce religious instruction in the schools, and is opposed by the education guild, or suppose there is a dispute between the church and the health guild. If the commune were to decide these disputes, it would violate the principle of self-government, since it includes no representatives of the church. We must take churches as they are, and we find them exercising influence in civic affairs. There is this truth in Cole's explanation. The state is essentially a secular organization. It includes all within its territorial confines—Christian, Jew, and Moslem; believer and atheist. The statesmen, however, will do well to bear in mind that churches, like national and economic bodies, do exist. If a functional council is ever established, it appears that consistency would demand the representation of churches.

In Cole's guild society the courts will occupy an important *rôle*, since the conflict of spheres of jurisdiction between functional bodies will be manifold. We have a right, then, to demand greater detail than Cole has given us in the structure of the judiciary. He has not told us fully about the hierarchy of courts, appeals, and the prevention of abuse either in appointment or in the exercise of power by the judges. Nor has he told us about the executive of his guild commonwealth. Will there be a Cabinet? If so, how constituted? To whom will it be responsible? What part, if any, will the Crown or political parties play in the government? Will there be a second chamber in the national commune for the purpose of revision? The method of indirect election of the members of the communes has also obvious drawbacks. Again, the existence of numerous functional organizations will involve a heavy drain on the will and judgment of the

individual, for each body will demand his instructed participation. Membership of Cole's guild society will require more persistent attention to common affairs than citizenship in the modern state and membership of the present professional organizations jointly succeed in calling out. Judged from present experience, is our expectation that the individual will efficiently assume the additional burdens justified? While it is not necessary for a social theorist to provide for all eventualities, still we have a right to demand that no approach should defy existing possibilities, for our present institutions and the human material available alone offer a safe basis for reform. Sidney and Beatrice Webb have shown us how concrete and realizable the structure of a proposed state can be.

Sidney Webb and Cole are respectively the active intellectual leaders of the Fabian and guild wings of the socialist movement in England. A comparison of their methods may be of interest. Sidney Webb has offered a number of realizable principles as a foundation, and on these principles he has constructed a realizable comprehensive superstructure. In Cole, his two principles—function and self-government—have become a fetish, while the structure which he has created is neither complete nor attainable. It is true that Cole only began his brilliant career comparatively recently, but the number of times he has in that short interval remodelled his guild society proves the inevitable confusion of his underlying assumptions.[13] Political theory should properly blaze the way for the facts, but Cole's society has so far outdistanced present-day facts as to be placed outside the pale of reality.

It is not as a theory of the state, however, but as a theory of administration of the functions of the state, that Cole's doctrine is most valuable. It is in the field of administration that his most suggestive contribution to the politics of socialism lies. There is no doubt that

the Fabians, even up to the end of the first decade of the century, concentrated mainly on distribution and not on condition of production.[14] To them the way to obtain socialism was through nationalization, which meant the control of industry by a government official at Whitehall in the interest largely of consumers. This system, of course, implied all the evils of autocratic control, centralization, and bureaucracy. Our chapter on the collectivists has shown us that this policy is no longer followed. The Webbs and MacDonald realize the necessity for decentralization and for the participation of experts and workers in the management of socialized industry. That the Fabian doctrine has been modified is surely in part due to the criticism of the guild socialists, of whom Cole is a foremost leader.

Recently there has been a *rapprochement* between the doctrines of the Fabians and those of the guild socialists. The former, indeed, stress more and more workers' control of industry, while the latter have come more to realize the necessity of protecting the interests of the consumers and the interrelated nature of all industries, as the recent writings of the Webbs and of Cole prove. Both wings of the socialist movement are equally anxious to prevent "government from above." It appears to us that to socialists the fundamental question is socialization under such conditions as will protect the interests of the consumers and stimulate the greatest possible self-development of those engaged in the particular industry. Whether in a socialist state any particular industry should be managed by the consumers, as is the case with the present co-operative societies, but with a sufficient degree of self-government by workers, whether by the workers themselves, as is the case with the present building guilds, whether a high degree of centralization can be with advantage carried out in industries like coal-mining and transport: these are questions

which will no doubt require different applications in different industries. For more immediate purposes there thus cannot be any rigid demarcation between these two wings of the socialist movement. It appears that the most profitable activity in the future for guild socialists lies in the field of application of the principle of self-government in industry by actual experiment.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE COMMUNISTS: WILLIAM PAUL AND E. AND C. PAUL.

If the liberal collectivists [1] represent the right and the guild socialists the centre,[2] the communists assuredly voice the opinion of the left wing of the contemporary socialist movement in Great Britain. Liberal collectivism under Fabian inspiration is mainly a theory of administration, while communism is essentially a theory of revolution. Guild socialism attempts to combine both. Even more than the guild socialists, and unlike the Fabians, the communists deny the efficacy of parliamentary institutions as a medium of reconstruction; but even less than the guild socialists, have they as yet elaborated with any completeness the institutional structure which will replace the present territorial state. It is true that they triumphantly point to the soviet organization of Russia as a sufficiently elaborate edifice to function after the overthrow of the existing political system. Yet it is, nevertheless, correct to say that their chief emphasis is on a doctrine which justifies revolution on the part of a rebellious minority against the constituted authority of the state. Like some of the dissenting sects of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they hold that, since within the confines of the state the good life is unattainable for them, they possess the right to destroy the state. In their enunciation of this doctrine lies their main importance for our purpose.

The communists, not the liberal collectivists, are the avowed followers of Marx. Their revolutionary politics is based, indeed, on the sociological synthesis

of Marx. To Marx we must return, then, if we are to grasp the foundations of communism.[3] Marx saw all historical movements, whether religious or cultural or political, as reflections of the predominant conditions under which any particular society sustains its material life. "It is not the consciousness of man," he said, "that determines his existence, but quite the reverse; it is his social existence that determines his consciousness."[4] Since the establishment of private property society has been divided into two hostile economic classes. Just as in the ancient world the interest of slave-owners was opposed to that of the slaves, and in mediæval Europe the interest of the feudal lords was opposed to that of the serfs, so in our own times the interest of the capitalist class, which derives its income mainly from the ownership of property, is antagonistic to the interest of the proletariat class, which depends for its livelihood chiefly upon the sale of its labour-power. By virtue of its control of the means of production—land and capital—the capitalist class appropriates the entire surplus of industry produced by the proletariat, the price of whose labour tends to equal only the cost of its subsistence. With the growing complexity of industrial technique, the control of industry will gradually concentrate in fewer and fewer capitalist units, while, at the same time, the conditions of the workers, relative to the enhanced wealth and power of their capitalist employers, will grow more and more precarious. Just as the birth of the capitalist class inevitably meant the birth of the proletariat, so will its triumph aggravate class antagonism and dissension, till, finally, its domination will end when the proletariat expropriates the means of production from the private owners. Communism, which by collective ownership and control of the means of production will inaugurate the emancipation of the working class, must thus in the course of social evolution succeed

capitalism. Yet, since no class will relinquish power without a struggle, a dictatorship of the proletariat, functioning under its own special political organization, will be necessary during the transition period. With the secure establishment of communism, the political state will disappear. It is these ideas that are either assumed or amplified or applied by contemporary communists.

Communism is an international body of doctrine and derived from the same source. Hence there is little difference between the theories of English or American[5] or Russian[6] exponents of that school. In England it does not possess great significance in current political speculation and practice. Yet its position as a world movement necessitates our giving its political aspects detailed consideration. It is certainly a movement with which the present state is concerned. William Paul (*The State*, 1917, *Communism* and *Society*, 1922) and Eden and Cedar Paul (*Creative Revolution*, 1920) may be taken as representative of those who have elaborated the political theory of communism in England.

William Paul analyzes the history and function of the state in terms of the Marxian thesis. Primitive clan organization, he states, was based upon kinship and communism. It achieved its ends not by compulsion, but by the cohesive forces of solidarity and custom. With private property and the class struggle came the state. The two chief aspects of the state are property and territorial organization. The historic *rôle* of the state has been to strengthen the power of the dominant economic class by putting down rebellion of the property-less at home and by foreign wars. The modern state is the organized political might of the capitalist. It is neither "order," nor "society," but the political executive of the propertied interests. Law is merely a declaration by the state of the will of the dominant class, and justice is the administration

and enforcement of the same law. It is true that the state undertakes functions which react on all classes, but only in order to concentrate all power within itself, and also in order to conceal its essentially class character. The state is *status quo*. All those who oppose it are regarded as enemies of society, when, as a matter of fact, their opposition is directed only against the rule of a class. In order to secure and extend the power of capitalism, it foments national and racial prejudice. The oppressed are thus divided at home, and acquiesce in imperialistic wars abroad. The state, with its army, navy, police, spies, bureaucracy, and courts, is the instrument of the exploiters.

In the modern state freedom for the masses is impossible, since the most valuable freedom is not the right to vote, but power over the means of life. Our system is essentially a dictatorship of the capitalists. "What determines a propertied class, in the social and relative sense, is not whether a worker possesses an alarm clock or whether a profiteer owns a Rolls-Royce car, *but whether any group, as a class, owns and controls the means whereby another class lives.*" [7] Freedom to the worker is merely freedom to change masters, which means that his masters, unlike the former slave-owners, are discharged from obligation to maintain him when work is not at hand. The extension of state control over industry strengthens only the master class, for the wage-earner is then compelled to fight not only against the individual capitalists, but also against the state army and bureaucracy. As the basis of the state is territorial, it can regulate industry only by means of the permanent officials, and this involves a tyranny of officialdom. Nor does state interference affect the commodity status of labour which is the crux of capitalism. Only with the abolition of the commodity status of labour will the antagonism of classes—rooted in the conflict between wages and surplus value—

end, and freedom for the masses be made possible. Freedom will be attainable only when economic equality and social control over the means of production supplement the existing fact of social production.

Parliamentary institutions cannot serve the purposes of freedom. They are merely a screen behind which capitalism rules unmolested. By the control of the press, church, and school, the capitalist class controls the minds of the workers, and hence their votes. During an election the workers are stampeded by appeals to passion. Some "stunts" like free trade or reform of the House of Lords are paraded, and the workers lashed into a fury. The main issue of capitalist exploitation is left untouched. After the orgy of the election is over, its alleged issues are either discarded or the decision of the voters openly disregarded or interpreted to suit the interests of the party in power. When capitalism sees a real threat, the sham disappears and its whole front is solid against labour. The individual member of Parliament is under the control of the party clique, which is in direct connection with finance-capital. The capitalist is invincible, since he can derange the economic mechanism of the country. Even if a revolutionary party should obtain a majority in Parliament, it will have to fight, as the Ulster dispute has shown, against the economic demoralization which capitalism can produce and against the army and bureaucracy, since the ruling class will not peacefully acquiesce. Since its territorial basis makes it impossible for Parliament to deal directly with industry, it was forced, in its recent extension of state control over industry, to resort to financial oligarchs and permanent officials, and thus gradually lost power. However, the chief defect of the parliamentary system is that its basis is remote from the mainsprings of life—the economic activities. It is founded on the erroneous theory that society is com-

posed of "citizens"—equal units of a democracy. The "individual" is but a figment of the bourgeois imagination; he exists only in relation to his economic class. Modern society is not composed of equal units, but of two irreconcilable classes. The parliamentary system is a farcical attempt to hide this vital fact. To be effective, government must be industrial, and under capitalism this is impossible, since the means of life are privately owned. Only with social ownership of the means of production and absolute control by the workers can we have industrial government.

To achieve this end will be the purpose of the social revolution—the transition period from capitalism to communism. It will be necessary to take advantage of any social crisis in order to uproot the capitalist order and capitalist state. The historic function of revolution is to destroy effete institutions in order to pave the way for construction. This will be the aim of the proletarian revolution. Capitalism was brought into being by a small clique and has continued its chequered career by means of a disguised dictatorship. Palliatives are sops which transform rebellion into servile submission. The revolution must therefore be thorough, with force as its midwife. Past revolutions have shown, however, that the force applied is due mainly to the counter-revolutionary movements, since no class will relinquish power without a struggle. They have also shown that a revolutionary force must apply its own code of legality, and have demonstrated the right of an emancipated class to expropriate the expropriators. The social revolutionary will fight with vigour, for he will be stimulated by the knowledge that his struggle is in accord with the current of social development, since capitalism, with its wars, crises, hates, and degradation of the masses, with its contradictions of social production and private control, of over-production and under-consumption, of the national political state and international finance, is a

dying institution. With the gradual decay of capitalism the social revolution will be more and more inevitable. It will be merely the decisive step in a long evolutionary process. During the revolution the spontaneous ferment aroused will free human intellect and stimulate it to new ventures. Then even the lethargic workers will join the leaders in the struggle for the emancipation of the proletariat and with it of the whole of humanity.

To prepare the workers for the crisis, and to acquaint the proletariat with industrial government, the revolutionary relies upon industrial unionism, with shop, district, and national councils, and upon a special workers' educational organization, a revolutionary press, and the political institutions of the capitalist state to spread the doctrine of the social revolution. The mechanism of the revolutionary proletariat at the time of crisis will be its own institutions based upon industrial functions organized in workers' local, district, and national councils. In the mass struggle every shop and locality will be a centre of attack and defence. The workers will then capture the political state with its army and bureaucracy only for the purpose of overthrowing it. With economic and political power in their hands, the workers, through their own state functioning through their own administrative functional councils, will inaugurate a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat in order to crush any counter-revolutionary movement. The workers must then, as a ruling class, consolidate the work of the revolution. When this is achieved, a Communist Republic will arise. The state will disappear, as there will then be no need for class coercion. Organization will be essential, but it does not involve force, but merely direction and supervision. Then the government of men will be replaced by the administration of functions and by the ascertainment of fact in industry, art, and science.

Paul's analysis of the state is the logical consequence of the Marxian theory of economic determinism and the class struggle. In the *Bibliography* we have inserted several criticisms of Marx.[8] Since we do not accept the Marxian doctrine, we cannot agree with Paul's theory of the state. We do not view the state as a glorified policeman used in the interests of the capitalists. The element of truth in Paul's interpretation is that property does play a predominant *rôle* in the affairs of the modern state. Property has frequently perverted the legitimate functions of the state. In order to have good government we must aim at a wide distribution of economic and political power, and at an enlightened population, since even a state where economic equality is the rule may be perverted by the sloth and ignorance of the people. Nor is the abuse of political authority peculiar only to property. Religious and national organizations may also corrupt the purposes of the state. The state is not an aspect of a particular form of industrial organization, but is an aspect of society organized to achieve certain common ends.

The state did not succeed the old tribal organization as a result of the rise of private property. In his anxiety to discredit the present, Paul gives to the past a Rousseauesque tinge. The state followed the old order for the same reason that railroads succeeded stage-coaches as means of locomotion. Tribal organization served the same purpose that the state serves now. A more complex form of organization followed the simpler form because social life became more complex. Laws are not the manifest will of the ruling class, as Paul believes, but rules of conduct enforced by the state, while the ideal of justice aims at the greatest possible harmonization of the interests of individuals and groups within the state. If communism is ever established, society will own and manage the means of production, may decentralize power on a functional

basis, and may apply little force, but such a society in its organized capacity, whatever name we may choose to give it, will have a state. Whatever basis of organization the state of the future may adopt, whether territorial or functional, or a combination of the two, is of little account in a general conception of the state. These various proposals are suggested administrative means to achieve its ends. We cannot conceive civilized society to be without some form of organization, and the state is merely the expression of such organization.

To Paul, the state is power—force used on behalf of the ruling economic class. He believes that the state carries on its diversified activities in order to concentrate all power within it, and to conceal its class character. We do not accept his explanation. Most of the recent extension of state action was achieved in opposition to the will of the dominant classes. It is true that the state, in the exercise of its function of adjusting the interests of individuals and groups, must frequently resort to force. The state possesses force as a reserve, and, as far as we can foretell at present, it will retain it as such in the future too. We can only hope to make this aspect of the state less important in the future. The use of force, however, is not peculiar to the state. Parents, churches, trade unions apply force, too; their force is of a different kind, but just as effective. Even if all men were capable of living peacefully without any threat of compulsion, as some are now, the state would still exist. Force is not its essential purpose; it serves the same purpose in the scheme of social life as the policeman serves when directing traffic at a cross-roads.

Paul declares that citizenship is a fiction. Society to him is torn in twain and most men may roughly be classified as belonging to one of the two antagonistic economic classes. To him the economic group is the only social reality, and hence the idea of citizenship is

based on a false analysis. From our conception of the state it logically follows that citizenship is not a fiction, but a vital social fact. It is active membership of a state; it is man in his political capacity. It is membership of the whole political community, and thus transcends membership of any association within the state. Since the state is an organization which coordinates all associations within it, membership of the state precedes in importance the membership of other associations. Man is a citizen first and a member of an economic, religious, or national group after. It is essential to emphasize now the obligation which each group owes to the state. Unless we do so, social peace is based on a precarious foundation.

Paul's exposition of freedom and the defects of parliamentary democracy is founded on surer grounds, but the only remedy he offers is revolution. Paul, following the Marxian analysis of history, sees the social revolution as inevitable. Therefore any reform is bad, since it retards its coming. He sees capitalism developing, with its hates, contradictions, and degradation of the masses, till ultimately the crash must come, ushering in the social revolution. It is the function of the social revolutionary to prepare for it and to hasten its coming. We do not see the historic process in the light of Marx. A violent economic upheaval we regard not as in accord with evolution, as Paul believes, but rather as a set-back—a stumbling block to the current of social development. We are inclined to view society in a more hopeful way than Paul. We do not regard existing society as impervious to reform. We believe that the conditions of the masses have improved and will continue to improve in the future unless international wars should intervene. Existing institutions are pregnant with possibilities, latent with potentialities. We believe in the gradual amelioration of social ills by social thought and foresight, and are looking to see in the future a

continuation of the ameliorative process of the past. In the course of the century the face of society may be revolutionized in the same sense as the Industrial Revolution revolutionized industry.

Since we do not see anything inevitable about the social revolution, we must regard Paul's theory purely as a doctrine of revolt against the constituted authority of the state. The right of a people to overthrow the existing authority, even by force, is generally admitted, but when this general right may be applied is a question which cannot be settled by abstract formulæ. Before any reply can be given, the tangible conditions of the particular case must be taken into consideration. In applying this general right to a definite situation, we submit certain considerations that it may be as well to bear in mind. The advocate of a violent revolution must feel reasonably certain (1) that peaceful and gradual methods will not accomplish his purpose; (2) that the bulk of the population is in support of, or at least in tacit sympathy with, his aims; and (3) that his constructive plan is superior to the system that he desires to overthrow. Judged by these conditions, Paul's case for a communist revolution in Great Britain is untenable.

Paul can resort to the available peaceful channels to propagate his cause. He must compel a reluctant public to accept his ideas by the force of his persuasion. In Czarist Russia, where a ruling class has continuously blocked all avenues of expression by brutal means, the case for a forcible rebellion is stronger. In Western Europe and the United States we are faced with a different set of conditions. Thus where, as in Great Britain, Paul's books are read and discussed, where the Communist Party can freely send a list of its books to any person desiring it, and where communist lecturers can openly preach their cause, the possibilities of peaceful penetration have not been exhausted. Communists are certainly frequently

baited, especially in times of social commotion, but revolutionaries should expect it and, further, are seldom checked by any petty interference.

Furthermore, it is pertinent to ask what proportion of the population of Great Britain supports, or is in sympathy with, Paul in his demand for a violent overthrow of the propertied classes. Paul does not believe in the existing forms of democracy, but for our purpose it is well to indicate the extent of support Paul's doctrine receives. It is to be noted that the choice offered is not between capitalism and communism, but between present society and the turmoil and uncertainty of revolution, since no one, including Paul, can foretell what type of society will ultimately emerge out of the chaos. In the circumstances, then, what groups favour a violent revolution? In whose interest is it demanded? Especially, what proportion of that class in whose special favour the revolution is advocated is at present its active supporters? The propertied classes will assuredly fight vehemently against any attempt to give Paul's theory concrete expression. The upper grades of the professions are in sympathy with the propertied interests, since with the abolition of capitalism they will find difficulty in adjusting themselves in a period of turmoil. The intellectual classes —the artists and authors—will in the main oppose revolution, since the upheaval which it would occasion would not be a suitable time to appreciate or support creative effort. The lower middle classes and those in the lower grades of the professions, too, will be in opposition, since their economic existence will be endangered. The little man will not take chances. The skilled artisans, again, will not agree with Paul's doctrine, since they might lose their favoured status. Of the unskilled classes a large portion pay no attention to social questions. The movement, then, for a violent abolition of private ownership of the means of production is favoured by a small number of Marxian

theorists, who are actively supported only by a small minority of the unskilled workers. For Paul to call the rest of the classes either slavish or selfish does not, even if it were a true explanation, change the facts. We are not justifying the conditions which tend to produce such vehement resentment on the part of a group, no matter how small; we are merely calling attention to realities. A minority may be a good opening wedge for peaceful agitation, but not for a violent revolution, in opposition to the interests and sympathies of the great bulk of the population. Paul says we have now a dictatorship of capitalists. By Paine and Godwin priests and kings were blamed for all human misery; to Paul the capitalist is the villain in the piece. Even if we accept Paul's exaggeration, there is certainly a difference between tacit submission to existing capitalists and the open opposition which a communist revolution would incur. We shall review later the idea of dictatorship as a problem in politics, but it is sufficient now to point out that all dictatorships are bad. Paul's definite promise is only to exchange our dictators.

Nor does Paul's thesis on its constructive side justify any confidence. Paul does not fully explain what kind of a society would replace the present. He merely promises that after the period of transition the administration of functions would replace the government of men. The very vagueness of the doctrine on its constructive side may explain the reason for the emotional appeal which it makes. We have already noticed how the liberal collectivists under the leadership of the Webbs have definite plans to deal with concrete problems. We are thus informed of and hence know what to expect in a collectivist state. The communists, however, regard the fact that they do not speculate upon the future as a virtue. Like the French syndicalists, perhaps, they rely upon the "*philosophie de l'action qui donne la première place*

*à l'intuition*." [9] The only definite thing that we may be certain of is that there will be violence and a dictatorship. The chaos and dictatorship are certain; the promised peace and security are uncertain and indefinite. "A very long time of transition," Lenin has said, "is necessary to pass from capitalism to Socialism; the transformation of production is a difficult thing; we need time to transform all the conditions of life." [10] The communists are correct in refusing to prophesy the course of events: for who dares to foretell with any confidence what will emerge out of the welter? We agree with Paul that the revolutionary spirit will stimulate energy, but the only tangible result would be the unloosening of fierce passions. The only choice Paul offers us is between the present system and the turmoil and confusion of a revolution. Under the circumstances Paul's doctrine is one of heedless recklessness. We must conclude, then, that as a problem in political theory Paul's idea of revolution against the state is not acceptable, since there is still free trade in ideas, and hence communism must take its stand in a competitive market; that it is not supported by, nor in the interest of, the bulk of the population; and that it is not a constructive social philosophy.

Again, we cannot enter here into a lengthy discussion of the practical difficulties which a communist revolution, as advocated by Paul, would meet in Great Britain. We shall only mention one aspect, which belongs to our special field. The communist revolution has failed in Finland and Hungary. Its initial success in Russia was due to defeat in war and hence to the desertion of the army, to the demoralization of life, to the bitter memories of oppression, and to the political inexperience of the bulk of the people. The communist dictators there succeeded a long line of autocrats. With their retention of power the revolutionaries were forced in a world of capitalism

to modify their principles. Paul himself realizes that conditions in Great Britain are different from those in Russia.[11] It is easy to exaggerate national differences, yet it is well to note that the British people will not easily submit to dictators, nor accept sudden and violent upheavals, nor is it fond of abstract theories. There is a spirit of legality in Great Britain which, though weakened by recent events, is still strong. The British people is also highly educated politically and is unlikely to endure doctrinaire dictators. The concrete mind of the British people perhaps offers some explanation as to why the administrative collectivism of the Fabians has taken root. A communist revolution in Great Britain would probably be ruthlessly crushed and would be followed by a period of reaction. If England is to have a socialized state, it can only achieve it peacefully and gradually.

Eden and Cedar Paul have elaborated more fully than William Paul the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship and of the soviet organization as a medium of communist revolution and reconstruction. They approach an anti-democratic political theory *via* an anti-intellectualist psychology. The democratic thesis, they argue, is based on the wrong notion that man is thoroughly rational. Democracy, in fact, denies this allegation; the present political state represents nothing but the rule of a propertied oligarchy supported by a mob of un-class-conscious proletarians. The moving force of life is not reason, as the democrats assume, but creative will; reason is the servant of the volitional impulse. The function of revolution is to discharge in a period of crisis the accumulated vital impulse. The communist revolution will thus be a supreme manifestation of the creative will-to-change. It will be an achievement not of reasoned appeals, but of revolutionary will; not of justice but of vital force. However, the creative will in its full meaning is largely the

monopoly of the few. The proletarian revolution will actually be the work of the select few in whom the class-conscious will-to-change is most lucid. These few will be followed by others in whom class-consciousness is merely a vague feeling that under capitalism they are "bested by the boss." The creative will-to-change will be released and diffused by the momentum of the revolution, thus enlarging man's capacity for constructive effort and hastening the dawn of the communist society. During the transition period a dictatorship of the organized class-conscious proletariat under its leaders will be essential to maintain order and repress the recalcitrant elements. As institutions are being remoulded and the coarse mentality bred by "ownership rule" is being altered, the dictatorship will gradually be replaced by the self-discipline of free and enlightened workers guided by their inspired leaders. With the total extinction of class distinctions and the socialization of man's nature, there will emerge a communist ergatocracy—a society based not on rule but on fellowship of workers co-operating in the administration of economic functions and voluntarily abiding by their leaders as members of an orchestra follow their conductor.

The instrument of the proletarian mass attack on capitalism and the means by which the workers will seize economic and political power will be not Parliament, but the organization of the soviets—councils of workers' delegates irrespective of sex or craft. Parliament is merely the political corollary of the economic dictatorship of the capitalists. As power is passing from ownership to function, the soviets will become more and more the rallying centre of the class-conscious masses. The workers have no confidence in Parliament, and that alone is sufficient reason why it cannot be the means of communist reconstruction. The soviet organization, moreover, is superior to

Parliament in several respects. First, the basis of authority in it is not representative, but delegatory. The primary soviet, in the nature of a factory or dock-yard committee selected by the workers, will send delegates to the local soviet, the local soviet will send delegates to a regional soviet and also delegates to the All-British Soviet. Each delegate in the various soviets will possess only the expressed authority of mandates on definite questions, will be liable to recall, and perhaps will be elected only for three or six months. Second, each soviet will have both legislative and executive power. It will thus deliberate on policies and execute the same policies. Third, the structure of the soviets tends to decentralization, and hence is more compatible with freedom. Fourth, it is based upon self-governed industry, the mainspring of life and focus of proletarian will. Such will be the mere skeleton of the new structure; the creative will-force will supplement the details.

By their enunciation of the two cardinal principles of communism—the dictatorship of the proletariat and the soviet organization—E. and C. Paul emphasize the difference between liberal collectivism and communism. The collectivists believe that the existing society is not necessarily so divided into two hostile camps that reunion is impossible. By gradual and peaceful means they hope to achieve a more integrated and unified society. They aim at making the political state the expression of social solidarity. In the existing parliamentary system, modified so as to avoid the evils of bureaucracy and to permit the participation of workers in socialized industry, they see the means of achieving the socialist commonwealth of the future. The communists, however, hold that existing society is torn in twain, and only by the complete overthrow of the dominant economic class is freedom for the masses obtainable. The present state they consider to be the expression of the domination of

capitalists. To achieve the end of capitalism, they advocate a temporary dictatorship of the proletariat and, if necessary, a violent revolution. To them, not Parliament but the soviet organization is the means of achieving the freedom of the masses. The communists are also internationalists. They stress the international solidarity of labour against international capitalism, and therefore refused to support their respective countries in the Great War.[12] The two wings of the socialist movement, then, have diverse views of the state and of administration.

E. and C. Paul, as we have seen, are avowed advocates of the rule of oligarchy. We have noticed previously how Mallock advocates the retention of the rule of oligarchy in industry and politics because ability, he believes, is confined to the select few.[13] Our present authors, however, favour a communist dictatorship because the creative revolutionary will is the gift of the few. They thus advocate not a dictatorship of a few persons, as Mallock apparently does, nor do they propose a dictatorship of the working class as a whole. They argue for a dictatorship of communists, that is, of a part of the proletarian masses, of the class-conscious minority of the masses, over the rest of the entire population. We see, nevertheless, no necessary relation between the creative will and communism. There is no logical affinity between the *élan vital* and revolutionary proletarian theory. We shall see later how G. Bernard Shaw applies the conception of creative will to a different sphere of thought entirely and more acceptably.[14] Even if we accept the doctrine that the creative will is confined to a small minority, we are not at all compelled by that admission to accept the theory of a communist dictatorship. Their doctrine is consequently a justification of dictatorship in general, as their theory of communist dictatorship is a *non sequitur* from their theory of creative will.

Our authors argue that the democratic thesis is

based upon the belief that man is a rational being; and hence, with the denial of the rationality of man, the case for democracy is shattered. In their discussion we see another illustration of the prevalent anti-intellectualism. However, we do not believe that the theory of democracy is necessarily tied to any particular psychology. True, the early philosophers of democracy have exaggerated the rational faculty in man. The denial of the intellectualist psychology merely shows that the facile optimism of the Utilitarians was unfounded; but the democratic thesis is still unimpaired. Suppose we accept their psychological view that man is mainly a creature not of reason but of impulses, we may still hold that political democracy offers the best means of guiding or expressing these impulses. An anti-intellectualist psychology, since it stresses impulses and will, does stimulate the revolutionary zealot, but it does not deny the validity of popular rule.

Again, and more important, the realization that man is now politically exploited by appeals to his emotions makes it more essential that we stress the application of reason to politics. To the Utilitarians the problem of politics was simple: give man the ballot and his calculated self-interest will do the rest. A century of experience has shown us the complications of popular government. We know, for one thing, that man is largely a creature of non-rational inference. Since human beings are emotional creatures, the government of man is more difficult than it was formerly considered to be, for impulses are regulated with difficulty, and easily exploited. Still, the fact that we realize this means that we know more now about human nature than we did a century ago, and are therefore better equipped to deal with our problems than our predecessors were. Thus we know that man is impulsive, but we also know that our emotions are unstable and unreliable props in politics.

Not in the glorification of impulses or in the denial of democracy, but, following Professor Wallas, in "the triumph of human reason" [15] is there any hope for the future stability of society. Our problem is to heighten the play of reason in the management of our common affairs, and to guide, not repress, the instinctive dispositions of man in healthy social channels. We must learn to apply a quantitative analysis to social facts.

Moreover, an anti-intellectualist psychology weakens rather than strengthens the doctrine of communism. Our authors stress impulsive action; they belittle the play of reason. The essence of impulses is that they are not easily subjected to regulations. It is difficult to modify them. They flare up unexpectedly. It is only with difficulty that they are checked by rules. Yet our authors offer a rigid universal dogmatism. They advocate the subjection of man to a rigid set of doctrines. Some one else may be discovered to possess a creative will of his own and smash the communistic society of our writers. If man is a creature of passionate emotions, we have no right to believe that man will submit to the well-rounded communistic system. Once we disregard the path of reason we are treading upon dangerous ground. In fact, as we shall point out more fully later, E. and C. Paul, like their Utilitarian predecessors whose psychology they deny, tend to over-simplify the issue.

In the presentation by our present authors of the theory of dictatorship, we recognize another illustration of the intellectual poverty on the positive side of all the critics of democracy. It was H. G. Wells who stated: "I know of no case of elective Democrative government of modern States that cannot be knocked to pieces in five minutes." [16] However, most cases for any other form of government can be refuted in less than five minutes. Lord Bryce, in completing his survey of modern democracies, declares that the

friends of democracy can always retort to grave indictments by the simple question: "What better alternatives do you offer?"[17] Such a retort is indeed the most telling argument for popular government.

As we have seen, E. and C. Paul advocate the substitution for existing democracy of a dictatorship of communists. The dictators will presumably replace their own rule with a more popular form when all opposition to them is removed, and when they decide that a communist mentality is widespread. They are to decide, further, what means to take to achieve the end of their own rule. We do not see why we should have more confidence in communist dictators than in any other kind of dictators. The strongest argument against any form of dictatorship by a small minority is that we have no assurance that the interest of the dictators will always coincide with the interests of the community. Our communists constantly emphasize the evils of concentration of wealth, but they are blind to the evils of concentration of power. Wealth is merely one form of power; office is another. Our communists criticize the politicians of the liberal collectivist parties to the effect that as soon as they assumed office they lost their ideals.[18] We cannot for a moment entertain the notion that communist leaders are immune from ordinary human frailties. The concentration of power, which the critical period of the revolution will necessitate, makes the danger more evident. Past experience with fanatical dictators does not justify any confidence in them. The rule of the Puritans in early Massachusetts, of Calvin in Geneva, of Cromwell in England, show the danger of the rule of doctrinaires. Selfishness may easily disguise itself in noble pretensions, especially when discovery will be difficult. Even if the first dictators are high-minded, we have no assurance that their successors will be likewise. Even if they are all benevolent, they will not be able to represent the

diverse interests of the whole community. Mere retention of office will give them a distinct mentality. The very intensity of their belief gives them a singular outlook and hence estranges them from the rest of the people. The communist rulers will become a privileged office-holding class with a distinct class character of its own, and thus remote from the rest of the population.[19]

Nor can we neglect the educational value of democracy. The essence of education is to socialize man's nature and to develop his rational faculty. To this end political democracy, even if imperfect and abused by selfish interests, is of value. The mere act of casting a ballot or of sitting on a jury is good training. It cannot but awaken in the individual a communal sense, a realization that his interests are related to those of his fellows. It tends to give one a larger horizon than one's immediate personal or family interests. The same purpose is also served by membership of any association within the state, but active citizenship is the most significant, as, with perhaps the exception of the church, it is widest in its reach. It is to be remembered that the communist dictators would debar the majority from all civic participation, and hence that they would deprive the bulk of the people of Western Europe and of the United States from the benefits which, as no one can deny, they derived from popular rule. Our communists believe that our elections are orgies of capitalist fictions foisted upon a deluded public.[20] Their only suggestion, however, is to substitute their own fictions for those of the capitalists.

Our communists argue that capitalist bias poisons our general outlook, and hence that any form of education, whether political or otherwise, is impossible under the present system.[21] Their positive suggestion is not to establish a free and liberal educational policy, but a narrow communist orthodoxy. They aim at

shackling the popular mind with a rigid dogmatism. In Russia this plan has actually been put into effect.[22] The communists argue that our society is ruled by capitalists. It is more important, however, to emphasize the acquisitive mentality which can only be eradicated by a slow process of education. This education can be better carried on in normal circumstances than during, or immediately after, a revolution, when human nature is demoralized. Our authors agree that the social revolution may mean a world convulsion.[23] Such a period is hardly a suitable one in which to begin education. Nor do we see any reason for taking risks with dark chaos and the grey unknown. The communists have a right to demand freedom of speech and of the press in order to lay their case peacefully before the public. They are entitled to the ordinary liberties. Recent events, too, have shown the effectiveness of communist propaganda. Thus, to mention one example, communist propaganda in the Middle East was so fruitful that it frightened the British Lion.[24] With free trade in ideas, we do not despair of human nature. To perfect it we see no need for a dictatorship of well-meaning doctrinaires.

To E. and C. Paul the communist dictatorship will not follow existing popular rule, for they consider our democracy to be a sham, as we are actually governed by a veiled dictatorship of capitalists. There is, nevertheless, an obvious difference between a *régime* in which the majority acquiesces and a *régime* established in open opposition to the bulk of the population, such as is implied by our authors' proposals. It is the tacit consent of the predominant majority that gives stability to the modern state. With the weakening of ancient reverences no single class can retain power long. The people will become restive, and only brute force will be able to subdue them. Their proposal really means the imposition of a Red military despotism over the peoples of Western Europe and of the

United States—peoples which have been schooled, to say the least of it, in the forms of liberty and democracy. The principle that a people is entitled to self-determination may have some limitation, but it surely applies to the peoples of Western Europe and of the United States. Yet it is on these very peoples that our writers aim at imposing the rule of dictators. If we deny the right of civilized peoples to their own salvation, we are justifying the attitude which imperialism has always taken and which the Allied Governments have followed in their harassing of Soviet Russia.[25] Our authors' chief criticism of the present system is that under it the proletariat is deprived of freedom;[26] yet they suggest the inauguration of a *régime* ostensibly based on the subjection of the vast majority. Even if the dictators are benevolent, the majority will not be free, since the essence of freedom is conduct governed by self-imposed rules. If human beings acquiesce in one *régime*, only an appeal to their intellect, not force, can make them acquiesce in another *régime*. Otherwise communism will appeal only to those imbued with a lust for power or a spirit of despair.

As the machinery of revolution, our authors suggest the soviet form of administration. This basis of organization is actually used in Russia, and is the theory of administration of international communism.[27] It should be noted, however, as the Webbs mention in their *Constitution* (pp. 210–211), that the Russian franchise as regards the industrial workers is not based on vocational representation, but on "place of work," irrespective of the particular vocation which the individual worker may pursue in the factory. The workers' delegate thus represents not a single function, but a collection of functions, which is precisely the purpose actually served by territorial representation. With regard to the peasants, the Russian franchise is actually geographical, but, in reality, owing to the

vocational homogeneity of the bulk of the village population, it is also vocational. Assuredly no such vocational homogeneity exists anywhere in Great Britain, but even if it does exist in some districts, as perhaps in the case of certain mining areas, the present geographical basis gives it effective representation.

For us the main significance of the proposal of E. and C. Paul is that it offers another illustration of the revolt against pure territorial representation and of the demand for self-government in industry. We cannot accept the soviet system as a complete form of political organization, however. To our communists the pivot of social life is industry, and hence they hold industrial representation to be sufficient for all purposes. However, according to our conception of the state, such a form of representation would not be sufficient, as it would merely represent one phase of social activity. We have already mentioned that citizenship is to us a social reality; it alone is the medium of political unity. The state co-ordinates all functions within it. For the purpose of representing citizenship, the territorial constituency is best. Functional representation, by whatever method is most suitable for the particular conditions, may assist and supplement the territorial representation, but the main basis must be geographical.

Our authors state that the soviet organization is decentralized and hence valuable. In appearance it is so, but whether it can withstand the pressure of critical events or the final organization of a complex life is a different question. The soviet organization of Russia became largely centralized as events grew critical.[28] Again, centralization is not inherent in the territorial basis. There is no reason why local and regional centres cannot function well within the political state. The Governments of the United States and Switzerland are more decentralized than

those of France and Germany. Our authors declare that industrial representation is close to the workers, and hence that their interest will be enlisted. The workers in a particular factory may know the immediate needs of their working surroundings, but they no more know about the general needs of the industry as a whole than about war and peace. The workers are undoubtedly entitled to representation in those affairs that are close to their working lives, but we must not exaggerate the simple knowledge or goodwill of the average wage-earners. Nor have elections in trade unions shown that the workers as a body have more interest in them than in the political elections of the modern state. We venture to assert that when there is ultimately evolved a political structure which will give due consideration to the representation of citizenship, to the representation of the workers in the particular affairs of interest to them, to the complex relation between different establishments in the same industry, to the relation between industry and industry, and to the relation between producers and immediate and ultimate consumers, it may, when developed, approximate to the plan which the Webbs have outlined in their *Constitution*.[29]

Again, the soviet organization, as proposed by our authors, is highly indirect. The primary soviet, it is suggested, will elect delegates to a regional soviet and also delegates to the All-British Soviet. Thus the delegates of the regional soviet and of the All-British Soviet will be two stages removed from those whose will they are supposed to carry out. The governors are thus removed from the governed, and the danger that they may not be sufficiently conscious of their responsibility to the people is evident. When it is remembered that these soviets are to decide questions both of administration and of legislation—questions of policy—the need for direct responsibility is more obvious. True, our authors suggest the recall and

short terms of office in order to check the delegates. However the multiplication of elections, added to existing wheels within wheels, will only make confusion more confounded. In the United States the multiplication of elections tends to strengthen the party bosses. Such a system is indeed suitable for manipulation by a ring of insiders. This has actually been the case in Russia.[30] It is true that in Russia the communists recognized that during the critical period concentration in the hands of a few was inevitable, but, we submit, the soviet system is conducive to that evil even in normal times.

Moreover, the soviet plan of administration may give undue power to the predominant party, because the delegates representing the minority parties will gradually be weeded out in the indirect elections, unless a scheme of proportional representation is strictly adhered to. The local and primary soviets may also become centres of intrigue and propaganda by the different parties or factions, which will aim at electing their men as delegates to the higher soviets. Thus the energies of the smaller soviets as governing bodies for their particular localities will be perverted and misdirected. This has actually been the case with some of the state legislatures in the United States when each legislature had the power to elect two members of the federal Senate. (We have already mentioned the educational value of political democracy, but a system of indirect election will deprive the people of a good part of their political education. Nor do we see how indirect election will prevent the election of demagogues, for if the people can be fooled directly, they can also be fooled indirectly.) The Senate of the United States has actually improved in integrity and repute since its members have been directly elected.

(Our authors offer as one reason for the superiority of the soviet system to the parliamentary the fact that the soviet will possess both legislative and

executive power. The soviet is a council or committee, and it is a common observation that a body of men is a good instrument for legislation, but not for execution of policy. For deliberation on policy a committee is effective, but to enforce the policy and administer its operation requires greater concentration. The recent history of the British Cabinet is of interest on the point at hand. During the war even the twenty odd members of the Cabinet were too many for the purposes of effective deliberation, and real deliberative power actually was in the hands of a small inner Cabinet. After the war the Cabinet was forced to rely more and more upon the work of its own Committees. The recent movement in the United States for the Manager Plan of municipal government—a system based upon an expert administrative head responsible to a small deliberative council—is due, at least in part, to the realization that the execution of policy is different from deliberation. These two functions require different modes of organization.

Our authors dwell upon the point that each delegate will have been given expressed mandates on definite questions. He will thus be purely the mouthpiece of the soviet which elects him. As a matter of fact, this principle has definite limits. Questions frequently arise which at the time of election had not even been thought of. If the delegates will be required to ask the opinion of their soviet on all occasions when new questions arise, it must mean endless delay. Moreover, each delegate can have a mandate on only a few questions; he cannot be instructed on all the innumerable problems which a complex society must deal with. Then the task of being merely the messenger of the soviet will not appeal to men of initiative and energy, and hence only men of second-rate ability will be candidates. These can more easily be manipulated by the leaders. We believe that the representative can with advantage be

instructed only in a most general way, and this is best achieved when the candidate is a member of a political party representing definite ideas and interests.

We must also note the danger of over-simplifying the problem of good government. In the last analysis the type of political structure is only of secondary importance. We do not see why the soviet organization which our authors propose is not just as open to perversion as the parliamentary system. It is just as liable to be misapplied by windbags or by the stupidity of the masses. With class-conscious, wide-awake, and determined communists almost any structure will express their intense zeal. The communists of Russia have shown in the main a remarkable sense of *esprit de corps* and obedience to their leaders irrespective of personal danger.[31] The Russian communists have been so long misrepresented that one feels toward them the natural sympathy with those falsely maligned.[32] Then, again, they are idealists with a vision of society in their minds and free from the passion of acquisitiveness which poisons our civilization. They gain much in contrast with the greed and selfishness of the leaders of the counter-revolutionaries and with the deluded or vicious leaders of their foreign invaders, who feared that communism might succeed. In Russia the communists actually became a "Communist Order of *Samurai*." Even there the communists have at times recognized that many of their members have joined their party not for the sake of an ideal but for selfish motives.[33] The spirit of sustained zeal and sacrifice can be expected even from followers only in times of crisis and only from the rare few who are inspired with a selfless devotion to an ideal. This was actually the situation in Russia. As far as the bulk of the population is concerned in ordinary times, a change of political structure is of little avail. We do not see why, in normal times, a demagogue cannot

hoodwink a soviet as easily as he can a legislative assembly based on territorial representation. No system can function well if the masses are unintelligent or uninterested in social questions.

Our discussion of communism reveals the fact that it is a cry of the disinherited. It is a philosophy of despair. It is the gospel of those who have no stake in the existing order. Marx and Lenin, driven, haunted, persecuted, become logically irreconcilable rebels. To an unskilled labourer who has ever thought of his hopeless position, communism comes as a revelation. From his present trap he sees no escape; he feels outraged. To him communism offers not only the alleged causes of his present misery, but also, though more vaguely, promises of a better future. Communism rationalizes his emotions, and he becomes a passionate convert to a doctrine which voices his helpless rage. H. G. Wells throws interesting light on this point. "There would have been Marxists," he states, "if Marx had never lived. When I was a boy of fourteen I was a complete Marxist, long before I had heard the name of Marx. I had been cut off abruptly from education, caught in a detestable shop, and I was being broken in to a life of mean and dreary toil. I was worked too hard and for such long hours that all thoughts of self-improvement seemed hopeless. I would have set fire to that place if I had not been convinced it was over-insured." [34] Russia, where the wage-earners were brutally exploited and where a cruel despotism enraged the free spirit, offered a congenial soil for a doctrine of revolt.[35] In some western parts of the United States, where homeless and needy men are shamefully mistreated, the destructive doctrines of the I.W.W., based on the Marxian idea of the class struggle, make their appearance. Only when we remove the causes which produce communism will the doctrine itself disappear. For that end we need not repression, but freedom; not hate, but

kindness and understanding. A society that is free and tolerant, where no individual can abuse economic or political power, will have no one-sided revolutionaries. Where there is no fierce passion of resentment to oppression, there communism will make little appeal.

In the four preceding chapters we have surveyed the theories of the three wings of contemporary socialism in Great Britain. The predominant popular movement at the beginning of the past century was democracy, at its end socialism. In 1789 France astounded the world by proclaiming political liberty. France was later forced to retrace her steps, but the history of the past century is a commentary on the French upheaval. That revolution was the concrete application of the ideas of Rousseau, whose *Contrat Social* the French radicals held as their bible. In 1917 Russia shook the world. The world is still amazed because the event was so astounding. The Bolshevist Revolution overthrew the Kerensky Government, which was in fact a revolutionary force itself aiming at achieving for Russia what the French Revolution had achieved for Western Europe. Power was then assumed not in the interest of the industrial classes, but in the interest of the factory and farm " hand," not in the name of political freedom—for communists aim at eventually abolishing all forms of political rule—but in the name of economic freedom. Russia, like France, is now apparently forced to retrace her steps.[36] She may achieve the socialization of her industries at a gradual pace. Lenin finishes his commentary on the political theory of Marx with the bland statement that activities of a practical kind prevent him from continuing this work.[37] Lenin's activities were connected with an event no less significant than leadership in the Bolshevist Revolution. A comparison of the work of Lenin with the theories of Marx shows how faithfully the disciple followed the precepts of his master. Both the French and Russian Revolutions demonstrate the

latent explosiveness of ideas. Great Britain followed a more gradual process politically, and may pursue a similar career economically.

Will the twentieth century be a commentary on the Communist Revolution of Russia as the nineteenth century was on the French Revolution? We shall not attempt to summarize the past of socialism, or predict its future. We shall leave this to the future historian who will achieve for socialism what Bryce did for nineteenth-century democracy.[38] Nor shall we appeal to our imaginary historian to answer our question in a definitive manner. Here we shall merely apply ourselves to the less ambitious task of mentioning certain aspects which socialism tended to emphasize. First, it calls attention to the inherent rottenness of an acquisitive civilization where frequently efforts of no social value or of absolute social harm are rewarded with the power and prestige that no passionate service to humanity could offer. It stresses the ideal of service and disparages possessiveness. It visualizes a society so organized that industries are managed for public welfare and not for private gain. Its goal is an integrated society, and it aims at using social institutions to achieve its end. Second, it emphasizes the economic foundation of the good life. Civilization may be everything above mere subsistence, yet the base cannot be neglected. The reformer of the past century fought for religious and political liberty; the socialist follows him with economic freedom. Third, socialism stresses the significance of the social environment. It points out that in degraded and base surroundings individual will and character can develop but little. It thus emphasizes social assistance where needed, so that opportunities may be equalized and individuality encouraged. Fourth, it constantly points to problems which require solution. Its agitation reveals existing maladjustment. It is a plea for the needy, the low-born, and disinherited.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE THEORY OF COMPROMISE: HOBHOUSE AND BRYCE

WHILE the authors that we have considered thus far belong mainly either to the right or to the left of political thought, the writers that we shall now review represent definitely the centre. When the radical directs us to the point of ultimate destination, and the conservative bids us not to embark on so perilous a journey, our present writers attempt to guide our progress steadily from point to point along the route.[1] While they prize existing institutions, they still consider them to be only points of departure. They aim at following a safe course between blind worship of the past and insecure innovations. To them the existing social system is neither the consummate perfection of social evolution nor a stumbling block to improvement, but rather the raw material for progress. In the plastic society of to-day they see the potentialities of a better future. The achievements of the past must point to the slow and painful process which will evolve the society of to-morrow. They thus aim at harmonizing the "charm of change and the charm of stability."

In their general approach we observe also a word of caution which perhaps may be best expressed in the following form. The social bonds are now held on slender threads, as it were; let us refrain from giving the shock which may tear them asunder. It is not that we fear experiment, but we fear dissolution. We must say now, as it was said to Napoleon, "It is necessary to live." Did not Marx say, "Thank God, I am not a Marxian"? It is more pertinent now to plead for

calculated change than for hasty departures or impossible goals. At any rate, let us first be certain of our climbing powers before we attempt to scale loftier eminence.

The problem which our writers face is how to make liberty, which is essentially a negative principle, serve as a valid foundation for the positive theory of the state that the stress of events demands. When attention is diverted from a theory founded on a *régime* of free contract to the realities of an altered situation which denies free contract to the vast masses, the need for a new synthesis is obvious. At the turn of the century we see signs of this attempt. In his *Democracy and Reaction* (1904) Professor L. T. Hobhouse points out that the philosophy of non-interference assumed effective equality between the bargaining parties, and therefore whenever such premise is not valid, it is unjust to treat unequals equally. He thus summons the state to create the conditions for real freedom.[2] In his later restatement of *Liberalism* (1911) the meaning of freedom is so far extended as to be acceptable to the Fabians. From the principle of social liberty he derives the doctrine of an organic state and its duty in the economic sphere to attempt to equate reward with service.[3] At the same time J. A. Hobson in his *Crisis of Liberalism* (1909) looks to the state to establish substantial economic equality.[4] Like the liberal collectivists, both writers distinguish property based on social function from that divorced from any function, and implore state assistance for the sections of the population which are unable to obtain by their own efforts the necessities of civilized existence. Nor were men of affairs less conscious of the need for a restatement. Thus H. H. Asquith in his Introduction to Mr. (now Sir) Herbert L. Samuel's *Liberalism* (1902) declares that the essence of liberty must imply more and more not merely the removal of obstructions, but the

definite development of human personality, and that this conception of liberty must lie at the basis of legislation. The mass of social legislation during the same period indicates another coincidence of theory with fact.[5] Within more recent years this theory has gained ground and it therefore demands fuller analysis.

An understanding of the theory of compromise as formulated at present may best be approached by a review of the more recent writings of Professor L. T. Hobhouse, especially the four volumes which constitute his *Principles of Sociology*.[6] In the chapter on the idealists we have already referred to his criticism of the metaphysical position. Here we are concerned with a more consistent exposition of his own doctrine.[7] Professor Hobhouse is the true successor to J. S. Mill in the line of realistic political thinkers. Like J. S. Mill, he is the outstanding exponent of the libertarian principle, but, living in a generation with a more mature social experience than that of Mill, he attempts to translate this principle into present-day needs. Like Mill, Professor Hobhouse grounds his theory of the state on a theory of morals. His underlying ethical doctrine is the principle of harmony which recognizes the goal of social evolution to be the harmonious correlation of all the legitimate interests in society.[8] "This is a direct inference from the principle of harmony which sees the good in a system of life shared by all who come into relation with one another, and deems anything that conflicts with such a system bad and anything irrelevant to it indifferent."[9] His politics, then, are dominated by the application of this ethical view.

Society, to Professor Hobhouse, is a network of diversified social relationships. It is a tissue of social interconnections which affect the individual, whether he is conscious or unconscious of their influence. It is unlimited in space and its origin coincides with the

origin of man. This unlimited web of relations gives rise to more definable groupings. Among civilized peoples the most extensive tie is the community which is based on the observance of a common rule. Formal authority and government are not essential to the formation of a community, but what is necessary is obedience to generally accepted principles of conduct. These rules develop from unconscious custom into deliberative law and formal authority. Within the community there are numerous associations for definite functions. The system of organs which enforces and formulates the common rules is the state.[10] The state is thus the machinery of law, government, and defence, and the authority from which they are derived. In a democratic state membership coincides with that of the community. Therefore the state may be regarded as the organized community, but even then state institutions constitute but a small fraction of the totality of communal life. "It may perhaps be suggested that a State is a fabric in which the principal functions, the declaration of law, its execution, and the common defence, are differentiated and co-ordinated."[11] The state prescribes rights and duties and organizes the common force and resources for the general interest. Its development accompanies the growing complexity of communal life.

Any stable human aggregate, such as the state, or a church, or the community, is a psychic phenomenon—the consummation of the interaction of minds. Each group has certain attributes which cannot be ascribed to the individuals when separated from the association. It is thus an entity which contains more than the mere sum of detached parts. Its decisions and work may be different from those of the individuals when unassociated. It is a mental network which modifies the lives of the individuals who form its constituent elements. However, any such association is still a group of individuals and no more; the whole is no

more than the co-ordinated activity of its parts. It is not above, or distinct from, or superior to, its component individuals. Its good and happiness cannot be abstracted from the good and happiness of its members. The distinct result which any aggregation of individuals obtains is due to the fact that a definite relation exists between its individuals, and the result derived is due to the special relation and to nothing else. The group may exist through generations of individuals, but it is still the individuals that constitute its life and transmit its tradition from generation to generation. It thus cannot have a separate end, or interest, or will. What is wholesome in the life of any association must complete the lives of the men and women who compose it. Its functions cannot thus be immune from the critical analysis of its members.

The state is one organization in the network of associations which constitutes the life of the community. The destruction of the state is, indeed, compatible with the retention of the life of the community. Simpler communities do not possess state systems, and with advancement of civilization it may be possible to dispense with much of formal law and government. Like any other association, the state fulfils a function and is a means to the life of harmony, but this function may be modified and changed as the reflective reason of individuals may suggest. Historically, force, altruism and egoism, generosity and cruelty, reason and stupidity, have all played a *rôle* in its development. Its history does not reveal any systematic evolution of coherent rationality, but frequently merely the imposition of the wills of a few on the subdued many. Thought and reflection have played a part, but it is not the thought and reflection of a unitary will, but of many wills. "It is not, as we have repeatedly maintained, one thought and one will, but the combination of many minds thinking and willing, each by its own

lights and each acting too often in accordance with its selfish interests." [12] There is a sense of unity vaguely felt by its component individuals which transcends mere transitory differences. "To express this aspect of social life, we might speak of social mentality, provided we understand that the kind of unity which the term expresses is not the unity of a person or self but that of many centres of thought and will in interaction." [13] Public decisions in the state are actually reached by means in which congeries of psychological forces participate. Will which implies deliberation is thus not applicable to such decisions. Solutions are reached by compromise and by the co-operation of individuals. The common good as a consistent plan of action is not general, but confined to a few select reflective individuals. What is general is an indefinable, incoherent mass of psychological forces. The law and conduct of the state must always be subjected to the reflective moral judgments of its individuals, and final judgment rest with their conscience. If an individual, after he has taken into consideration the limitations of his own understanding and the social consequences resulting from his dissent, should then decide to oppose a declared state policy, disobedience is for him a moral necessity. On its part, the state may coerce, but it must prevent possibility of clash of conscience, realize the value of reflective citizenship, and avoid cruelty or insult in its punishments.

Rights are not derived from legislative enactments of the state, but from the moral order underlying social relations.[14] A right is a claim on the part of an individual which his fellows recognize as a duty to respect. A right is a social claim by the individual; a duty, a corresponding social claim against him. The possessor of rights may be an individual, or the community, or a necessary function. The criterion of rights is whether they promote the principle of harmony in society. The individual has no rights against

the common good, but he may have a right which society does not recognize. A valid right violated forms a centre of perpetual disharmony and opens a way for further denial of rights. The only supreme rule is general harmony. There are no absolute rights, but it is well to have rights securely and definitely prescribed. Rights and duties should form a harmonious system, but rights clash and conditions change; it is then the function of statesmanship to form new syntheses.

Each right carries with it the corresponding liberty of exercising it. Liberty proper is thus a group of liberties.[15] "Liberty rests on the spiritual nature of the social bond, and on the rational character of the Common Good."[16] Protection of rights, then, is the security of liberty. When the state resists the invasion of rights, including the rights of the community, by force, or by fraud, or by superior economic power, or by offering temptation which undermines the will, liberty is then secured. When any liberty does not endanger the rights of others, its suppression for the good of the doer is undesirable, since moral freedom must be self-imposed. A distinction should be made between action and opinion, and only when communal life is endangered can conformity be demanded. Tutelage is legitimate only when the will is immature or diseased. It is thus unjust for the state to interfere with opinion and personal life. In the economic sphere, however, the limitation of liberty of free contract is justifiable, since such limitation may secure more important rights, and its proper operation assumes equality between bargaining parties. The organization of common resources for common purposes, such as education and unemployment insurance, is desirable, since it appropriates social wealth for social purposes. Liberty is based on the common good, but the common good is itself open to criticism. "A community is free in the degree in which will

replaces force as the basis of social relations, and this again means the degree in which a fundamental harmony is established as a firm basis of co-operation underlying all divergence of individual and sectional desire." [17]

In the economic sphere, also, the task is to harmonize the interest of the community with the freedom of the individual.[18] Such an effort implies the abolition of inheritance and private property in land and other natural resources. Yet provision for children may be made during the lifetime of the parents. It implies, further, that income not due to social service must be prohibited when the source of income is obviously harmful, or, in other cases, taken away by taxation; that a limitation must be placed on the accumulation of private wealth; that no remuneration for service must fall below a civic minimum, with proper provision for sickness, old age, and unemployment, and participation of workers in the collective management of industry; that the community must retain ultimate power over the control of industry. Under these conditions there is no overwhelming preference between private management and public management of industry. What system to apply depends upon the nature of the particular industry. Production for profit and private enterprise under these regulations may encourage initiative and experiment. Municipal services may be extended with benefit, but the administration of large industries from Whitehall, as suggested by the socialists, offers all the evils of control unanswerable to popular opinion. Industries that cannot be operated either by the state directly or left to private enterprise may be placed under tripartite boards of control representing the consumers, the management, and the workers. Whatever authority manages a particular industry, whether an organization of consumers, or the state, or private persons, questions relating to wages, hours, health, and status

of the workers must be formulated by state law, and applied and enforced in each industry by Trade Boards representing the management and workers with the addition of impartial members to decide between them. A Central Trade Board will co-ordinate the decisions of the various Trade Boards and act as a court of final appeal.

In the government of states the problem is how to obtain an effective popular will. Direct legislation may be used to a limited extent, while proportional representation will tend to make government more in conformity with actual cleavage in public opinion.[19] Autonomy should be given to distinct national minorities, since democracy is workable only where there prevails a sense of homogeneity. The conception of state sovereignty is untenable, since discoverable authority is pluralistic, while definitive power is spiritual, to which even the humblest may appeal. Each organization within the state must be granted self-government in order that it may effectively carry out its functions. In the adjustment of relations between organizations within it, the state is not now a trustworthy authority, since, owing to conscienceless relations between states, it is an instrument of power and a hate-organization. However, when a world authority is established, then the government, based on geographical representation, may become a proper organ of adjustment of diverse internal interests subject to the conditions prescribed by the international authority.

Human obligations are not confined to state boundaries. All human beings are within the scope of the moral law, and hence cannot be outside the pale of rights. Political obligations are secondary to the obligations to the spiritual community, which is universal.[20] The state itself owes responsibility to the civilized order and is subordinate to the ethical community of mankind. The notion that the state

is a self-sufficing unity is mythical. The real values of life—art, science and literature—are universal. The best that is in civilization is international. The preservation of civilization itself depends upon giving institutional expression to the international unity of mankind. Far-sighted men must dedicate themselves to the task of strengthening existing interstate authority. In the government of dependencies the interest of the dependent peoples must be strictly observed. The principle of self-determination of nations must be applied impartially to all, but not in such a manner as to cause the economic demoralization of neighbouring peoples. The organization on an international plane of functional bodies, both religious and economic, offers a good means of fostering international solidarity. Disputes between such bodies should be adjusted by an international authority. Such a world authority must also decide interstate disputes, limit armaments, secure interstate commercial intercourse, guarantee certain basic individual rights, and settle controversies between a state and a distinct national group within it. Then the principle of harmony which includes within its operation all beings capable of reason will find its logical completion in the established unity of mankind.

A critical examination of Professor Hobhouse's views must include an appreciation of his solid achievements. He may, without any exaggeration, be regarded as one of the outstanding contemporary social philosophers in Great Britain. His volumes offer for the intelligent layman a greater area of truth and more wisdom than the works of any other living British author. They form, indeed, a remarkable edifice. Fruitful social theory must include a set of underlying principles as derived from experience and a structure to give them concreteness. Professor Hobhouse attempts both. In his closeness to the facts of life he is typically English, but unlike most British

experimentalists, he possesses the courage and depth to pursue ideas to their logical conclusion. He thus offers both normative principles and some consistent applications of his standard. More than any other writer, is he immune from accusations of inconsistency. Like most eminent teachers, he is barred by largeness of comprehension from the dogmatism of competing schools. Perhaps, to be more correct, he himself forms, so to speak, a school. Not only does he emphasize the need for philosophic foundations, but his works demonstrate persistent attempts at their elucidation.

His principles, further, never obscure his vision. His realistic approach to his principles is perhaps his most effective contribution to political theory. No one has done more than he to discredit the Hegelian theory of the God-State.[21] A healthy realism is the pervasive tone of his discussions. Indeed, he recognizes that the lives of humble men and women offer the best criterion of the worth of institutions, and that only such an approach can serve as a guide for any needed reconstruction. His outlook is emphatically determined by the concrete and the factual. "It insists," he argues, "on going back from the large generality, the sounding abstraction, the imposing institution, to the human factors which it covers."[22] Nor does he blur the distinction between existing actualities and possible goals. That idealism involves such a confusion is his chief criticism of this doctrine. His goal is the attainment of social harmony, but never does he allow it to obscure existing discords. He is too much imbued with a passion for reform to fall a victim to self-deception. It is this attitude, which was no doubt encouraged by recent events, that gives to his writings freshness and vitality.

The first principles to which Professor Hobhouse takes us are ethical. He alone among contemporary writers explicitly bases a theory of politics on a theory

of morals. Politics he holds to be subsidiary to ethics, and to be deduced from a theory of ends. As with the Utilitarians, institutions must conform to a standard of values. The moral law is co-extensive with reason. Man being a moral personality, all human relations involve responsibility. It is in the realm of international affairs that Professor Hobhouse applies his doctrine most effectively, and it is in this field that such a view is most urgently needed. If civilization is to be overtaken by the impending disaster which threatens it, it will be due in part to a theory which limits human obligation to national frontiers. Not only the good life which is constantly asserted to be the aim of the state, but any sort of human life may be impossible unless international unity is effected. To the accomplishment of such a task, Professor Hobhouse offers a necessary ethical foundation.

Professor Hobhouse's writings also reveal a bold attempt to reconcile the freedom of the individual with the needs of society. He is as eloquent an exponent of the spiritual freedom of the individual as J. S. Mill, and thus abhors the interference of the state with opinion and private life. The necessity of personal initiative and enterprise is a recurrent note in his writings. However, his solicitation for the individual does not prevent him from perceiving the tangled nature of social relations. The doctrine of liberty has been so much modified from the days of Mill that to most of Professor Hobhouse's specific suggestions liberal collectivists like the Webbs could offer no opposition. He is as conscious as are the collectivists that freedom for the great masses is a myth. It is on behalf of freedom that he formulates his suggestions that private property in natural resources and inherited wealth should be abolished, that all individuals should be guaranteed a civic minimum, and that an extension of collective manage-

ment of industry is desirable. Freedom, to Professor Hobhouse, is thus not, as it frequently becomes, an obscurantist defence of the existing economic arrangement, but the instrument of urgent reconstruction. The changed conception of the doctrine of liberty from Adam Smith to Professor Hobhouse offers the best key to an understanding of the evolution of political thought during the past century and a half.

Yet we may also urge that the doctrine of liberty is an imperfect guide to radical social reformation. Both logically and historically, liberty is essentially a doctrine of negation. It means release from restraints and removal of obstacles. It found its origin in the doctrine of natural rights and of utility. From Locke to Bentham liberty was enunciated as a battle-cry against obstructions. During the last century the progressive forces in the state marched under its banner. Its triumph was remarkable. It established political democracy, religious toleration, free trade, and a free empire as it concerns its white peoples. During the century it was the watchword of the middle classes, which were then fighting for a place in the state against a privileged landed aristocracy. A doctrine which demanded abolition of existing obstructions, and then non-interference, satisfied the expanding political and economic ambitions of the industrial middle classes. However, the demand now is not for the removal of obstacles, but for the effective creation of opportunities. It is the newly enfranchised wage-earners and not the middle classes that demand a place in the state. The field of progress lies now not in the political sphere, but in the economic. For such attempts liberty as a principle for social effort is unsuited. The very effectiveness of liberty as a weapon in the struggle against past obstruction makes it a stumbling block to further advance. The difficulty which Professor Hobhouse experiences in dealing with liberty shows the nature of the problem.[23] Collec-

tivism alone seems to promise to fulfil the desire of the masses for an economic reconstruction. On the other hand, if liberty is interpreted in a positive sense, as Green and Professor Hobhouse have, its meaning is then extended virtually to justify collectivism. It is then applied in a sense which by history and tradition is foreign to its nature. Collectivism proper is free from any hampering traditions and is held to be the doctrine *par excellence* of reconstruction. Thus, when Mill realized the consequences of liberty in the economic sphere, he really became a collectivist. Collectivism alone appears to be capable of arousing the hopes and firing the imagination of the intelligent portion of the propertyless wage-earners.

Professor Hobhouse is opposed to socialism because it means control of industries and services from Whitehall, thus ushering in the evils of a centralized bureaucracy.[24] To the liberal socialism that we have reviewed this charge is inapplicable. To the Webbs, for instance, socialization means merely the production of goods for use and not for profit. The method of control and management will depend upon the particular industry involved. Providing that certain minimum conditions are observed, the Webbs do not object to a particular industry or service being managed by the producers, or by the consumers, or by a combination of consumers and producers, or by private persons, as the case may warrant.[25] In relation to the large industries, like coal-mining and transport, which will have to be managed by the entire community, we have seen how the Webbs provide for the avoidance of bureaucracy by a decentralized structure, by the representation of the workers, by extensive publicity, and by the application of the data of science.[26] Their scheme may be faulty, but they are obviously conscious of the problem. Argument, then, must range not on the evils of bureaucracy, but whether the structure suggested promises to remove such evils.

Furthermore, it is true that no appreciable reform in the working of political democracy is possible without an approach to a greater economic equality and without improvement in the intelligence of the electorate. Professor Hobhouse, in his specific suggestions, appreciates the importance of the economic factor in society, and thus favours a radical transformation. Yet in his discussion of certain political problems he does not refer to the impact of property on state institutions. Thus when he discusses liberty in his *Elements of Social Justice* he realizes that an extension of collective interference in economic affairs has meant an extension of liberty for the vast masses. A full estimate of the importance of the economic factor to individual development, however, should regard the economic problem as the centre of the discussion. When the masses in the state do not possess the means of obtaining the amenities of civilized existence, it is surely out of tune to deliver a discourse to them on the joy of spiritual liberty. Again, when he deals with the imperfection of political democracy, he apprehends the fickleness, the unreliability, the instability, of the popular mind, but he does not point out that agencies like the Press which provide for the emotional orgies of the democracy are largely the by-products of existing economic inequality.[27] The psychological factor is undoubtedly important, but so also are the influences which thrive by its corruption. He understands that the present state is an imperfect co-ordinating institution, but he fails to mention that this condition is evidently in part due to the perversion of its functions by vast aggregations of wealth.[28] He rightly considers militant nationalism to be a menace to civilization. He does not refer, however, to the influence of competing economic imperialisms on the stimulation of such a menace.[29] Undoubtedly, even a world based on a system of rigid economic equality would suffer from the ills of human nature, but no

adequate treatment of the present state can afford to neglect the impact of property on its doubtful career.

With the solution of the economic problem, the other ills of human psychology may be remedied by intelligence. Hence the problem of education is obviously vital. Yet it is curious that nowhere in his writing does Professor Hobhouse refer to this question at any length. To the political reformer this question is as pertinent as it is taxing. Professor Hobhouse stresses the value of spiritual freedom, but this is unattainable without the capacity to participate in the arts and sciences of civilization. To enable the masses to enjoy such spiritual freedom would in itself create an educational revolution. To be effective, freedom implies knowledge, and knowledge involves a system of education free from the bias of both class and sect. Further, it is reasonable to assume that whatever economic arrangement will ultimately be established, some occupations, perhaps most work, must remain irksome and uninteresting. Hence the skilful enjoyment of leisure must overbalance the sacrifice required by monotonous work. The proper use of leisure necessitates training by education. Thus, whether regarded as a means of reform or of human happiness, this problem is significant. Yet Professor Hobhouse neglects to deal with such an essential foundation.

Professor Hobhouse is mainly concerned with principles, and we should therefore not expect a detailed political structure to embody his principles. Yet the inadequacy of the structure must affect the value of the contribution, as no theorizing can be fruitful unless accompanied by appropriate administrative machinery. Without such machinery we feel a sense of intangibility and haziness. Our author has developed at the most the mere scaffolding of his state. Two illustrations of the incomplete nature of his edifice

will suffice. (He realizes the value to freedom of the participation of the workers in management of all industry, whether operated by the state or by private persons. He does not explain, however, how self-government in industry is to be established. Industries, he declares, that cannot be operated by the state directly or left to private persons should be controlled by tripartite boards composed of the representatives of the workers, of the management, and of the consumers. The mere representation of the workers on that board, however, will not inaugurate democracy in industry.[30] Self-government in industry, to be real and effective, must mean the participation of the workers in the determination of those conditions that affect their working life immediately and directly. It must be founded on the workshop as the unit of government, with representation on the district and national boards.) Professor Hobhouse further suggests that questions so vital to the lives of the workers as wages, hours, health and status should be established by Parliament and applied in each industry by a Trade Board, the composition of which will include representatives of the workers in the particular industry. This is the method actually used now in some industries, but this method does not mean self-government in industry. Nor has this plan, even where it exists, apparently caused any abatement in the demand by the workers for industrial democracy. The members of these boards will feel a sense of freedom and the satisfaction derived from the consciousness of self-importance, but the rest of the workers will remain in a state of unfreedom. In their *Constitution*, the Webbs have indicated the path to be followed by any proposal which attempts to grant democracy to the workers and yet to protect the interest of society. Professor Hobhouse correctly realizes that obedience to orders given by those who are responsible to no one but their own caprice results in the unfreedom of those

who are forced to carry out these orders, but his suggestion for administration does not promise to achieve this goal.

The other illustration that we submit is his omission to deal with any plan of decentralization of the functions of the state. Like the problem of the control of industry, this question is also concerned with the distribution of power in the state. In his earlier books Professor Hobhouse indicates the need for devolution.[31] In his *Elements of Social Justice* he is anxious to protect the freedom of functional organizations within the state,[32] and, as we have stated, is opposed to socialism because it fosters centralization. Nowhere, however, does he fully appreciate the importance of federalism to freedom apparently, and nowhere does he offer a detailed scheme of devolution. In fact, in his more recent books he conceives the state largely in its relation to other states and thus as being an instrument of force.[33] It seems he does not fully stress the fact that with the creation of an international authority and a greater economic equality among its citizens the state may become a valid organizing institution of the common life. Yet if the state is to become an instrument of freedom a vast dispersion of its functions is essential. We have already noted how contemporary writers recognize the need of federalism. Professor Hobhouse's own suggestions will involve an extension of the functions of the state. He favours, we recall, that the state should own all natural resources, manage some industries, retain ultimate control over all industries, and regulate by law the civic minimum to be applied in each industry by Trade Boards. Such proposals obviously mean multiplication of the work of the State. The inevitable extension of communal control over vital industries must be accompanied by administrative decentralization. For such a purpose it may be necessary not only to resuscitate local centres, but also to change

their areas in accordance with the needs of the functions and perhaps also to create new administrative regions to serve as gaps between the local divisions and the central authority.[34] Without a scheme of devolution we may merely substitute the evils of power for the evils of property. If the liberty of the individual is to be secure, as Professor Hobhouse desires, it will be achieved only when power is brought closer to those who must feel the effects of its administration. The absence of a discussion of these topics in Professor Hobhouse's writings may perhaps be attributed not to his lack of appreciation of their importance, but rather to his hesitation to enter the intricate complexities which their satisfactory analysis must call forth. Our bare suggestions in the field of applied politics may then be best understood as merely pointing the direction in which Professor Hobhouse's principles lead.

While Professor Hobhouse offers proposals for a reconstruction, Lord Bryce, whose *Modern Democracies* (1921) we shall now attempt to analyze, confines himself to a comparative survey of contemporary democracies and to an evaluation of the results which the experiment in popular government has achieved or failed to achieve. Democracy, he declares, is a form of government "in which the will of the majority of qualified citizens rules, taking the qualified citizens to constitute the great bulk of the inhabitants. . . ."[35] His work is thus a study in comparative politics. Bryce is as anxious as Professor Hobhouse to protect the liberty of the individual, but he is not concerned with enlightening us with the means of securing freedom. Yet his faith in democracy and his general social outlook undoubtedly place him in the centre of rival schools of political writers. For the purposes of our *résumé* we shall limit ourselves to Bryce's summary of the results and present tendencies of democracy.[36]

After analyzing the experience of a century of popular rule, Bryce concludes that, taking all factors into consideration, democracy has achieved more satisfactory results than any other form of government. The primary functions of the state, the establishment of security within and from without, the maintenance of justice, the administration of common affairs, and the promotion of the well-being of the citizens by the regulation of industry—all these free governments have carried out well. In foreign affairs the conduct of democracies has been as sagacious as, and more amenable to principles of morals than, any other form of rule. Democracies have shown a greater zeal in alleviating the conditions of the poorer classes; nor can they be accused of being ungrateful to their heroes or of undermining valour and patriotism. If they have failed to subdue the clash of hostile classes, to establish peace between nations and harmony between races, to abolish corruption and the tainted influences of money, to remove the fear of resort to violent revolutions, and to enlist in their services the most honest and most wise, it is because no form of government can be expected to accomplish a revolution in human nature. The educational value which democracy offers to its citizens is of prime importance. Participation in the management of the common business enables the citizens to lead a larger life, and makes possible an escape from personal egoism. Has democracy enlarged the happiness of the individual? Happiness depends little on forms of government. Yet it has certainly hastened the termination of many injustices, persecutions, cruelties, and oppressions which were obstacles to happiness. While the fond hopes of the early champions of democracy have been shattered, still its achievements are none the less solid. "Yet the rule of the Many is safer than the rule of One—as Cavour said that however faulty a legislative chamber may be an ante-chamber is worse—and the

rule of the multitude is gentler than the rule of a class. However grave the indictment that may be brought against democracy, its friends can answer, 'What better alternative do you offer?'"[37]

The constitutional machinery of democratic government is undergoing at present a radical transformation. Democracy is spreading; the new states have established representative institutions. Authority, however, is being transferred from the representative assembly either to the executive or to the people by direct legislation. The recent extension of the functions of government enhances the power of the bureaucracy, necessitates an extension of the discretionary authority of the executive, thus making it more difficult to check responsibility, and creates the danger of the abuse of power by state employees. The doctrine of the dispersion of power from central to local authorities has achieved little practical result. The movement of population from rural to urban centres has aggravated the problem of government of large and excitable masses of humanity.

Not only the structure, but also the philosophic foundations of democracy are being modified. Demands are made for an extension of the principles of liberty and equality from the political to the economic field. The newly enfranchised masses are not satisfied with mere political freedom, but are attempting to use the state to establish economic liberty. Their political emancipation was thus followed by a wide expansion of governmental activities in order to propitiate the wage-earners. The machinery of democracy is thus used by the masses as a means of obtaining higher wages, shorter hours, and security of employment. Political democracy is found to be insufficient, and socialism is proposed in order to establish economic equality. This movement aims at a positive reconstruction of the economic foundations of society. In some quarters, too, constitutional means are openly

disregarded and political democracy derided. The right of aggressive minorities to force their will upon the majority is openly championed, and attempts to establish a communist state by violence are affirmed. By means of strikes, compactly organized trade unions force the entire community to do their bidding, while non-political, anti-democratic, and revolutionary means, such as direct action, are being practised in order to extort demands from parliaments. The class antagonism which the economic movement arouses is the inevitable outcome of the suffering of the masses in the past, and is not worse than the selfishness of other classes in the past. "This idea is the child, a child whose birth was to be expected, of the passion for Equality and of the feeling of injustice which resents the absorption by others than the hand-worker of a disproportionate part of what his labour produces." [38] Still, this tendency offers a menace to the existence of democracy. Class antagonism replaces fraternity and collectivism undermines individual liberty.

The logical development of the movement of economic equality means the establishment of the communist state. The state will become, if we take an extreme instance, the sole owner and manager of all industry, and all citizens will be its employees. It will control health, recreation, education, and means of publicity. Unless communism can be established in all states, an army will be necessary; and this means a constant threat to the entire system. Real power will be in the hands of the supreme officials in charge of vital industries and services. It is they and their immediate subordinate employees who will possess the power of promotion and of application of the rules of justice and equality in industry. There will be wide opportunities for nepotism and favouritism. The work of parliament may then be diminished, since laws relating to property, and perhaps also to

foreign affairs, will demand little attention. Other sources of dispute will remain, however. The most acute problem of the legislative assembly will be how to control the bureaucrats. Each member will be importuned by his constituents to use his influence with the officials. Will the members be able to criticize freely those who will employ them when their term is over? Will the members have the power to displace the officials who have displeased the voters who work under those officials? Will the bureaucrats be subjected to the decisions of a popular vote of the citizens who, as workers, are employed by them? No effective discipline will be possible under such a system. Under communism state administration alone will offer opportunities for the exercise of power, while art, science, and literature will depend upon official favour. The state will become a vast economic co-operative organization, to the detriment of the spiritual forces which democracy attempts to liberate.

What of the future of democracy? The origin of free government was not due to any abstract principles of liberty or self-government. The elucidation of abstract principles was the work of the few; the masses followed because democracy promised to remove tangible evils, and not for the sake of satisfying any passion for liberty. If democracy itself should give rise to evils, it may be overthrown and be replaced by a well-disciplined and efficient oligarchy. Nor can we assume that, since man has once tasted self-government, he will not be willing to relinquish it. For a thousand years after the democracies of Greece and of early Rome man cared little for freedom. The necessity for military preparation, or lethargic indifference on the part of the intelligent, or delusive promises of an economic transformation, or continuous strife of class or sect may well bring a concentration of power hostile to freedom. "Few are the free countries in which freedom seems safe for a century

or two ahead."[39] Yet we need not entirely despair of the future. Democracy was founded upon faith in the capacity, the virtue, and the sense of duty of the ordinary man. While that confidence has been rudely shaken, the world is, after all, the better for it. Only when hope itself expires will democracy end.

In our critical examination of Bryce's *Modern Democracies* we shall attempt to estimate its place in the contemporary literature of politics. Bryce's analysis is a commendable achievement. He is indeed the Montesquieu or the De Tocqueville of our generation. His work is undoubtedly the pre-eminent contribution to comparative politics, comparable only to the best efforts of Dicey.[40] It equals his previous achievement of the elucidation of the American democracy.[41] It is a massive survey of the problems of democratic politics. It may properly be entitled an Encyclopædia of Things Political, and it testifies to the extensive knowledge of its author. For such a study Bryce was well equipped not only by scholarship, but also by participation in affairs of state. For that contribution writers on politics owe to him a heavy obligation.

That political institutions must be adjusted to relative conditions is a lesson which Bryce's compilation makes prominent. The very method which he employs—the comparative and experimental—emphasizes the necessity for harmony between the *milieu* and the governmental structure. Thus, to take random examples as offered by Bryce, democracy is farcical in most South American countries because the environment is unsuited to freedom. The direct election of judges works well in Switzerland, but it works less well when applied to different conditions in some States of the American Union. Direct legislation works fairly well in Switzerland and in some parts of America, but may work differently when put in force in the States of Central and Southern Europe.

Parliamentary institutions will surely undergo a change when applied to China or to Russia. The multiplication of direct elections and of offices popularly chosen results in the strengthening not of popular control, but of the party machine. How many elections can be held in any one year without causing a strain in the electorate? How many offices can be intelligently chosen in any one election? Such questions are quantitative, and can only be solved, as Professor Wallas has shown us, by inductive analysis. Bryce's volumes bring out well the futility of neglecting relative circumstances. Although a realistic age such as ours is conversant with the need of induction, yet that our political reformers must consider the existing equipment cannot be over-emphasized.

The comprehensiveness of Bryce's survey brings out more clearly the disappointing results which democracy has achieved. The ideal of the philosophers of democracy of a century ago has failed to materialize. The ideal of an efficient civil administration, of a capable legislature, of an intelligent electorate, has not been realized. The imperfections of legislative assemblies, the lack of interest on the part of the voters, the gullibility of the masses to seductive appeals, the perversion of the popular mind by special private interests—all this is brought out by Bryce with an iteration which gives effectiveness to the contemporary disillusionment. As we have noticed before, this state of mind is a current note in contemporary political literature, but Bryce's analysis of actual conditions certainly strengthens the prevailing sentiment. The present discouragement with the operation of democracy is strongly affirmed by the massiveness of Bryce's details.

Bryce's analysis, valuable as it is, is, however, only a summary of nineteenth-century democracy. If issued in 1900 it would have been more timely than in 1921. He himself declares in his introductory

chapters that he is concerned only with the results already achieved in the last century, and that he will omit present departures.[42] With the exception of the suspended gloom of his last chapters, which are no doubt the product of post-war events and discouragement, the entire work is thus a compilation of the experiences of the last generation. Only in this light can we understand why certain aspects of contemporary politics have escaped his keen intelligence. Thus he fails to deal with movements like federalism and a functional organization of the state. Collectivism is still to him the nineteenth-century variety of government control from Whitehall, and he apparently has no acquaintance with the Fabian attempts to reconcile collectivism with liberty. Nor does he show an appreciation of the importance of the group in the state, especially the *rôle* of the recently developed democracies of producers and consumers.

Not only his materials, but his general outlook belongs to a past generation. In 1885 Bryce would have been considered a reformer. It is no exaggeration to assert that his political philosophy is still generally that of John Stuart Mill and Walter Bagehot. The democracy which he eulogizes was the goal of the reformers of a generation ago. Democracy is to him government by the majority and confined only to politics, and liberty, which he couples with political democracy, is to him non-interference. He fails to realize that the salient principle of democracy is self-government—that is, participation in the determination of the conditions that affect our lives—and that the extension of the sphere of self-government to industry is not antithetical to democracy, but the very affirmation of its principle. Surely the casting of a ballot once every five years in a political election will be little conducive to a consciousness of freedom. If the principle has any vitality, its application must be extended. Liberty, to Bryce, may mean more than

mere "anarchy plus a street constable," but he shows no apprehension of the problem of how creative freedom may be attained for the vast masses. Obviously the extension of the functions of the state makes the problem of liberty more complex. The solution is to be found not by frowning upon such action, but by reconciling it with liberty through federalism. What is essential about democracy is self-government, and to make it real, not only its extension, but a readjustment may be necessary. Bryce's concentration upon, and adoration of, purely political democracy is a characteristic of the generation of John Stuart Mill.

Bryce declares that his work will not deal with the elaboration of his own suggestions, but only with the explanation of facts. The paucity of his own constructive suggestions is indeed as remarkable as the richness of his survey of facts. His book may be summarized in some such form as this: Political democracy is imperfectly operated, and it does not appear to satisfy man's entire needs. What is necessary is more wisdom and virtue on the part of the ordinary man. As to economic reforms, material means are of little avail in relation to happiness. Bryce leaves us thus not only in the dark, but also with a sense of helplessness.

Yet he raises more problems than he himself perhaps realizes, and surely when he finds fault with certain present tendencies we have a right to demand from him alternative proposals. A few examples may suffice to prove the incompleteness of his treatment. He is solicitous about the liberty of the individual and recognizes in collective action a threat to freedom, yet he does not explain how to preserve individual initiative amidst the complexities of our social life.[43] He realizes the baneful influences of money in politics, and deplores the fact that political parties express more and more the diverse interests of hostile economic

classes.) Yet apparently he does not mention the need for an approach to a greater economic equality. Nevertheless the two democracies which he considers to be the freest from the taint of money—Switzerland and the Orange Free State before the South African War—approach nearest to economic equality. He realizes that socialism is the most dominant movement following the movement for democracy in the past century, yet his analysis is meagre. In painting the dreary communist state, he surely has in mind the experiment in Soviet Russia. The Webbs' *Constitution*, we suggest, offers a happier alternative. The class war he rightly considers as a menace to political institutions, yet he does not suggest how to remedy the evils which give rise to it. He is sceptical about the results of the socialist experiments in New Zealand and Australia, yet he fails to offer any proposals as to how to remove the abuses or how to avoid the alternative evils of private control. His more specific suggestions as to how to cure certain concrete political ills do not in the main rise above the ordinary commonplaces in which political literature abounds. (In order to prevent government from becoming "all sail and no ballast," he declares a second chamber of revision to be essential. Yet his most elaborate positive proposal, that for the construction of a second chamber by a special and impartial select commission, he realizes himself to be not feasible because impartiality is a rare gift and even more rarely recognized when it does exist.[44] Recent events have offered additional proof that Bryce is correct in his statement that the masses may exchange self-government for the promises of good government under a dictator or oligarchy, but the problem of how to make self-government efficient is a region which Bryce is reluctant to explore.[45] Bryce undoubtedly deserves the reputation of possessing a remarkable knowledge of political experiments, but

his constructive talent is perhaps not of the same dimension.

If there is little similarity between Professor Hobhouse and Bryce, there is at least the value of a strong contrast. Their respective approaches constitute the two diverse methods of examining political problems. Methodology may be a tedious subject, but it is, nevertheless, important. The relation between Professor Hobhouse and Bryce is parallel to that between Plato and Aristotle or, in a different sense, between Hobbes and Machiavelli. One is concerned with political right; the other with political fact. Thus, for example, one deals with liberty as a problem in moral and political philosophy; the other with liberty as it developed historically with the rise of democracy.[46] (With Professor Hobhouse we are in the realm of political values, with Bryce we are in the province of comparative administration and dissection of existing political institutions. The method of Professor Hobhouse is mainly speculative, that of Bryce entirely factual. The former deals with the principles which should govern a state, the latter with the administration of actual states.)

Any discussion of the comparative value of these two methods is superfluous, because they supplement each other. Our principles must be deduced from facts, and to be helpful they must be realizable and clothed with a structure. Such principles, however, are essential in order to serve the purpose of a normative standard. (They act as a guide and thus prevent aimless and inconsistent meanderings. Otherwise we subject ourselves to the criticism of a narrow opportunism. It is in this light that Bryce may be criticized with justice, for he leaves us in the dark as to his standard of political values. With the possible exception of some essays in his *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, nowhere does he offer an elucidation of principles.[47] He may thus be understood as an

experimentalist unaided by a set of working principles. His views on detached problems and his admiration for an idealized Switzerland give us a hint as to the type of polity he prefers.[48] Yet nowhere does he develop it consistently. When a writer has devoted a life to the study and practice of politics, it is legitimate to inquire what criterion he has to offer. As a guide to the discovery of new paths, Bryce is as helpless as a captain of a vessel in mid-ocean who has lost his compass.

Professor Hobhouse and Bryce differ more on methods of approach, perhaps, than on ultimate social goals. Both, whether explicitly or implicitly, attempt to harmonize the individual and society, order and change, stability and progress. To both the underlying principle is liberty. Like the Fabians, they regard J. S. Mill as their spiritual master, but their journey is more halting and their destination less certain. The collectivists stress collective responsibility and mutual aid, while our present writers emphasize freedom and individuality. Yet, and more specifically in the case of Professor Hobhouse, they conceive the rights and liberty of the individual to be possible only in and through society. We may thus submit that the difference between them—and particularly in the case of Professor Hobhouse—and the collectivists is more a question of goals than one of the immediate steps to be taken. The collectivists aim at establishing by a gradual process a collectivist state, while our present authors have no more definite goal than the vague ideal of a harmonious society composed of individuals well trained in initiative and responsibility. Their outlook is thus centred on less distant possibilities. Perhaps Professor Hobhouse would desire to reach a state similar to that of the Webbs, although by more moderate progression. Bryce's ideal state would be somewhat different. It would be more in the nature of the polity of Aristotle.

## COMPROMISE: HOBHOUSE AND BRYCE

In both cases theory has moved with the direction of events away from the individualism of a century ago. In both cases institutions such as the state and property are not viewed as sacrosanct. New possibilities are ventured upon. We are led slowly and moderately towards newer experiments and aroused from complacency and discouragement either by a vision of a regenerated state, as in the case of Professor Hobhouse, or by a decisive criticism of present states, as in the case of Bryce.

# CHAPTER X

## INTERNATIONALISM: NORMAN ANGELL

THE theory of internationalism is of interest to us for various reasons. Perhaps its chief significance is its relation to the doctrine of sovereignty. We have already observed that the essential idea of political pluralism is its emphasis on the distinction between state and society.[1] Internationalism also denies the identity of the state with society, and it undoubtedly reinforces a pluralistic view of the state. Yet, while pluralism mainly stresses the complex of associations within the confines of the state, internationalism emphasizes the larger society outside the boundaries of the state. While pluralism points to the multiplicity of social relations within the state, internationalism indicates the multiplicity of relations outside the state. The ideal of internationalism is the Stoic conception of *nil humanum a me alienum puto*, and the unity which it predicates is the solidarity of a world community of states. Thus internationalism, like pluralism, aims at discrediting the exaggerated particularity which an unmodified theory of sovereignty ascribes to the state.

The theory of sovereignty, radically applied, postulates international anarchy. Few political philosophers, however, have dared to follow on to the inevitable conclusion of their premises. Yet a mediæval Italian patriot and a modern German nationalist have combined logic and arrogance. To Machiavelli[2] and Treitschke[3] the state is power. The essence of power is self-direction. To argue that the state is responsible to an external force is to deny its funda-

mental basis. Self-interest is the sole guiding star of statecraft. A host of critics have perennially assailed these hypotheses. To Grotius [4] and Kant,[5] if we limit ourselves to major prophets, the state is not power, but a vital centre in a universal kingdom of ends. There is a social contract between states based upon the unity that underlies all rational beings. The moral law is universal, and hence moral responsibility follows all human relations. To these writers, then, sovereignty is delimited by a sense of universal right. By denying the ethical self-sufficiency of the state, they have thus destroyed its pretension to omni-competence. The issue between Machiavelli and Grotius, between Kant and Treitschke, is the key to a salient aspect of the recent story of man's troubled career.[6]

Fortunately, in Great Britain, whatever may have been the acts of kings and statesmen, the theory of irresponsible statism has never found clear expression, perhaps because British nationality and territory have not been seriously threatened for so long. On the other hand, we find numerous exponents of the contrary doctrine. Thus Cobden and Gladstone, about three-quarters of a century ago, coupled the high sentiments of international morality with the interest of Lancashire manufacturers.[7] In the fine humanism of T. H. Green we have a restatement of the Kantian precepts in unmistakable terms.[8] Later, with the development of imperialism, mainly due to the accumulation at home of surplus capital, the edge of idealism was dulled. The Empire was now rediscovered, and the legacy of a fit of absent-mindedness was then recognized as a Godsend. In Disraeli and Sir John Seeley [9] we notice the transition in fact and thought. At the turn of the century British statesmen sought for Imperial harmony by granting self-government to the dominions inhabited by white men, and sought for peace between states in a world of balanced

powers. At the present day, owing to recent events, the converts to internationalism are legion. Contemporary writers not only offer a theory, but also formulate the proposed administrative structure of international organization. J. M. Keynes,[10] H. N. Brailsford,[11] C. D. Burns,[12] J. A. Hobson,[13] L. S. Woolf,[14] and G. Lowes Dickinson,[15] to mention some typical writers, adumbrate various aspects of international politics.

No one, however, has so persistently advocated a revolution in the relation between states as Norman Angell. Apparently he alone fully dissects the assumptions underlying the present practice and the foundations of a necessary modification. Hence in him alone do we find explicitly a theory of internationalism. Norman Angell has now (*The Fruits of Victory*, 1921) somewhat modified his earlier view (*The Great Illusion*, 1909).[16] Yet his approach is still, as formerly, mainly but not exclusively economic. His thesis is that the frustration of the cultural and economic unity of the globe by the divisive influence of nationalism, supported by the juristic theory of sovereignty, will end only with the establishment of an organized society of states on the basis of consent. He is not concerned with the administrative problems of the new world organization, but rather with the principles of world unity;[17] and thus he endeavours to enlist in the cause of interstate comity an appropriate state of mind.

To Norman Angell, society is an organism engaged in the struggle of subduing nature. The state is not society, for it is not coterminous with all forms of human relations. It is merely an interdependent part in the completer life of society. It is not a person. Personality and individuality cannot be accredited to the state. The terminology of monism is not applicable to the vast aggregates of human beings possessing varied interests and ideals. The expression "Ger-

many" or "France" covers a multitude of individuals whose vital connections transcend state lines. The modern state is not the political embodiment of a homogeneous social, economic, or cultural outlook. It cannot be said to offer a single conception of life, but rather a series of differing points of view. The vital human groupings do not correspond with state boundaries. Differences in ideals do not implicate disputes between states, but between groups irrespective of state frontiers. Thus there is no British morality as distinct from that of the French. An English aristocrat has a greater common point of view with a Continental aristocrat than with a Dorset peasant; an Oxford Professor has a greater common outlook with a member of the French Academy than with a Whitechapel publican. (The British state includes such deep national cleavage as exists between an Englishman and a Welshman, a Scotsman and an Irishman. The British Empire includes almost every existing race and almost every religion. The contemporary chasm between economic classes is not delimited by state lines.) The state, then, does not correspond with a distinct segment of the human race, but is an area for administrative convenience. The end of the state must serve individual welfare, but the good of the citizen has no relation to the extent of the territory of the state. Our regard for a Russian *moujik* or for Ibsen is unaffected by the size of their respective states. In all its relations the state must not violate the moral judgment of man.)

Even more marked than in cultural affairs is the economic interdependence of states. Economically our planet is a unit. The "reacting bourses and bank-rate movements" show the sensitiveness to disturbance of a universal credit economy. The maintenance of our present standard of life is possible only by an interchange of products between inter-related parts. Thus the British people can live only if food is pro-

duced in abundance abroad, and they can pay for their food only when other states enjoy peace and prosperity so that they are enabled to purchase the products of British industry. It was in part French capital that made possible the development of Russia, the Near East, and South America, on which German trade depended for its existence. A high agricultural output in Russia and the Balkans may become a matter of life and death for Great Britain. Nor can Great Britain rely upon Imperial preference and solidarity for the trade necessary to her life, for the bulk of British trade is with foreign states. Further, if British trade is canalized along political lines, it will engender animosities on the part of other states and Imperial security will necessitate alliances. States in relation to each other are not only competitors, but also clients. Our planet is so closely interwoven, that "conquest" of one state by another is economically futile, for just to such a degree as the "conquered people" are destroyed as competitors they are also destroyed as clients. The imposition of an indemnity involves encouragement of the economic revival of the defeated state and the intensification of competition, for the defeated state can pay the indemnity only by an excess of its exports over imports. It is thus to the advantage of each state that the security of life and of property and incentives to the exertion of human energy are universal. This vast and intricate interconnection which is the base of our civilization can function properly only when there exists confidence in a calculable future.

Yet this confidence is chronically shaken and the economic interdependence by which alone the world's population can live is frustrated by the emotion of "mystic nationalism." Nationalism views each state as a sentimental and sovereign entity, when actually it is only a link in a cultural and economic chain. Nationalism is rooted in the impulse of domination,

in tribal prejudice, in the herd instinct, in suspicion of strangers. It deprives the human will of the moral and psychological factors requisite for world co-operation; for the cult of patriotism compels unquestioned allegiance and exclusive loyalty. Patriotism is the residuary legatee of the fanaticism of the religious strifes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It blinds our path, and we stumble over the precipice. The hates and suspicion which competing nationalisms arouse prevent the establishment of a society of states, and the absence of such a society offers a pretext for brutal statecraft. Each national unit attempts to couple a fictitious sovereignty with self-sufficiency and security. Hence each extends its sway over as large a territory as possible, and this involves the subjection of other nationalities. Oppressed peoples, who yesterday were pleading for freedom, on the day of their emancipation become oppressors of others. For the sake of economic sufficiency and safety, each encourages by artificial means a many-sided industrial development resulting, from a world standpoint, in gross waste. The resources of the globe suffice for the preservation of all, but owing to nationalistic "sacred egoism" they are maldistributed and inefficiently exploited. The claims of nationalism create barriers between coal and food, factory and farm, agricultural machinery and producing area. They thus create a conflict of interest where there should be a feeling of interdependence. Self-determination frequently means sentencing other people to death. As a consequence the history of our times has been a vicious circle of wars, Alsace-Lorraines, strategic frontiers, economic demoralization, more wars, more Alsace-Lorraines, more strategic frontiers, more economic demoralization.

What is the way out of this *impasse*—this perennial orgy of madness? No solution is conceivable unless we appreciate the truth of the futility of force in human

relations. "The victor on the Egyptian vase has his captured enemy on the end of a rope. We say that one is free, the other bond. But, as Spencer has shown us, both are bond. The victor is tied to the vanquished: if he should let go the prisoner would escape. The victor spends his time seeing that the prisoner does not escape; the prisoner his time and energy trying to escape. . . . Only if they strike a bargain and co-operate will they be in the position each to turn his energy to the best economic account."[18] This illustration epitomizes the moral of social life. Contract, not status, must define association. The imposition of a culture by the bayonet is obviously futile; only appeals to the human will can attain this end. For economic advantages preponderating force is useless. Slaves are economically worthless, and when a people is granted the knowledge and instruments necessary to its efficiency, it becomes at the same time strong enough to be free. All the bravado of armies and navies cannot solve the simple problem of "moving some stones from where they are not needed to places where they are needed." We cannot with profit compel people to buy from us or sell to us. The sole workable means of interdependent activity is voluntary co-operation. The only force that is efficacious is force used to facilitate co-operation. The force of the police within the state aids co-operation because it is used in the interest of recognized rules of conduct against crime—that is nature. With regard to the unexploited regions, it is frequently desirable to apply force against native disorder in the interest of the natives themselves. But the force used between two orderly states destroys co-operation. It is the force of the individual in a lawless community. It diverts energy from the struggle against nature to disastrous conflicts between men. It foils the very purpose for which it is created.

What is required, therefore, is to organize a society

of states on the basis of consent with a community of power representing associated mankind. Then alone may force be the instrument of co-operation. The Balance of Power cannot guarantee social peace. It actually results not in balance but in rivalry for preponderance, for each group strives to be secure by possessing superior power. As the two opposing groups will support their members irrespective of merit, the decisions are consequently not the fruits of impartial adjudication, but of partisan adherence. It is thus inimical to the principle of a society of states. World stability will arise not from shifting and precarious alliances of intense nationalisms, but from an association of states. There is no justification for a balance between justice and injustice; there should be a preponderance of power in behalf of law and right. The enlightened judgment of man is indispensable as the bulwark of this new order. The effectiveness of the police is not due to its force, but to the fact that it represents the allegiance of the will of most men to a common code of regulated life. Similarly, a community of force as the expression of a social contract of states will operate only when men agree to a code of social peace embracing consent, mutual advantage, and equal economic opportunities. The machinery of a society of states deserves study, but no structure will function unless it is backed by will. A society of states resting on the instructed opinion of mankind is realizable only if men desire it ardently. It should also be noted that the Law of Acceleration is true, not only in physics, but also in politics. Recent social changes have been at a remarkable pace, advance in internationalism may be hastened by devoted zeal.

Nor can the present international anarchy be defended on the ground that it is rooted in the impulses of domination and pugnacity and hence inseparable from the cosmic order, for "human nature is always what it is." What is human nature? To this question

no definite reply can be offered. If man is at the mercy of his primæval impulses, the race is predestined to mutual extermination. Such fatalism is, however, unwarranted. Undoubtedly there dwells the beast within man, but human advance is made possible, not necessarily by the crushing of elemental dispositions, but by rationally directing them into healthy channels, so that the ultimate result is considerably modified. Man's nature is not static and unchangeable, but malleable in accord with circumstances, tradition, and education. Even within comparatively recent years may be observed the victory of the "seeing mind and the soul of man" over blind impulse. The end of the duel in the Anglo-Saxon world, of slavery, of belief in witchcraft, of burning heretics, and of brutal torture demonstrates the growing ascendancy of human reason. True, reason is only skin-deep, yet on this frail foundation is built all civilization. International goodwill does not require complex psychological effort, but merely an understanding of the simple facts of interest, justice, and compassion. The progress of rationalism will not recoil from patriotism.

The views of Norman Angell have been, especially before the war, the centre of considerable discussion. His *Great Illusion* has been translated into numerous foreign tongues [19]; on the other hand, his *Fruits of Victory*, which is a post-war sequel to the original, deserves greater recognition than it apparently receives. Perhaps the calm reception of his later book shows the wide acceptance of his cardinal principles. They have evidently lost the novelty of a sensation, and rather tend to become traditional politics. The admirers of his first book have referred to him as the Grotius of our time, and have placed his book on the same plane with Rousseau's *Contrat Social*. In discussing contemporary writers a wise scepticism as to their ultimate position in the world of thought is needful. Yet we may affirm without reserve that he

is the outstanding advocate of the noblest of causes. In an age when thought was cast in a theological and metaphysical mould, Grotius substantiated his theory of internationalism by appeals to the theological or metaphysical doctrine of a law of nature. In an age like ours, which witnesses the conquest of a material civilization, the plea for internationalism rests on the argument that existing chaos is disadvantageous. It should be noted, however, that Norman Angell does not equate civilization with economic utility; he merely warns us that unless we manage to curb our emotions, human existence will be so insecure that life will become a scramble for sustenance.[20] Between Norman Angell and Rousseau there is this similarity. Rousseau argued that the basis of the state is consent and not force; Norman Angell counsels an extension of the *régime* of consent to the world community of states. He warned us beforehand of the dire consequences of interstate anarchy, and few men are as justified as he is in pointing at us a finger of scorn, for the retribution of our disobedience is unmistakable.

The thesis of Norman Angell is as simple as it is significant. The existing international lawlessness, he argues, is due mainly to the fact that man is heir to certain primitive impulses. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the bogey which aroused fear and hate was the "heretic," now it is the "foreigner." We may of course continue our worship of bogeyism. We shall then continue to cut our nose off to spite our face. "We shall perish of hunger in order to have success in murder." We are then doomed to mutual annihilation. If, however, we made even an elementary effort to be rational, we would soon discover that most of our quarrels are imaginary. Even where there exists a conflict of interest, force offers no solution. Force as a means of attaining our ends is futile and wasteful. The only possible solution is that derived from consent, grounded on mutual advantages, and

realized in an association of states.) Only then will unity and peace materialize. It requires little dialectical skill nowadays to convince most reasonable persons that Norman Angell's analysis is correct.

His theory of the state deserves comment.[21] As he himself observes, he has somewhat anticipated a pluralistic doctrine.[22] He has, however, reached a pluralistic conception not by emphasizing the mass of associations within the state, but by emphasizing the complicated relations that transcend state lines. He has shown us that in many activities the state is merely a part of a larger whole. Especially in the economic field has he, more than any other writer, elucidated the economic interdependence of modern states. This thesis is now accepted.[23] Norman Angell, as well as C. D. Burns [24] and L. S. Woolf,[25] have called our attention to the intricate interstate life taking form in varied and numerous official and private organizations. The influence of their study on our theory of the state may perhaps be summarized thus. From the individual radiate centres of activity giving rise to associations. Some of these associations are wholly within the state; others overleap state lines. The state is still the most vital focus of organized life, but in order to administer most expeditiously certain common interstate functions a recognized society of states with appropriate institutions is indispensable. In addition to the political society of states, but perhaps in connection with it, there may also arise functional international bodies. In part this idea is already embodied in the structure of the International Labour Office.[26]

Nationalism Norman Angell conceives mainly as a destructive force. He is not oblivious of its beneficent aspect, however. "Nationality," he states, "is a very precious manifestation of the instincts by which alone man can become socially conscious and act in some corporate capacity. The identification of 'self' with

society, which patriotism accomplishes within certain limits, the sacrifice of self for the community which it inspires—even though only when fighting other patriotisms—are moral achievements of infinite hope." [27] The appeal of nationalism is frequently a call to service, to self-sacrifice, to loyalty ; it inspires men with a feeling of solidarity and thus serves to elevate them above their petty personal or more exclusive group ambitions. Yet a realization of this truth does not lessen our apprehension of the threat which nationalism offers to world security. Norman Angell rightly suggests that the dangerous beliefs are not those that are totally fallacious, but, on the other hand, those that do possess an element of intrinsic worth.[28] It is " just anger that makes men unjust." The men who burned heretics were sincere and conscientious. Their error was not the inherent wickedness of their dogma, but their application of force to the domain of conscience. The fallacy of the nationalist lies not in his devotion to his nation, for within limits such an attitude is a noble one. His error rests on the exclusive character of his loyalty, so that a lofty impulse becomes a disastrous and irresponsible mania and destructive to the individual conscience. Further, an age that witnesses the havoc created by exultant nationalisms has no occasion to dwell on its inherent glories. Our present obligation is to inculcate the need of the subordination of group prejudices in the interests of a common civilization. This is the mission with which Norman Angell, more than any one else, has identified with himself.

Further, the just aspirations of nationalism will find in a society of states the best conditions for their maintenance. We recognize the nation as a distinct cultural entity in the world community. A colourless cosmopolitanism we hold to be a psychological monstrosity. A nation is certainly entitled to cultural autonomy and local self-government, but not neces-

sarily to complete political independence—not to statehood—for each Ireland invariably embraces an Ulster, and political barriers are frequently economically disastrous. The present Balkanization of Central Europe shows a confusion of nation with state.[29] Within the state we are gradually approaching a recognition that federalism is the best solution to the conflict of loyalties. Federalism also suggests the medium of harmonizing culture with economic inter-dependence. A society of states, as Norman Angell points out, will greatly assuage the existing hates and suspicions between nationalisms, for it will personify adherence to common world principles.[30] It will also offer the most effective security for the just aspiration of each, and will guarantee protection to the weaker against the aggressions of the ambitious and the powerful.

The problem of the state, however, is only one of the two problems that require solution if our civilization is to be secure. The other is that of property. Both are at present divisive influences. The first gives rise to interstate wars; the second to conflict of classes. Both are inter-related, for the private interests of conflicting capitalistic cliques tend frequently to stimulate international ill-will.[31] Yet property, as Norman Angell suggests, cannot be held to offer a complete explanation of international wars.[32] Such an explanation must refer, rather, to the impulses and emotions allied with nationalism and patriotism. Norman Angell does not desire to substitute the conflict of classes for the conflict of states. He is opposed to all forms of exclusive loyalties and to all forms of force when not applied in the interest of fostering co-operation. In fact, he states that Bolshevism attempts to transfer to property the militarist fallacy of the adequacy of force.[33] He gives, however, only passing attention to the problem of property; his main concentration is directed to that of the state. Yet, we submit, the solution which he offers to the problem

of the state is also applicable to that of property. A solution to both is conceivable only when the principle of consent replaces the principle of authority.

We have begun our chapter on internationalism with a reference to its relation to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the state; we conclude our discussion with the same theme, for the theory of sovereignty is crucial to our subject. The origin of this theory can be traced to the social anarchy created by the religious conflicts. This theory, as enunciated, then, by Bodin, proclaimed that order is more relevant than religious conformity.[34] The security of life and property demanded allegiance to a common political authority empowered to will acts of universal reference. Obedience to an omnicompetent state meant that at least within its confines order replaced the chaos resulting from the clash of sects. Now, however, we are facing a totally different situation. Since the seventeenth century, owing to the mechanical revolution, the world has been unified. This transformation gives us economically a territorial division of labour, and politically the necessity for world organization. Order and social peace within any single state depend upon factors which are world-wide in their scope. The theory of sovereignty which when formulated originally was in the interest of order, is now its negation. It still predicates an exclusiveness which is as unreal as it is economically impossible. It has in fact long been discredited not by political philosophers, but by rapid communication. It is undeniable that no society of states could develop before the rise of the sovereign state, yet the sovereign state is now the chief obstacle to the rise of a world community. The need for order and a calculable future which was responsible for the origination of the theory of sovereignty demands now a society of states, but no effective organization is possible unless the philosophic foundation of the state as an isolated entity is to a great extent modified.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE GOVERNANCE OF A UTOPIA

In periods of stress, when the reformers turn to improve actual institutions, the more imaginative writers concentrate on ideal constructions. A man with a vivid imagination is less patient with unpleasant actualities; hence he searches for an escape. Thus, while Plato visualizes a *Republic*, the more pedestrian mind of Aristotle dissects existing constitutions. Yet the freedom of the writers of utopias from objective restraints is indeed limited, since even man's fancy cannot escape the strait-jacket of his environment. If the imprint of time is less visible in idyllic productions, it is nevertheless present. That the *Republic* of Plato is a perfected Spartan pattern is undoubted. The *Utopia* of More, next to that of Plato in importance, is not only an expression of awakening Humanism, but is also a veritable catalogue of the social ills of its day.[1] A century after More, Bacon's fragment bears unmistakable evidence of the dawn of experimental science. The Utopian Socialists testify to the birth-pangs of the new industrialism, while the socialist ideal states of the last half century indicate the rising tide of collectivism. Thus to the student of social movements a study of utopias is significant, as they invariably offer reflections of their environment.

For political philosophy, however, the value of such a study lies in its suggestion of social norms. It is the proposed perfected state, and the perfected principles of liberty and property therein, together with such perfection in operation, that are of interest to us. If

a function of political theory is to indicate the direction of events, the function of utopian theory is to point to the vanguard of this direction. While utopian writers may not be wholly reliable guides, they yet deserve our attention, because they indicate possible goals of social advance. The utopists are bold free-lancers in social speculation, and their idyllic states are not only fascinating, but also possess some solid value as a means of foreseeing the path of social movement. In fact, the authors of ideal commonwealths are frequently only one leap ahead of the more realistic theorists. Much in their writings may be conceived as being in the nature of anticipated ideals—as fully developed reproductions of tendencies which are present in their own generations only in embryonic form. This is especially true of some of the utopias of the past century, as, for instance, Bellamy's *Looking Backward* and Hertzka's *Freeland*. To take random examples of single ideas, eugenics, religious toleration, and equality of the sexes were anticipated by utopian writers centuries before their attempted translation into the concrete. In such writings, too, pure fancy often encroaches upon valid theory, as is inevitable when the imagination is given a freer rein. Yet it is no less certain that a form of speculation which served as a vehicle of expression for such arresting minds as Plato, More, and Bacon cannot be designated as the mere day-dreaming of visionaries.

Furthermore, all political speculation may be said to be in a general sense utopian, as its avowed aim is to realize ideals. Even when we confine the term to a more restricted field, the limits between the accepted utopian writings and those outside that category are not easily discernible. Thus the *Republic* of Plato is a utopia, but it is also a seminal book in political philosophy. Is Harrington's *Oceana* a utopia? Is not the solid *Constitution* of the Webbs the ideal polity of liberal collectivists? Is it an exaggeration

to refer to Cole's guild structure as a guild utopia? In regard to some of the avowed utopias of the past century, as, for instance, Cabet's *Icaria* and Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, they are so true to contemporary facts that their chief value lies not in pointing to an ideal, but in issuing a warning—a warning against the day when bureaucrats will manufacture the good life wholesale. There are surely greater objectivity and regard for the limitations of relative circumstances in the efforts of Cole and of the Webbs than in the more formal utopias. Yet both Cole and Webb merely suggest idealized, well-rounded sketches of commonwealths which, though they are in accord with certain prevailing tendencies, will never materialize in the form in which they are presented. Nor have their authors any expectation of anything but their partial realization. Regarded in this light, we can appreciate the fact that the difference between the formal ideal contributions and those not commonly referred to as utopian is only relative. A review of a noteworthy recent contribution to utopian literature may, therefore, be of value.

The experimental English mind is apparently an uncongenial soil for the creation of utopias. Yet the name is itself derived from the title of an English book, and the most familiar contemporary ideal state is written by an Englishman. By a feat of the imagination H. G. Wells (*Modern Utopia*, 1905) finds himself in the utopian world-state. This universal commonwealth constitutes a perfected synthesis of the diversity of cultures and races that prevail in the world at present. Wells has suggested his utopian solution of certain problems in political theory upon a markedly realizable plane, and hence the analysis of them is especially pertinent to us. The underlying principle of the utopian world-state, Wells says, is a universal maximum of individual freedom.[2] Individuality is the most significant fact of social life, and in free

initiative lies the only possibility of progress. The state represents the species and deals with human averages, and hence cannot be the source of bold experiment. Intellectual, material, and moral advance depends upon individual innovators. The uniqueness of personality is a precious element, and institutions must preserve and foster such uniqueness. "The State is for Individuals, the law is for freedoms, the world is for experiment, experience, and change: these are the fundamental beliefs upon which a modern Utopia must go." [3]

Absolute liberty is impossible, however, and a reconciliation of conflicting claims and wills is essential. There can be no absolute rights or wrongs, but only quantitative adjustment. For, "both Individualism and Socialism are, in the absolute, absurdities; the one would make men the slaves of the violent or rich, the other the slaves of the state official, and the way of sanity runs, perhaps even sinuously, down the intervening valley." [4] The utopian world-state will attempt such a reconciliation of conflicting liberties as will result in the greatest general freedom. It is this ideal that a utopian state will apply to concrete problems of social and economic life. This ideal predicates universal freedom of locomotion, but not so as to involve freedom of intrusion, since expansion of personality requires solitary reflection and exclusive communion with kindred spirits. The home will therefore be private, and perhaps also the garden adjacent to it. There will be reverence for bold departures in personal conduct and tastes. The utopian state will control the drink trade, punish drunkenness in public, protect the young and preserve public decency, but beyond that the state will not venture to interfere with personal taste in drink. In relation to family life, the interference of the state will be purely for the sake of the offspring, since the state will of necessity guarantee proper maintenance to all children. Thus

the state will demand from all those contemplating marriage a certain minimum age, mental and physical health, and a position of economic solvency. The state will conceive motherhood in the light of a profession to be rewarded with economic sufficiency. Subject to certain causes for divorce, the home life where there are children must be maintained. A marriage, however, that remains fruitless for a number of years may be allowed to lapse. Otherwise the private morality of adults will be of no concern to the state except where any act offers temptation to the immature.

In industry, the principle of maximum possible individual liberty postulates that the utopian world-state will be the sole owner of the land and the local authorities will hold their land under it as feudal landlords. "The State or these subordinates holds all the sources of energy, and either directly or through its tenants, farmers and agents, develops these sources, and renders the energy available for the work of life. It or its tenants will produce food, and so human energy, and the exploitation of coal and electric power, and the powers of wind and wave and water will be within its right." [5] The state will thus control all natural resources, also all means of world communication, regulate the standard of exchange which will be in terms of units of physical energy, although gold will be used as token coin, and carry out all other necessary functions of government. Industries, however, which are novel, uncertain, and not universal in their scope will be left to the freer rein of individuals. Farming may best be pursued by tenant associations under elected managers, but the state will supervise and receive the rent. Stock breeding, seed farming, and agricultural experiments will be managed by companies or public authorities. The state will subsidize research and distribute useful information. Scientific knowledge will be fostered, and a corps of experts will

analyze, compare, and experiment with new ventures. That inventions may be encouraged, the inventors of materially profitable appliances will receive a royalty. The development of applied science will be so advanced that no person will be forced to do routinary toil.

In order that personality may be preserved, the great eye of the state will watch over the individual and may be of special assistance to him during critical periods in his life. The state will secure an economic minimum to the individual no matter where employed. It will operate a system of employment exchanges, and stand, as a right, as the reserve employer at a minimum rate of wages to all unemployed. It will offer shelter to the sick and financial assistance to the needy. It will, however, forbid all those whom it employs at the minimum rate to become parents. It will insure adults against sickness, old age, and accidents, and children against the death of their parents. In such circumstances the individual will be encouraged to spend his surplus income upon the enlargement of his mind and tastes. All education, including that of upper school and college, will be free. Those who can afford it may be idle, since leisure is of value, or they may engage in unremunerative pursuits. A man will be allowed to choose to earn only the minimum wage for part-time work in order that he may have the rest of the time at his disposal. The lunatics, the diseased, the adult criminals, the incurably base will be secluded from the body of the population in islands where they will be kept under guards, but will otherwise enjoy full freedom there. They will not be allowed to bear children, however. The entire population of the world-state will be indexed and a record of their lives kept. The general population will be contented and vigorous and more or less free from dissipation and barbarity.

Private property is necessary to personality, but

the state will limit the amount in order to prevent it becoming the expression of mere power. The individual will thus retain ownership over all property that he has earned. He will have unqualified possession of property that is especially related to his personality, as, for example, books, clothing, jewels, and perhaps also his house and household furniture. Such property he will also have the right to bequeath. He will also have the right to set aside sums of money for the better development of immature children, whether his own or those of others. These funds may be also transmitted to future generations, but a periodic revision of endowments will be necessary. All other forms of property that he has accumulated through investments in private and company undertakings will be in a different category, and at his death the state will take the lion's share. With leisure and decency within the reach of all, and a non-material standard of public esteem, the rich men, of which there may be a number, will exercise little special influence.)

The government of this vast world-state will be directed not by cabinets and parliaments, but by a special class of *samurai*, an order of "voluntary nobility." Admission to this order will be open to all adult men and women who pass a certain educational examination, are in good health, and show evidence of creative power. The members are required to observe the Common Rule. "The rule aims to exclude the dull and base altogether, to discipline the impulses and emotions, to develop a moral habit and sustain a man in periods of stress, fatigue, and temptation, to produce the maximum coöperation of all men of good intent, and, in fact, to keep all the *samurai* in a state of moral and bodily health and efficiency."[6] They are forbidden "alcohol, drugs, smoking, betting, and usury, games, trade, servants."[7] Seven days in the year, at least, they must live in a

wild and solitary place, alone with nature, in order to develop stoutness of heart and mind and to recuperate from the worries of life. The men are enjoined to marry women members. Both men and women are prescribed a certain uniform dress for their respective sex. The rules for women are more lax, but women members who are married should bear children. Most members belong to *samurai* families. This order constitutes the embodied mind of the utopian state, its directive intelligence in all departments of life. The head teachers, legislators, large employers of labour, physicians, and scientists are *samurai*. They are not only the sole governors and officials, but also the only voters. The supreme legislative assembly must have one tenth and may have one half of its members outside the order, however. Tenure of office is permanent, although every three years the fitness of the incumbents is reviewed by a jury of *samurai*. The utopian world-state is thus unacquainted with the machinery of democratic politics; its affairs are directed by the elect and the capable.

The analysis of Wells shows not only a vivid imagination but also a comprehension of political realities. Wells criticizes former utopian writers for their unreal and fantastic departures. He himself is resolved to keep close to the line of the possible.[8] With some exceptions he has achieved his aim. We see little hankering for the impossible, little yearning for the unreal. Thus he does not propose to revolutionize human nature, but merely aims at finding the loftiest height that human nature can reach. The utopian man will be a perfected human being, but will not be wholly transformed. Initiative will still require definite stimulation and encouragement. Self-seeking is balanced with social utility. Liberty is essential, but its full enjoyment requires reconciliation with order. Private property is desirable, but

it must conform to social needs. We are not offered the mistaken utopia of a regimented communism. Nor are we futilely exhorted to a return to the pre-industrial master-craftsman era. Machinery is not only accepted, but its application to human uses vastly augmented. In the utopia of Wells middle class comforts are made possible for all, with the slum and Park Lane removed. For us the chief importance of the book is that it offers a concrete model of a liberal collectivist state, and thus perhaps anticipated future discussion. In fact, to the general solution by Wells of the problems of liberty and property liberal collectivists such as the Webbs, or a liberal individualist such as Professor Hobhouse, would offer little objection. The utopia of Wells is in accordance with the prevailing social trend, although these tendencies are more fully developed. With some exceptions, it is thus ahead of events, but in the direct line of advance.

There is, however, a number of aspects which demonstrate the richness of the author's imagination, but which cannot be considered as serious solutions of concrete problems. It is a common idea that in the state of the future all barriers of nation, or of race, or of class, will disappear, and that no obstacles will block a consciousness of human unity and solidarity. Wells has embodied this idea in his utopia. His state is a world-state—a universal coalescence of all the various races, cultures, and traditions of the present day. Wells does mention, however, that this does not imply fusion or uniformity.[9] Yet his emphasis is on an all-inclusive melting-pot. It is to be a single-state civilization, with a social, moral, and political synthesis—"a synthesis of all nations, tongues and peoples in a World State." As a solution of the problem of peace between states the suggestion of Wells is questionable. Peace in the immediate future lies not in any world coalescence,

but in a confederated league of nations, based roughly on the principle that each nation-state is supreme in those affairs that relate to its own interests and subject to the international authority in those affairs that affect also the interests of other nation-states. An attachment to a particular locality and a common sentiment with those who have experienced the same fortunes and misfortunes is all that sane nationalism means, or should mean. Such a feeling cannot be a hindrance to international comity. Even a belief that one's nation is destined to play an important *rôle* in the world's future is not contrary to a belief in the unity and solidarity of western civilization or of the human race as a whole.[10] The immediate need is for harmony between nationalism and internationalism, and not for a universal synthesis.

In our author's striking suggestion of a select class of *samurai* as the sole governors of the world-state, we are again more in the realm of pure fancy than in that of concrete politics. Yet even here we may note the closeness of our utopia to the facts of British life, for Wells' proposal offers an extreme illustration of the Fabian ideal of a score of years ago. That government by an ideal man or group of men is best, is, moreover, a trite idea in political literature. Wells has adopted this notion in his utopia. The *samurai* obviously recall Plato's guardians and Carlyle's *Heroes;* and limited historical examples may be observed in the Society of Jesus and perhaps also in the Communist Party of Russia. They are the natural oligarchs for whom Mallock pleads.[11] A criticism that the *samurai* may abuse their power, and that favouritism may be shown in the selection of successful candidates, does not apply to ideal men. That Wells totally disregards the whole machinery of democratic politics in his ideal state is another indication of the prevailing discouragement with the results of democracy. The element of realizable truth in Wells' proposal is that

the state needs a specially trained force which of course must be subject to popular control. Its vaster functions necessitate an expert class of administrators. We must stress that proficiency in our governors which Plato long ago pointed out to be essential to a well-governed state. It is a recognition of this truth that made Wells resort to a special class.

However, the resort to a special class of *samurai* is open to another line of criticism.[12] Wells rightly stresses the uniqueness of personality and asserts that our social life must find room for it. The essential feature of personality is its singularity. In politics we assume that each class has interests and an outlook which are peculiar to it, and which are best fostered by those who best understand them. Thus we correctly assume that while an artisan can but poorly represent philosophers, philosophers are no less imperfect spokesmen for artisans. This is indeed the logic of democracy. Wells violates this principle. He perhaps prefers that philosophers should represent the artisan class. If so, the uniqueness of personality is discarded. The *samurai* will appeal only to persons of a special type. Membership of the order requires a complex regimen, and hence a special like-mindedness will develop among the members. The uniqueness of their personalities will deepen. They will become more and more estranged from the unique interests and personalities outside the order. With the exception of some representation in the supreme legislative assembly, Wells does not provide for the full representation in his state of the special points of view of those outside the order. We are not assuming the existence of class and national conflicts in the utopian state; we are merely assuming, as Wells desires us to do, that utopian human nature is but little altered. On the principle of the uniqueness of personality, all unique interests must find a full avenue of expression, but Wells fails to offer that.

Further, the essence of character is its individuality, and hence its reluctance to be subdued by regimentation. All creative minds are unique and in violent opposition to all forms of restraint. They insist on being a law unto themselves. It is thus doubtful whether the host of *samurai* rules and regulations will appeal to creative minds in normal times. Obviously these rules purport to develop intellectual and physical power, but a man with a creative mind desires to develop his body and mind in his own particular way. The order of *samurai* is virtually hardened into a mere function, and is thus highly uncongenial to free spirits. Monastic orders have normally made little appeal to persons with distinctive personalities. It may be doubted whether Wells himself would find membership of the order agreeable. (He mentions that some routinary regulations are necessary to develop personal stability,[18] but if the choice spirits find such rules onerous, and hence refuse to join, the order will not constitute the organized *élite* of the state. Such an order may be liked by people of second-rate talent, since membership may offer social prestige and personal gratification, but it may not be preferred by eminent geniuses.)

In fact, such an order may become too popular with people who possess some creative ability, but not that of the highest type. (In utopia such ability will have greater opportunities to develop, and hence the number of talented persons will increase. If too great a proportion of the population desires to belong to the *samurai*, will its membership be limited ? If so, how ? Unless we suppose that a person may hold an inferior position in society, say that of a clerk or an elementary schoolmaster, and still be a member of the order, limitation of membership will be necessary, since positions with creative opportunities are few. There is, indeed, no reason why a waiter in our own society should not possess a university education. Yet a

person with a university education will be happier as the organizer of an eating establishment than as a waiter in it. If a limitation of membership is essential, is there not the danger that such an order may become a closed corporation, like the Roman Senate or the English Parliament in the eighteenth century? Perhaps the order will in any case become a co-opted body, since Wells says that most members come from *samurai* families.[14] Attempt to limit the number will undoubtedly aggravate this tendency. This problem is important for concrete politics. Once we allow class rule, even a class of experts, opportunities for evil are legion. It is commonly heard that it is the task of the democracy to search for an aristocracy of talent. However, before we make a serious attempt to find our *élite*, we must first clearly define what we mean by an aristocracy of talent, and then provide the means for checking our talented.

Still, even the rule of a class does not dispense with the need of administrative organization, and hence the absence of a discussion of any governmental structure is perhaps for our purpose the most glaring defect of the utopia of Wells. We are offered certain ideas and some applications of those ideas, but we are not informed what political machinery will enforce these ideas and their applications. The *samurai*, we are told, will be the sole governors of the world-state, but, with the exception of vague hints, we are not told through what institutions they will exercise their vast powers.[15] Some powers, Wells suggests, will be exercised by the world-state and some by the local authorities, but as to what will definitely be the relation between the local authorities and the world-state, and through what political channels each will enforce its appropriate powers, we are left in the dark. Will the world-state be the recent Fabian ideal of a federation of municipalities?[16] The state will enforce a minimum wage, but what officials will exercise that

power and through what channels the enforcement will take place we are not told. The executive, its relation to the legislature, the powers of the legislature, and the administrative officials of the state are not elucidated. If an ideal state is to be vitally suggestive, it must elaborate a definite structure. Wells has almost entirely omitted the necessarily complicated administrative structure of his universal state.

Wells mentions that the secret of his utopia is intelligent organization. The need for intelligent co-ordination is a recurrent idea in his book, and is indeed a typical Wellsian note.[17] Wells constantly stresses the necessity of a greater enlightenment and understanding if our social ills are to be remedied.[18] Stupidity and senselessness keep men disunited and their society in travail. What is needed is order, clarity, and light. The utopian state exists even now in the minds of the more enlightened. We can realize it if only we aim high. We are foolish creatures ruled by our past, but by an effort of will and a greater imagination we may free ourselves from our prejudices and narrowness. For this redemption we must perfect our facilities for popular education. We must also use the manifold possibilities of science and the limitless applications of exact measurement and tests in the social sciences. We also need the leadership of the expert and the wise. Aided by science and led by the capable, we shall emancipate ourselves from the thraldom of the past and the utopia of our dreams will be realized. Wells is eminently fitted to propagate such a vision, and it is perhaps as the prophet of clarity and enlightenment that his position in contemporary social thought is most secure.[19]

# CHAPTER XII

## THE STATE IN LITERATURE: I. THE DRAMA

A REVIEW of the political theory of literature is as fascinating as it is difficult. It is fascinating to follow the great masters as they plumb the deeps of human woe. It is difficult, for while we aim at analyzing institutions, the men of letters concentrate on the delineation of character. It is the nature of philosophy to deal with the institution, the universal; while that of art treats with the particular, the individual. Yet who dares to omit the great stars in the literary firmament? If the artist presents the institution only in reflected lustre, it is nevertheless present, and the reflection of gifted minds is of social concern. Every great book is of social significance, and its impact on the state is unmistakable. In Great Britain, one feels there exists a special connection between culture and politics. No one can underestimate the influence of Carlyle and Ruskin on their generation. Our own period sees Morley, Balfour, Haldane, Bryce and Webb as Ministers of the Crown, H. G. Wells as a candidate for Parliament, and G. Bernard Shaw as an active corporal in the socialist ranks. Life and art can never be severed without an injury to both. Happily in England the separation, if there is any, is less noticeable.

Again, the pervasive realism of contemporary literature makes it of special importance for the social investigator.[1] Our authors continue the traditions of Dickens, but with less fear of scandalizing their readers. The thought of our age is primarily realistic and the literary craftsman follows in line. Literature

is thus a deliberate delineation of life and not a romantic escape from it.) Our men of letters do not shrink from observing the unpleasant, nor do they pine for an imaginary romantic past. They grasp the interesting and vivid material about them and enrich it with the spell of their genius. Their novels are nourished on life and their drama is most conspicuous in the *rôle* of elucidating it. Man's misery and suffering, his joys and gladness, his struggles with his fellows and with institutions, and his elemental impulses—these form their themes. If we search deeply, therefore, we discern in their productions a dissection of society, with the individual as the centre of imponderable forces.

Still, there is another aspect which gives added interest to current literature. The realism of the men of letters is coupled with a challenging irreverence for existing institutions. As artists they desire beauty, as reformers they plead for a change. They not only explain life, but frankly demand improvement. Morris has shown them that life and art cannot be separated, and, like Ruskin and Carlyle, they insist upon action. Art they conceive to be not merely for art's sake, but surcharged with human possibilities. Literature is instrumental to man's needs. The aim of art must be social and its goal human regeneration. They are thus bold and vigorous critics of life. Nor does the state escape their searching penetration. As artists they adore order and abhor anarchy. The essence of art is order, clarity, harmony, but life reveals disorder, gracelessness, disharmony. Hence they demand that beauty should transform life, which reformation can be successful only after social adjustment. "To button your pockets and stand still" is folly. What Ruskin and Carlyle expressed through the essay, our authors achieve through the novel and play. To this general tendency Arnold Bennett offers perhaps an exception. He is concerned more with a

description of the procession than with attempts to reform. The novels and plays of most other writers, however, are as much a trenchant criticism of institutions as formal treatises on them. Hence, while the literary prophets of the past generation were brilliant essayists and moralists, those of our own age are imaginative writers.

We have selected Galsworthy, Shaw, Bennett, and Wells as the outstanding representatives of contemporary English literature. We have already had occasion to refer to some of the more definite social theories of Shaw [2] and Wells.[3] Here we are concerned mainly with their social views as reflected in imaginative productions. Obviously it would be futile to attempt to find a coherent political theory in novels and dramas. All that we discover is either the reaction of men of letters to certain particular problems or a general social outlook. The best that we can do is to offer an account of their reflections as presented in some of their more pertinent works on issues which are of import to us. In some cases a mere hint is the only definite thing we may observe; still a social outlook is never absent. Our method of analysis must of necessity be different from that pursued in the other chapters. In this chapter we shall consider the dramatists; in the following, the novelists.

Two dramas of Galsworthy are germane to our purpose. In his *Strife* he deals with a problem of the modern state no less vital than the conflict of economic classes. A long strike is on at the Trenartha Tin Plate Works. On the day when the company's board and the strikers are to meet to decide whether the strike should be continued, the situation is perilous to both sides. The company is on the verge of bankruptcy, while the strikers and their families are starving. The moving spirits of the strike are Anthony, the Chairman of the Board, who recognizes in the strike not only a threat to the existing relation between

employers and their workmen, but also to the entire social order; and Roberts, the leader of the workmen, to whom the strike is merely one aspect of the struggle of the proletariat against the domination of the capitalists. Roberts also has a personal grievance: for an invention of his which the company made use of he received only seven hundred pounds, while the company earned a hundred thousand pounds out of it. Anthony and Roberts are both fanatics and are both pledged to a policy of no surrender. A policy of compromise is represented by the leader of the union, who has refused support to the strikers on the grounds that he considers their demands excessive. While Roberts is exhorting the strikers to stand firm, he receives word that his invalid wife has died of cold and hunger. In his absence the moderate element gains control and the strikers decide to ask the union to reach an agreement with the company. At the same time news of the death of Roberts' wife reaches the company's Board and the misery of the strikers is brought home to the members with greater emphasis. There, too, the moderate succeed and Anthony resigns. The strike is ended, and the terms reached are the same as those drawn up by the moderate elements of both sides before the strike began.

Galsworthy's *Strife* is not only an artistic triumph, but also shows profound perception of social realities.[4] It has, indeed, as much value for the student of politics as for the student of literature. As an artist, Galsworthy merely presents a situation—but it is a situation latent with social significance. He points to a disease by offering an example. His own social creed is only implied. It never interferes with the unfolding of the situation. Nor does he allow a superficial sentimentality to obscure his vision. His portrayal of the psychology of class—that mental outlook which establishes a gulf between classes—is admirable. He realizes that both classes are equally contaminated

with this malady. To the student of society, Galsworthy's masterful analysis of character in grips with the impersonal social forces offers a concrete illustration of the dynamic social movements that sway these individuals.

The centre of the drama, of course, revolves around the struggle of the Titans, for Titans Roberts and Anthony undoubtedly are. The other characters are mere puppets in their hands. On the analysis of this struggle rests the chief value of the play to us. For the struggle of these giants is the struggle of conflicting social principles. Anthony typifies the principle of authority. The employers, he says, embody the brains and sinews of society, and any talk about the solidarity of interests between them and the workmen is pure cant. He is indeed a dramatic personification of the social theory of Mallock. Roberts, on the other hand, voices the principle of liberty and equality, recognizing in capitalism its chief enemy. We see thus the social philosophy of Mallock [5] in conflict with that of W. Paul.[6] Galsworthy has depicted both sides with remarkable fairness and understanding. With the exception of the personal grievance of Roberts, we find no individual variation or eccentricities to mar the importance of the play as offering a type-situation. Nor is there a spirit of personal malice and revengeful vindictiveness between the antagonists. Both have a stoic indifference to suffering and financial loss. Roberts has given all his savings to the strikers' fund, while Anthony regards the financial loss of his company as trivial compared with the principle. He orders that the sick wife of Roberts should be given medical attention, thus showing that he bears no personal hostility to his antagonist. Indeed, between the two men one notices mutual admiration—that admiration which a strong man feels for an equally strong opponent. Each is an incarnation of his particular "sacred cause."

What social teaching does Galsworthy's *Strife* convey? That we are justified in demanding from a playwright the exposition of a social truth Galsworthy himself recognizes. In a different connection he remarks: "A drama must be shaped so as to have a spire of meaning. Every grouping of life and character has its inherent moral; and the business of the dramatist is so to pose the group as to bring that moral poignantly to the light of day." [7] If we interpret the play correctly, Galsworthy endeavours to impress upon us his view that most strikes are futile and can be prevented by a greater good-will and compromise on both sides. Strikes feed upon the bitterness of class and are fomented by fanatics. We need more kindness, more sympathy, more generosity. With less haughtiness on the part of the employer, with less suspicion on the part of the workman, with a better education of both classes, we may obtain a greater degree of social peace.

Whatever our opinion may be of the thought that this play imparts, it surely gives form to a crucial problem of the modern state, and that is perhaps all that we should expect from a playwright. It is a problem which threatens the existence of the life of the state. The Robertses and the Anthonys are the expression of the deep cleavage of classes. To the removal of this chasm the state must dedicate its energies. We see no other way of achieving this purpose than by a better education of all classes, by the democratization of industry, and by an approach to a greater economic equality. Obviously, a state dominated by the Robertses offers no improvement upon one controlled by the Anthonys. However, in a state in which there are fewer Anthonys there will be also fewer Robertses. The best method of preventing the Robertses from kindling a social conflagration is to make it less easy for the Anthonys to exercise their dictatorial whims. The accomplishment of this

aim postulates the dispersion of all forms of power, whether of wealth or of office.)

While in *Strife* Galsworthy discusses a question which in its most striking aspects is largely modern in its origin, in *Justice* he deals with a problem which is as old as the state itself. Falder, a young clerk of twenty-three, commits forgery in order to help the woman that he loves, who is abused by a dissolute husband. At his trial his counsel pleads that Falder, owing to the woman's distress, was mentally irresponsible when he committed the crime. He is found guilty and sentenced to penal servitude for three years. His prison term, which includes three months in solitary confinement, impairs his body and mind. When released from prison, Falder forges a reference in order to find employment. He is unable to make a new start, as his sensitiveness makes it impossible for him to retain any situation after people discover his past. At the same time when his old employer consents to re-engage him, a detective enters to rearrest him for forging a reference and for failure to report periodically to the police, as ordered when released from prison. Rather than go back to prison Falder takes his life by throwing himself out of the window.

*Justice* cannot be placed in the same high rank with *Strife*. It lacks the pulsating vitality which the conflict of personalities gives to the latter. In *Strife* we see the struggle of different theories of society; in *Justice* we see an individual trapped within the meshes of an institution. In *Justice*, as in *Strife*, the situation is a type-situation, and the play deals with the reaction of type-characters to that situation. The chief characters are normal human types and not eccentric personalities. Falder is weak, and hence true to his type, since a strong-willed man seldom finds himself in such a predicament. The people that are the instruments of Falder's ruin are kindly and well-

meaning. The judge, for instance, is not a Jeffreys, but the ordinary trial judge, who conscientiously applies the law to individual cases. Falder is crushed not by individuals, but by the prevailing system of law-enforcement. The individuals are merely the blind votaries of existing traditions of justice. Galsworthy offers to us the operation of an impersonal social force. The play presents, as he himself states, "a picture of the whole process of justice as seen by this painter's eye." [8]

The moderation and detachment with which Galsworthy depicts the system of justice make his condemnation of it more eloquent. The play is an indictment of a social tradition. It is a sermon on the imperfection of an essential function of the state. It presents in an unmistakable manner the contrast between the actual realization of justice and its ideal purpose. Falder's previous record was without blemish, and his first offence was committed when he was under great emotional strain. A more perfect system of judicial administration would have looked upon him as a patient, and not as a criminal. It would have offered him an opportunity to atone morally for his deed not by external physical compulsion, but by a reformation of his will. It would have thus saved him from himself and for society. The prevailing system, however, meted out to him a prison term and the horror of solitary confinement, which debased him physically and morally and ultimately sacrificed his life. How many Falders do the mills of justice grind out?

It was Aristotle who long ago pointed out that the value of law lies in its universality. While law is universal, individual cases differ. It is obvious that the aim of justice is to protect society and reform the offender. To reform the offender is the best means of protecting society, but reformation, too, necessitates individual treatment. With a greater realization that

moral ills are in the same category as physical ills, with a greater knowledge of abnormal psychology, and hence an appreciation of the gusts of passion and momentary aberrations that reduce responsibility to a minimum, with a fuller understanding that reformation is possible not by breaking the will, but by assisting it, then we may learn to rely more upon extenuating circumstances in each case than upon impersonal generalities. Just as it is necessary to quarantine persons who suffer from contagious physical diseases, it may also be necessary to exclude some moral offenders from the body of the population. In no case is it justifiable to apply any treatment which leaves a spirit of fierce resentment in the heart of the victim. To achieve this reform it is necessary to alter a deep-rooted tradition. Galsworthy's play is an important contribution to popular enlightenment. The prison reform which occurred at about the same time as the play was offered to the public may, perhaps, in part be attributed to the agitation which it stimulated.

While in the plays of Galsworthy a social outlook is only implicit, in those of G. Bernard Shaw the advocacy of a political doctrine is openly avowed. A discussion of three of his dramas will give us the pertinent Shavian gospel. In *Widower's Houses*, Shaw focusses our attention on the problem of slum landlordism in alliance with corrupt politics. Harry Trench, a product of upper middle-class ideals and prejudices, is in love with Blanche Sartorius, the daughter of a wealthy "self-made" London estate agent. During their engagement Trench is amazed to discover that the Sartorius' wealth is derived wholly from the exorbitant rents imposed upon the impoverished tenants of slum houses. Trench's ideals of personal honour and pity for the poor are outraged, and he consequently stipulates to Blanche conditions which lead to the breaking-off of the engage-

ment. Sartorius, however, has previously informed him that his own income is derived from the same sources, as the Trench family is the ground landlord of a part of these properties. A realization of the tangled connection between the misery of the poor and the luxury and idleness of his class disillusions him. When Sartorius, in acting upon information derived from corrupt official channels, sees an opportunity for greater profits, Trench joins him as a willing partner in this shady transaction. He marries Blanche and his reconciliation with the existing system is presumably complete.

Shaw dramatizes the same problem of the relation between the poverty of the poor and the tainted incomes of the rich in *Mrs. Warren's Profession* in an even more poignant manner. Vivie Warren, a clever and self-reliant Girton girl, has been supported by her mother throughout her life, but has never come into contact with any of her other relatives. She is determined, however, to find out her family connections. After pressing her mother for information, Vivie is astounded to learn that she is an illegitimate child, and that her mother, instead of suffering the misery and poverty which is the lot of the underpaid working girl, had prospered by pursuing illicit commerce. When Sir George Crofts, one of her mother's associates in the lurid business, proposes marriage to her, Vivie repulses him with disgust. In extenuation of his guilt, Crofts retorts that society cares little for the sources of income and that many respectable persons derive profits from vice. Vivie does not blame her mother, as she realizes the force of the conditions which compelled her degradation, but her sense of dignity is outraged. She separates herself from Frank Gardner, to whom she was attached, and from her mother and her associates, and determines to pursue a business career and never enter those relations of life which her mother has corrupted.

The plays of Shaw reveal him not only as an artist, but also as a determined reformer.[9] The drama thus becomes a medium for popular education, and the theatre is placed alongside the school and the forum as a means of enlightenment. Art thus definitely becomes the instrument of a social mission. It is the vehicle of the expression of ideas. The artist is truly an artist-philosopher. As an artist, Shaw offers a cross-section of life, but the didactic aim is never concealed. The plays present not only a description of life, but also elaborate suggestions for its improvement. Should the plays themselves throw doubt on Shaw's own position or his didactic purpose, long prefaces attempt to remove any misunderstanding. Most of his plays are indeed brilliant dialogues on sociological subjects. Each is a sermon presenting an aspect of the "Shavian *Anschauung*." We can thus best understand Shaw as censor of social institutions.

The ideas which Shaw conveys in the plays which we have summarized are not far to seek. He uncovers the seamy side of our industrial civilization. If society allows misery and wretchedness to exist, it offers encouragement to the unscrupulous to take advantage of the helplessness of their victims. If it pays to oppress the poor, it also pays to corrupt the officials of the state. Moral slovenliness is due not to original sin, but to social factors. As long as decent employment cannot secure self-respect and comfort those who do not possess forceful characters will prize comfort higher than cleanliness, and force of character and slum life go ill together. Again, as long as society allows such sores to exist, the line between the desirable and undesirable sources of income will be blurred, and men like Crofts can defend themselves by failing to see any distinction. Thus does the slum revenge itself upon the boulevard. In such a state the good life is possible neither for the poor nor for the rich. The

blame, however, is not with individuals—not with Sartorius, or Trench, or Mrs. Warren, or Crofts—but with institutions. To arouse an agitation for the reformation of these institutions has been the life-work of Shaw.

Shaw does not confine himself to mere negative criticism, but also offers positive suggestions. We have already noted that his concrete proposal is socialism.[10] To him socialism alone can abolish poverty—which he considers to be a cancer in the social body—and secure to each person a sufficient income—which he believes is the salvation of the soul.[11] Shaw's socialism differs in important respects from the liberal collectivism which we have reviewed. Thus he believes that a resolute and conscientious minority has a right to impose its rule on an amorphous majority, and Bolshevism he regards as belonging to that category.[12] But the most striking aspect of Shaw's socialism is his insistence upon equality in distribution. This doctrine he elaborates in the Preface to *Androcles and the Lion*. Shaw would guarantee to each child an equal share of the communal income, and when the child grows up the state would insist that he earns his share. He believes no other standard of distribution to be feasible. Equality, he declares, will prevent class government on behalf of the plutocrats, make it impossible for luxuries to be produced before the necessities of all are satisfied, and foster biological selection, since intermarriage would be possible throughout the whole community. Only when the economic security of each is insured can human energies be freed to achieve the purposes of civilization.

The socialism of Shaw necessitates an extension of the functions of the state, but for contemporary governments and politicians Shaw has the utmost contempt. Hence his doctrine of eugenics, which he expounds in *Man and Superman*. John Tanner, philosopher and critic of popular shams and conven-

tions, is pursued in marriage by the energetic and outspoken Ann Whitefield. Tanner believes that woman pursues man in order to achieve the purpose of nature, and that blundering society can be saved only by a race of supermen. He thus becomes aware of Ann's intention, but he desires to retain his individuality, and married life he regards not only as boring, but also as narrowing, because of its confined exclusiveness. Ann is loved by Octavius Robinson, who upholds the romantic views of art, love, and marriage, as opposed to the ascetic doctrine of Tanner. Ann maliciously encourages Octavius without, however, intending to marry him. In order to escape being trapped by Ann, Tanner flees abroad, but Ann follows him. He finally surrenders, feeling convinced that he is subdued by the Life Force that is in woman.

Shaw refers to *Man and Superman* as "A Comedy and a Philosophy." The pertinent aspects of the Shavian philosophy may easily be observed. Evolution is the development of the Life Force, that is, of Cosmic Will or Purpose. This spirit incessantly strives to attain greater self-consciousness.[13] In man it finds its most effective expression. It is the Life Force which compels woman as the mother of the race to perpetuate the species, and hence she pursues man as an instrument in the vital work of nature.[14] By will, intelligence, and foresight man can achieve a more perfect social order. But to achieve this end it is necessary to breed a race of supermen—men who are most conscious of the will-to-live, and in whose minds the Life Force finds its clearest realization. In politics the need for the supermen is urgent. Our governments are managed by pompous windbags who pander to a crowd of dullards.[15] If the state is to fulfil its vast functions, it must breed a race of superior men. Shaw, then, is an apostle of eugenics.

The subject of eugenics includes two separate questions, one of ends and one of means. What type

of human being does Shaw consider desirable to evolve? He is not unconscious of the difficulty of the problem. He realizes that to decide upon an ideal human model is infinitely complex. Nor does he aim at developing a uniform pattern. He does not propose any dogmatic goal. To him an ideal type can be reached only by trial and error, and the final test is pragmatic. He does, however, suggest the ideal parents of his super-race. "Some sort," he says, "of goodlooking philosopher-athlete, with a handsome healthy woman for his mate, perhaps."[16] Thus a brilliant critic of popular superstitions and the possessor of a good income, such as Tanner, with a healthy and resolute woman, such as Ann, constitute a super-couple and are fit to propagate a race of their kind. With regard to means Shaw has a number of suggestions to make. We have already mentioned his insistence upon the economic security of each individual. The economic independence of woman he considers essential. Child-bearing he recognizes as a public function, and consequently mothers should be given grants by the state. He also favours an extension of the powers of the state over the home life of the child. Divorce he would make easily obtainable.[17] Some undesirable types he would exclude entirely from parentage, and the more extreme cases he would send to the lethal chamber or retain them for the purpose of studying their pathological conditions. By these means, among others, he hopes to select the supercitizens of the future state. "We must eliminate the Yahoo, or his vote will wreck the commonwealth."[18]

To Shaw, socialism and eugenics are interwoven. Socialism will enable the state to breed a superior race, while no radical social transformation is possible without supermen. As we have mentioned, the most interesting feature of Shavian socialism is the demand for absolute economic equality. In his *Case for Equality* Shaw finishes his plea by emphasizing the

need for gentlemen. The essence of a gentleman he considers to be a desire to give to society as much as possible and to take only as much as is available for every one else. He believes that with a race of gentlemen all practical difficulties of his proposal would be solved. Shaw is correct in saying that in a society of supermen his ideal is realizable. Yet in our present society the number of such gentlemen is small. For the human material that is at our disposal at present or in the immediate future some superior financial reward as an encouragement to effort is apparently essential. This does not imply that the manager of industry or financier should receive ten times the salary of the student of pure science. It does mean, however, that both the manager and scientist may look forward to financial preference as a stimulus to the exertion of their best efforts. The energetic must be financially preferred to those who care only to earn their salaries.

Again, if the total national income were large enough for each person's equal share to be sufficient to secure for him the comforts and amenities of life essential to creative effort, the case for equality would be strengthened. Such a supposition, however, postulates an economic system more efficient and productive than the present one is.[19] Nor can we expect such radical industrial changes as would make that possible in the immediate future. Under our present inadequate system it may be desirable that men of genius and talent should receive more than their equal share. It is thus socially preferable that a genius like Shaw should receive more than his proportion in order to enable him to continue his work, even if it means that others receive less than their equal share. It is socially desirable that Shaw should be offered such a congenial environment as will enable him to be at his best. Inequality is, then, preferable. The ideal of distribution which we seek is a maximum

and minimum to be prescribed by the state with ample freedom for variations between the two limits.

There is still an important aspect of Shaw's suggestion which deserves consideration. Suppose socialization of industries and services is carried out to such an extent that all functionless incomes are abolished. Under our supposition all managers of industries may be salaried workers. Have we any assurance that social peace will then be realized? We have no reason to feel certain that this condition will result. The present conflict between employers and employed may be replaced by a conflict between various economic groups—between skilled workers and unskilled, between managers and their assistants, and between workers in different industries. The most serious source of friction will undoubtedly relate to distribution. There may be manifold disputes as to how big a share each economic group should receive from the total national dividend. There may, of course, be other causes of dispute. Yet a system of distribution on the basis of absolute equality would have the advantage of removing one fertile source of grievance.

Shaw's discussion of eugenics, if we omit some Shavian exaggerations, is moderate and helpful. He cannot be accused of minimizing the difficulties of the problem. He understands that chance and fancy must still play a part in the mating of the sexes.[20] In fact, the whole problem of human biological selection is still unexplored, and our speculations must of necessity include a large element of hypothetical supposition. When we breed race-horses we have a definite goal in mind, and we know fairly definitely what means to use to reach it. In the case of man we are uncertain as to what type is most desirable. We need, too, not a single type, but a diversity of types. Thus a society possessing a single type like Tanner would be a less interesting group than one also possessing a due proportion of Robinsons. Shaw's ideal approaches the

*samurai* of Wells rather than the philosopher-statesman of Plato's ideal state. His proposals with regard to the methods the state should employ in order to obtain the ideal type are in the main suggestive. Some of his ideas, as, for instance, that those who are unmistakably unfit should not be permitted to propagate their kind, are advocated in a good many quarters.[21] There is a growing feeling that the state should pursue more positive action in a field which is so vital to its existence. Yet if wholesome advance is to be made, inveterate prejudice must still be overcome. Shaw is doing valiant service in educating the popular mind.

Nevertheless, it is safe to assert that Shaw's significance to his generation rests not on his advocacy of eugenics, or of socialism, or of creative evolution, but on his general criticism of life. It is as a critic of life that he has enriched our age. It is in this respect that he is one of the major prophets of our time. His position is indeed similar to that held by Carlyle, or Ruskin, or Tolstoy. Like a true seer, he penetrates through our shams, conventions, and fictions. He is the foe of false religion, of pseudo-science, of bad economics and politics, of the cowardice that passes for respectability, and of all forms of baseness and degradation.[22] That our institutions need constant reaffirmation as to their purpose and that many of our sanctified social practices are based upon pure superstitions cannot be too frequently reiterated. It is because he realizes that no radical social reform is feasible without transforming the state and property that he has become a critic of both. Whatever subject he approaches, whether socialism or eugenics, he stimulates us by irritating us, and provokes thought by his absolute disregard of accepted norms. To our special field he has brought the passionate zeal of a master of reality.

In our discussion of the political thought of the drama we have selected two outstanding representa-

tives of contemporary playwrights. In the plays of Galsworthy and Shaw we saw the unmistakable reflection of social views. In Galsworthy's two dramas we noticed an analysis of two important problems of the modern state, and while the discussion is offered with the objectivity of the artist, the purpose of the author is nevertheless apparent. To Shaw the drama is openly a medium of social reform. The views of both of these writers are of special interest to us, since their reflection is not the product of a concentration in a limited field, as is the case with most students of politics, but the product of a general philosophic and artistic point of view. Thus, for example, Shaw approaches his socialism in a more broad and general spirit than the other socialists that we have reviewed. What these writers may lack in scientific precision they more than make up for by their breadth of mind and largeness of outlook. They bring to our subject a much needed universality of vision. We shall also observe the same helpful spirit in our discussion of the contemporary novel in the next chapter.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE STATE IN LITERATURE: II. THE NOVEL

In our last chapter we have reviewed two plays by Galsworthy, but his *magnum opus* is, perhaps, the *The Forsyte Saga*. This novel is of import to us not only for its delineation of the property instinct, but also for its dissection of recent social changes. The Forsytes are an upper-middle-class family—solid, wealthy, and respectable. Their god is property. Soames, of the later Victorian Forsytes, is the man of property *par excellence*. However, to his wife, Irene, and to the architect Bossiney, with whom she is in love, life means creation and the enjoyment of beauty and not the acquisition of possessions. Enraged with jealousy, Soames endangers the architect's career when he wins a suit against him for the breach of a financial contract. The architect cares little for monetary matters or for his future, but, when maddened with the knowledge that Soames has violently exercised possession over Irene, he commits suicide. Twelve years after Irene has left him, Soames tenaciously attempts to get her back, for to be deprived of a possession is foreign to a Forsyte. In order to escape from his pursuit, Irene enters into relations with Jolyon Forsyte, Soames' cousin, that constitute legal grounds for divorce, and she later marries Jolyon. Jolyon has long been a rebel against Forsytean traditions. Soames marries a young French woman. This marriage is one of convenience rather than of sentiment, for Soames desires an heir, and his wife covets his wealth and position. Nineteen years later, in 1920, Soames' daughter Fleur and Irene's son Jon

become passionately attached to each other. Jon, however, when informed of his mother's tragic experience, refuses to marry Fleur, as he realizes how abhorrent such a union would be to Irene. With an aching heart, Fleur marries a man for whom she has but little affection. (As Soames, now sixty-five, reviews the tragedy of his life in consequence of his inordinate possessiveness, he sees a glimpse of the truth that beauty, which is everlasting, is capturable only by a love which forgets self.[1])

(The book is a fine penetrating study of the possessive impulse in human nature. It is an admirable analysis of the strangle-hold which acquisitiveness may gain over the human soul. The Forsyte family is truly possessiveness incarnate. Property is its religion, with stockbrokers, solicitors, and merchants as its high priests. "For what," is its philosophy of life, "shall it profit a man if he gains his own soul, but lose all his property." Its property comprises name, reputation, wives, children, pictures, and houses. The most tragic representative of this family is Soames. His wife he considers in the light of a possession. He felt mystified that as a piece of property she eluded him. He desires an heir to whom to bequeath his proprietary interests in his name, reputation, and wealth. He has no other interest in his collection of paintings than the acquisitive interest of the stamp collector. His pictures are selected with an eye to their future market value rather than to their æsthetic worth. His patriotism, too, is proprietary. Like all the Forsytes, he is an imperialist, because imperialism means the expansion of national possession. His judgment on national affairs is determined by their effect on his investments. The world to him is an arena of conquest and appropriation. The good life is the one with the greatest accumulation.)

In his Preface the author declares that the book is "an intimate incarnation of the disturbance that

Beauty effects in the lives of men." Irene thus represents Beauty impinging on the possessive world of the Forsytes. But the book also manifests the tragedy of a life devoted exclusively to acquisitiveness. Soames is a pathetic figure, a brooding monomaniac. His life is haunted by his pathological obsession. He is a slave to his fanaticism, bound and tortured by his mania. His life is almost void of the freedom, the occasional joys, and tolerance which we find in Irene, Bossiney, and Jolyon. His grand passion for Irene ends in disaster because his affection is tainted with his insatiable possessiveness. Her aversion to him embitters his life, and later deprives Fleur of happiness. Only at rare moments of introspection does he realize that the most precious possession is the possession of oneself, and this can be achieved only by giving rather than by taking, by creating rather than by acquiring. In his whole-hearted love for Fleur, which alone was uncontaminated with his master passion, he came near the truth that true devotion forgets self. The pathos of Soames' career unmistakably demonstrates that if life is to be free and generous, it must be dedicated to creation and service, otherwise it forges the chains of its own servitude.

That an economic foundation is essential to the creative life is obvious. A "sense of property," thus interpreted, has a definite *rôle* to fulfil. A certain degree of acquisitiveness is necessary as a means to an end. The end is creation. This is the meaning of Shaw's statement that money is the salvation of the soul.[2] The difference between creation and possession is that, while the former adds to the total free goods of the world, the latter appropriates a part of the world's goods for exclusive ownership. Creation, too, enjoys the doing of the act, while possession is concerned only with the results of the action. Our social institutions, as Bertrand Russell points out, should foster the creative impulses rather than the possessive,

since acquisitiveness engenders discord and conflict.[3] Assuredly, too, possessiveness is applicable only to material things, for every human being is an end in himself, and not even love can alter this basic truth.

The *Forsyte Saga* not only shows the dangers of unlimited possessiveness, but also marks the passing of an age. In the old generation of the Forsytes we see the dominating spirit of the Victorian era. In them we note the determination, the tenacity, the contempt for ideas, the materialism, and the individualism of the ruling class of the past century. Forsyteism is a symbol of an economic and political theory which is dying. It represents the Victorian belief that unrestricted private property is the best means of attaining desirable social ends, and that the founding of a family to be the most important individual impulse working for the same end. Property, too, was held as a right of the individual which the state must protect, but cannot modify. This doctrine was interrelated with a belief in authority—the authority of a ruling oligarchy in politics, of the employer in industry, of the husband over the wife, of the parents over the children. The book offers an analysis of the gradual revolt during the past two generations against acquisitiveness and authority. The present generation of Forsytes are untrue to Forsytean traditions. They may not know definitely what beliefs will replace the shattered doctrines of the past, but they see everything, and, after having seen, they cynically find that there is nothing to see. They are thus too disillusioned with the past to have too great reverence for property and authority. They know that in the society of the future the possessive principle will play a subsidiary *rôle*, and that if society is to attain the common good it must deliberately strive for that end. They know, too, that in the future more than in the past the common authority of the state

will interfere with the private authority of the parent or employer. They are also conscious that behind these impending changes there is a new heir apparent threatening the domination of the Forsytes—the rising power of the masses. Thus Soames, standing near the family vault where Victorianism is buried, well summarizes the demise of an epoch. After brooding upon the crumbling of old beliefs and the fatuousness of the present, he declares: "'To Let'—the Forsyte age and way of life, when a man owned his soul, his investments, and his woman, without check or question. And now the State had, or would have, his investments, his woman had herself, and God knew who had his soul. 'To Let'—that sane and simple creed!"

Like *The Forsyte Saga*, the novels of Arnold Bennett deal with the middle classes.[4] Of Bennett's novels a social background is most evident in the *Clayhanger* trilogy, and hence it is of most concern to the student of politics. Darius Clayhanger was of a destitute family rescued from the workhouse by a clerical friend. By effort and perseverance this child of paupers has created a prosperous printing establishment in Bursley, one of the Five Towns. Life, however, has brutalized him, and as a father he is harsh and dictatorial. His son Edwin, a thoughtful and imaginative child of sixteen, has gone through the routine of dry book knowledge which passes for education in a school for the children of the provincial middle class. Edwin desires to study architecture, but his unsympathetic father compels him to join the printing works. The child develops into a contemplative young man—an observer of life about him, a silent rebel against provincial vulgarities and prejudices. He asks his father for an increase in his wages in order that he may marry the enigmatic Hilda Lessways, with whom he is in love, but his father offers him only a pittance. Edwin is spared embarrassment, for Hilda, who has

been victimized by a bigamist, feels that marriage is impossible for her. Some ten years later Edwin and Hilda marry, and the erstwhile ineffective rebel, now a pillar of local society, resigns himself to the injustices of a world which he is unable to alter.

The art of Bennett is undoubtedly of a high order. As an artist the novelist selects his material, and assuredly the mere act of selection involves evaluation, but once he has selected his material, he does not criticize or propose changes, but merely marks down. The chief characteristic of Bennett's work is the absolute detachment with which he portrays contemporary life. Like Edwin Clayhanger, Bennett is a spectator of "the squalid and pitiful human welter." He is not a reformer, but merely a chronicler. He delineates the ordinary events in the lives of simple and plain provincial folk with exactness and fidelity. The minuteness, the accuracy, and impassivity of his work offer us a remarkable photograph of a cross-section of contemporary society. Bennett sees humanity marching in a procession, a procession both sublime and grotesque, and driven by inscrutable forces. For himself he has assumed the *rôle* of a dispassionate recorder of certain aspects of this procession.

For the student of politics Bennett's *Clayhanger* trilogy is significant, because it brings to the surface the social realities behind parliaments and elections. We are face to face with the wide hinterland where political theories must find their adherents if they are to modify the springs of human action. We are made familiar with the social background of the modern state, and are shown the "divine average" whose majorities determine the policies of the state. It is indeed no exaggeration to affirm that the novels have the same value for us as the more formal studies of different classes by Booth and the Hammonds. Bennett is an objective recorder of sociological data,

and his novels are descriptive sociology. They are, in fact, social studies using the case method.

In Bennett's novels there are a number of pen-pictures which give great lucidity to some political movements, past and present. Thus in depicting the wretchedness of the family of Darius Clayhanger he vividly analyzes the horror of child labour and the misery of the workhouse. His exposition of the tortures of the child Darius is a more effective criticism of the then accepted principle of *laissez faire* than tables of statistics or formal treatises could accomplish. We are made more convinced of the justification of the growing collective interference beginning with the last half of the century. Again, when he describes the education of young Edwin in the third quarter of the century, we realize how imperfectly the education of children equipped the future voters for responsible citizenship. Further, his sketch of the banquet of the local Society for the Prosecution of Felons is an admirable portrait of the moving forces of contemporary politics. The local tradesmen and manufacturers are gathered there to convince themselves that the "heart of the country beat true." While the solid classes profusely congratulate themselves, they hear the cheers of the governed proletariat who are congregated in the open square to applaud their parliamentary candidate. What a portent for the feasting notabilities! Bennett's novels are rich in such episodes.

The picture of the social life of England which Bennett offers is not an edifying one. We notice the tenacity, the reserve, the industry, and the individualism of the characters—traits which are held as peculiarly English—but we also see the dinginess, the smugness, and the narrowness of their lives. We observe the coarseness of their public celebrations, their crude vulgarities, their pietistic hypocrisies, and their facile complacency. All classes are isolated from the current of ideas. They are all ready to throw a

brick at any one whose ideas, or deportment, or dress is not in accordance with the uniform pattern. The provincial oligarchs of trade and industry have raised themselves, like Darius Clayhanger, above the grey mass of the proletariat. Yet these upstarts are arrogant snobs, look with contempt upon the class from which they have sprung, vehemently denounce liberal movements as destructive of the social order, and subserviently cringe before their social superiors. Edwin Clayhanger alone is able to pierce through the superficialities of his class, but he lacks the energy to act. The pharisaism of the middle class is matched by the crass stupidity of the wage-earners. They are easily beguiled, easily succumb to the platitudes of adventurers. We appreciate more emphatically why political reforms are necessarily slow even if injustices accumulate.

We have already mentioned that Bennett is not formulating a social thesis, yet we may with justice ascribe to him a definite attitude to politics. It is apparently the attitude of philosophic conservatism. Your political principles, he apparently would argue, are worthless when in conflict with the "invisible roots of humanity." Your theories are castles in Spain, and your revolutions mere front porch spectacles when not in harmony with the unassailable bedrock of man's nature. An Edwin Clayhanger can do but little when confronted with the intricate network which both the stupidity and sagacity of man has elaborated throughout the ages. The individual is only an atom in the clutch of destiny, an instrument of imponderable forces. Society in the future may perhaps be less ugly and coarse, but we must not be too sanguine, since fundamentals change only by imperceptible gradations. Mankind will continue to blunder and suffer till the time "when men's hearts and the weather will grow more gentle when time fades into Eternity."

While Bennett is a chronicler, H. G. Wells is an avowed critic. The novels of Wells, like the dramas of Shaw, are written to expound social themes.[5] Wells has stated that he prefers to be considered as a journalist rather than as an artist. However, in his finer efforts he succeeds in being both. Thus his *Tono-Bungay*, which we shall review, is perhaps the author's most artistic creation, and abounds with the sublimity and largeness which characterize Wellsian social speculation at its best.[6]

*Tono-Bungay* is the story of the life of George Ponderevo, told by himself. George spends the first fourteen years of his life at Bladesover House, a typical country house on the Kentish Downs, where his mother is housekeeper. The child shows an inquiring mind that even the inefficient education offered to children of his class failed to dampen. For fighting with a "young gentleman" George is forced to leave Bladesover, and is later apprenticed to his uncle, Edward Ponderevo, a chemist at Wimblehurst. The youth studies science and comes to London imbued with a noble aspiration to devote his life to the service of science. Meanwhile his uncle has amassed a fortune from the sale of a quack patent medicine, Tono-Bungay, which his clever and exaggerated advertisements have popularized. Later, as a promoter of new companies, the uncle becomes a Napoleon of finance. In order to marry the unimaginative Marion, whom he loves, George joins his uncle's shady enterprises, but his marriage is a failure, and he is subsequently divorced. At this crisis of his emotional life George severs himself from active connection with his uncle's affairs and directs his energies to research in aeronautics. When his rich uncle, who has subsidized his studies, fails, George earns a livelihood by building destroyers. He is now passionately attached to the Honourable Beatrice Normandy, the ideal of his childhood, but she refuses

to marry him, as she feels that the life of futility and indolence allotted to the women of her class incapacitates her from companionship with him. As George reviews his career he broods upon the fact that a life which he aspired to dedicate to noble aims was by our blundering society cruelly frustrated.

*Tono-Bungay* is a splendid study of some aspects of recent social changes and of present-day life in England. Our society, Wells aims at showing, is a planless and wasteful confusion, and we must reconstruct it on the basis of freedom, order, and light. Bladesover, where George Ponderevo spent his childhood, is a country mansion, typical of those which housed the rulers of society of a generation ago With its adjacent district it represents the England of the past century in miniature. That England was a feudal state founded upon the accident of birth. Bladesover was the apex of the social structure. Society was hierarchical; every one belonged to a definite rank, with the gentry on top. All other classes existed to minister to the wants of the gentry. The landowners controlled church and state. Bladesover set the standard, which the other classes sought to imitate. Such a society sacrificed the many for the few because most of the population lived in ignorance and squalor. The bulk of the gentry themselves frittered away their time in aimless activities. They dabbled with art and literature, spent their lives in their stables, and played an amateurish game of party intrigue. Their chief passion was in their pride and in their vested interests derived from dubious origins. The state rested, then, on a wasteful and irrational foundation.

The book goes on to delineate the recent changes in the social structure of England. The gentry are no more the masters of the state. The Bladesovers are now occupied by the Ponderevos—pill vendors, brewers, newspaper proprietors, and financial adven-

turers. The industrial buccaneers have replaced the feudal lords. But the tradition of a hierarchical society, the shadow of Bladesover of a generation ago, still dominates English life. Bladesover has not disappeared, but is merely overlaid with alien elements. The old is in a state of senile decay; the new is still formless. Society thus offers a spectacle of hopeless maladjustment. The new masters ape the futility of the old. Their ideal is to be completely useless socially. They possess less sense of social obligations than the old. Their sole passion is possession. They are more intelligent than the old, but their intelligence is devoted to acquisition. They, too, play with art, collect useless trinkets, rub elbows with men of letters who despise them, but they dream possession. With this class at the head, our society is an arena of dissension torn by hate and malice.

Such a society can produce only frustrated and wretched lives. The relation between the sexes is poisoned by possessiveness, while a mistaken furtiveness hides vital facts. The superficial Marion forces George to give up his study of science, to which he was planning to devote his life, because she desires a high income irrespective of the source. She merely imitates the standard of the present occupiers of Bladesover. George joins the dishonest ventures of his uncle, and thus wastes his career and happiness. By means which are socially harmful he obtains the leisure and prestige that no passionate service to society could offer him. When he returns to his science, his researches are made possible only because their expenses are defrayed by a swindler. When this subsidy is stopped, George applies his scientific knowledge to make destroyers. Science, which offers such redeeming possibilities, depends for its development upon casual accidents in discouraging circumstances, and its applications are used not to create order, but to intensify the confusion. In a rationally

organized society George Ponderevo would be a force for service, but our aimless method has made of him a wreck; his marriage a failure, his business a swindle, his science a means for destruction.)

(Again, our economic organization is absurd. It is based upon the principle that commodities should be produced as cheaply as possible and sold as dearly as possible. Social service is only a remote consideration. In such circumstances the disreputable charlatan will have little hesitation in exploiting credulity and ignorance. When George reproaches his uncle for engaging in the swindle, the latter retorts that it is fair trading, and points to other quacks who have been ennobled. If swindling the public brings freedom and prestige, men will swindle. Assuredly such a society cannot claim to be rationally constituted. "It is all one spectacle," says our hero, "of forces running to waste, of people who use and do not replace, the story of a country hectic with a wasting aimless fever of trade and money-making and pleasure-seeking.")

Wells not only offers a ruthless dissection of existing rottenness, but also implies a mode of reconstruction.[7] The state, he suggests, can be reorganized and life made wholesome and beautiful. The world is in a muddle; it needs a synthesis. This better organization must be on a universal scale—a world state crowning the unity of life and spirit of modern civilization. This reconstruction must involve the subordination of individual selfishness to the collective state of mankind. It postulates the co-ordination of particular efforts into a world-wide plan of free co-operation. It is thus in conflict with every form of greed, waste, and parochialism. In that free universal state the promotion of science will be a collective enterprise, and its fruits used for human ends. Goods will be produced because they serve social welfare, and not because they cater for private acquisitiveness. The relation between the sexes will not be embittered

by ignorance or coarseness.) Wells does not now believe that this intelligent organization of the material and human resources of the globe will come as a result of the efforts of a consciously superior class which endeavours to raise others to its own level.[8] Some organization by functionaries, he suggests, is essential, but the most precious things are spontaneous, and do not survive regimentation. The new world order will be ushered in by the awakening of the collective intelligence of the masses of mankind. Nor will it come by fostering class animosities, since all classes are the victims of the present chaos, but rather by releasing ourselves from discords and jealousies. The republic of mankind must succeed the regeneration of the souls of men.)

To achieve this end Wells, as we have already mentioned, urges us to free ourselves from the shackles which bind our intellects and make us blind to present stupidities and suffering. In this noble service education, science, and the vital truths of religion must play a part. Man must obey the "still small voice within," which is God. We must cultivate charity and magnanimity. We can give expression to the intelligence which exists in all of us only if we sever it from base and degrading purposes. We can create order in our social life only if we cleanse our mental dustbins. We must escape from the shackles which bind us to our class, race, nationality, and sect. We must strive for broad possibilities and possess faith in human destiny. Man is a victim of his own folly, and hard thinking and a free imagination alone can save him from the consequences of his stupidity. Man is capable of infinite and variable potentialities. With critical thought, broad outlook, courage, and imaginative freedom we can achieve limitless conquests.

In this chapter we have selected for our consideration three authors of recognized merit. From their works we have chosen those books which are most

germane to our subject and which typify best the contribution of their respective authors to our special field. Each work selected is not only valuable for its social theme, but is also a work of art and a contribution to the general literature of our age. In the *Forsyte Saga* of Galsworthy we have seen depicted the rise and decline of acquisitiveness as a determining factor in the modern state. In the *Clayhanger* trilogy of Bennett we observed the silent but significant forces behind parliamentary institutions and political philosophies. In the *Tono-Bungay* of Wells we witness existing waste and futility and are exhorted to recreate the state on basis of order and free co-operation. All of these books offer admirable pictures of some aspects of the contemporary state. Our knowledge of present-day politics and conflicting political ideals is made more vital, more human, more vivid, and more tangible, because they are portrayed with that imperishable touch which art gives to life and philosophy.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE FUTURE

We began our review with a summary of the past; we conclude it with a prophecy for the future. Like most pedestrian prophets, we deduce our hopes from the evidence of history. The nature of political thought offers us a safe clue as to the ensuing line of development. The relation between political theory and fact is reciprocal. The political thought of an age is not only a rationalization of its experience, but also an indication of subsequent experiments. Since it is the mission of theory to suggest the direction of events, it must precede realized experience. The theory of one generation is thus frequently the fact of the next. In the theory of yesterday we may observe an anticipation of the broad outlines of the state of to-day. Thus, to take concrete instances, Bodin and Hobbes heralded the modern sovereign nation-state. The fathers of the democratic state of the nineteenth century were not the Utilitarians, but Locke and Rousseau. In the same manner, Grotius and Kant undoubtedly presaged the coming of an organized society of states. Not Lenin, but Marx, is the real author of the communist revolutions.

Likewise, some aspects of contemporary thought foreshadow the society of the future. The political theory of the present day is of especial value as a guide to subsequent advance, for seldom has inquiry possessed as close a kinship to facts as that of our day. It is obvious, too, that only radical writers throw light on our path, for the defenders of stability —as, for instance, Cecil, Mallock, and McDougall—

merely concentrate on justification of the present. The social value of conservatism is to prevent recklessness, but it does not engender progress and is seldom able to stem the tide. Hence Norman Angell, Cole, Laski, the Webbs, Wallas, and their colleagues fashion the state that is to come. Only to their doctrines are we justified in ascribing some prophetic value, and only to them apparently does the future belong. If, then, we disregard the inevitable exaggerations of heated partisans, the varied terminologies, and the confused clash of dogmatisms, what are the common generalizations that seem to characterize all contemporary progressive political thought? Also, as a corollary, what broad principles will underlie the state of to-morrow?

All progressive writers are acutely aware of the impact of property on state institutions. They give a wider significance to those principles of liberty and equality which the past philosophers were wont to confine to politics. Liberty is interpreted as meaning capacity for growth, and equality as denoting equal opportunities for self-expansion. Both, they hold, are unrealizable for the vast masses unless the institution of property is modified. Private property is, then, interpreted to be in the nature of a social trust, and a brief is formulated for an approach to a greater economic equality. They aim at securing for each citizen an economic sufficiency in order that he may realize his best self, and at preventing the monopolization and misuse of the means of life by a few; for such is hostile to corporate freedom. However they may differ in details, they all agree that a state-regulated economic minimum, and perhaps also a maximum, are desirable. Perhaps no other age has witnessed such a concentration by the writers of politics on the economic factors of the good life as has our own. It is, too, in this field that future experiments will most probably be undertaken. We may with justice expect

that coming generations will attempt to prevent great diversity in the possession of property and make ownership amenable to social needs in a more radical manner than our own.

(But property is only one form of power; the other is that of office. Hence our writers focus their interest on the problem of the redistribution of the sources of power in the state. They regard the convergence of authority in one centre as dangerous, because it overawes the individual. Justifiable authority, it is urged, is derived from the attainment of definite ends, and hence is manifold, and in order to strengthen the individual, his active participation in all centres of authority is demanded. They thus insist upon local self-government, greater freedom for functional bodies to achieve their purposes, and, as a corollary, the representation of the workers in the management of industry. Like liberty and equality, the principle of self-government is thus also given a more extensive application. It is not unreasonable to assume that the future state will tend more and more to give validity to the regulations of functional bodies in their own respective spheres, and the activities which will remain with the state will be widely decentralized. Again, in the structure of the future state the group may receive definite recognition either in the nature of a functional council or by some other administrative device. All forms of authority will consequently be made more answerable than at present to those who must comply with its orders.)

Further, the method of approach by our writers to the study of politics is of interest. Present speculation is characterized by intensive study of administration. Perhaps no other age has observed such rigid attention to the structure of the state. Our writers offer not only the elucidation of relevant principles, but they almost invariably clothe their ideas with a political scaffolding. Their principles, too, are not obscured by

metaphysical doctrines, and in their application of their ideas they duly recognize the force of relative factors. They also constantly stress the necessity of a quantitative analysis of social data. The dissociation of politics from metaphysics, the various administrative proposals, and the emphasis on tests and measurements indicate the rise of scientific politics. It is, therefore, legitimate to postulate that science will make heavy inroads in our field. We may see a more diligent study of social cause and effect. In the future, functional bodies, municipalities, and the central administration may make greater use than at present of investigators in order to analyze and compare. This obviously does not involve government by experts, but merely an extension of social laboratories. Democracy will not be supplanted, but assisted, by a corps of experts. Authority may thus be subjected to analysis in scientific terms.

On the problem of the relation between states our writers are not less definite. They do not conceive the substitution in the immediate future of the present territorial state, embodying only a portion of mankind and occupying only a fraction of the habitable globe, by a universal state. They hold that the nation-state will remain for a considerable time the most effective expression of the associated life of man, and will for long continue to be man's greatest achievement in group life. But they do not fail to observe the intensification of interstate solidarity, or to give voice to the principle of the universal nature of moral obligations. In the region of international government they urge the necessity of an organized society of states based on a loose world federalism in order to settle disputes between states and to accomplish peacefully the common purposes of an increasingly unified world. They further suggest a greater development of functional bodies on an international plane. These proposals appear likely to become effective in

the not too remote future. We may, not without reason, expect that in time the permanent conferences of the representatives of nation-states will be coherently defined and their decisions more universally accepted. As human interests become more interrelated there may also arise an increasing number of official and voluntary international functional associations with the power of delegated decision. Such expectations are not extravagant.

We conclude our review in no spirit of pessimism about the fate of our society. If it be true that periods of social dissolution are preceded by cynical opportunism and the absence of coherent faiths, then our civilization is not in danger of impending dissolution. In the last analysis ideas alone are eternal. As long as the human mind is active there is hope for civilization. In our narrow field we see no signs of decaying senility. We observe no evidence of retrogression and decay. On the other hand, our survey reveals the richness of the contemporary mind. The variety and versatility of our social speculation indicate not decay, but the imminence of momentous alterations. Our generation has shown sufficient curiosity and boldness to question even the domains of social inquiry which have hitherto been accepted as eternal verities. Few ages have enjoyed as wide a range of speculative freedom. It is not presumptuous to conjecture that successive generations will continue this illumination.

# NOTES

## Chapter I

1. Dunning, W. A. Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer, pp. 91–100.
2. Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.
3. Essay on Population.
4. Trevelyan, G. M. British History in the Nineteenth Century, quoted on p. 158.
5. *Contrat Social.*
6. Fragment on Government.
7. Law and Public Opinion in England, pp. 218–219.
8. Works, Vol. III., p. 372.
9. Liberalism, pp. 89–101.
10. *Esprit Des Lois.*
11. The Constitution of England.
12. Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I.
13. Reflections on the Revolution in France.
14. Green, J. R. A Short History of the English People, Part V., by A. S. Green, p. 851.
15. On political ideas of the American Revolution, see Dunning, pp. 91–100.
16. Common Sense and the Rights of Man.
17. Brailsford, A. N. Shelley, Godwin and their Circle, Chapter I.
18. Godwin's Inquiry concerning Political Justice, and Brailsford, Chapters IV. and V.
19. Beer, M. History of British Socialism, Vol. I., pp. 259–270.
20. Beer, Vol. I., pp. 211–228. See also Chapter V. of this book below.
21. The Book of the New Moral World, Dunning, pp. 342 and 350–351; Beer, Vol. I., pp. 160–181.

22. A Fragment on Government, Dicey, Lecture VI., and Trevelyan, Chapters XV.–XVII. inclusive.
23. The Great Society, Chapter VII.; and see also Chapter II. below.
24. Physics and Politics; and see also Chapter II. below.
25. Law and Public Opinion, pp. 211–218.
26. Trevelyan, pp. 276–280; Dicey, pp. 240–242.
27. Green, pp. 855–857 and 863–865.
28. Quoted in Green, p. 873. See also Dicey, pp. 248–258.
29. Dicey, Lecture X., and Trevelyan, Chapter XVIII.
30. Quoted in Dicey, p. 217.
31. Quoted in Barker, Ernest, Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day, p. 192.
32. Barker, Chapter VII.
33. Barker, Chapter I., and Merz, J. T., History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. IV., Chapter X.
34. Dunning, pp. 340–348.
35. Beer, Vol. II., pp. 180–187.
36. Beer, Vol. II., pp. 202–213. See also Chapters V. and VIII. below.
37. On Liberty, Representative Government, and Autobiography, Dicey, pp. 422–432, and Hobhouse, pp. 106–115.
38. The State in Relation to Labour, and Barker, pp. 206–207.
39. Trevelyan, pp. 340–410, and Dicey, pp. 211–311.
40. Principles of Political Obligation and Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, Barker, Chapter II.; and Nettleship, R. L., Memoir of Thomas Hill Green.
41. Bradley, Ethical Studies; Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory of the State; Barker, Chapter III. See also Chapter III. below.

42. Social Statics and The Man *versus* The State, and Barker, Chapter IV.
43. Quoted in Barker, p. 85.
44. Dicey. Introduction to the Second Edition of his Law and Public Opinion in England, 1914, pp. xxiii.–xciv.
45. Barker, pp. 213–222; Beer, Vol. II., pp. 274–297; and see Chapters V., VII., and VIII. below.

## Chapter II

1. The Republic.
2. The Politics.
3. Leviathan.
4. Two Treatises on Civil Government.
5. *Contrat Social.*
6. Inquiry concerning Political Justice, etc.
7. Fragment on Government and Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. See also Chapter I. above.
8. Utilitarianism. See also Chapter I. above.
9. Political Thought from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day, p. 151.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Physics and Politics, 1873, p. 92.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 92–93.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
14. McDougall, William. Social Psychology, p. 11.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
16. McDougall, William. The Group Mind, p. 7.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
21. See, for example, McDougall, William, An Outline of Psychology, p. 126, a list of six different psychological theories attempting to explain human action. In this book Professor McDougall has

somewhat changed his theory of instincts, but for our purpose the modification is insignificant. Yet see Chapter V. of the Outline, pp. 121–176.

22. See Chapter I. of his Social Psychology, and note, however, also pp. 1–8 of his Group Mind.
23. Rivers, W. H. R. Psychology and Politics, Lecture I., especially pp. 7–19.
24. See Ginsberg, Morris, The Psychology of Society, pp. 11–14.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 13. See also Hobhouse, L. T., Mind in Evolution, pp. 102–106.
28. Trotter, W. Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War; and see Ginsberg, pp. 19–22.
29. Hobbes. Leviathan.
30. Adam Smith. Theory of Moral Sentiments.
31. Bishop Butler. Sermons upon Human Nature.
32. The Utilitarian School.
33. See Ginsberg, pp. 15–19.
34. Quoted in Ginsberg, p. 34.
35. The Great Society, Chapter III.
36. Mind in Evolution, p. 103.
37. See Ginsberg, Chapter III., and Hobhouse, The Rational Good.
38. McDougall, William. The Group Mind, pp. 19–20
39. See Chapter III. and IX. below.
40. See also Ginsberg, Chapter IV.; Hobhouse, Social Development, its Nature and Conditions, Chapter VIII.; and Maciver, R. M., Community, pp. 69–97.
41. The Great Society, p. 236.
42. Social Development, its Nature and Conditions, pp. 179–187. See also Chapters III. and IX. below.
43. See also Ginsberg, Chapter VI.
44. See Barker, Ernest, Political Thought from Spencer to the Present Day, pp. 248–251; also,

in Chapter V. below, the discussion on J. Ramsay MacDonald's political theory, and MacDonald, Socialism: Critical and Constructive, pp. 244–253.

45. Professor McDougall has made some applications of his theory of the national mind in his National Welfare and National Decay (1921) and Ethics and some Modern Social Problems (1924).
46. Keynes, J. M. The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 133.
47. Quoted in Ross, E. A., The Russian Soviet Republic, p. 196.
48. Rivers, W. H. R. Psychology and Politics, 1923.
49. Hobhouse, L. T. The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 124.
50. McDougall, William. The Group Mind, p. xi.
51. These problems are discussed in the subsequent chapters.
52. The Great Society, Chapter XIII.
53. See, for example, his Human Nature in Politics, pp. 167–199 and 269–296.
54. The Great Society, p. 182.
55. Watson, John. The State in Peace and War, pp. 224–229. See also Chapter III. below.
56. The Great Society, Chapter IV.
57. Our Social Heritage, pp. 161–162 and 183–184.
58. See, however, his discussion in Our Social Heritage, Chapter VII.
59. The Great Society, Chapter XII.
60. Walter Lippmann's Public Opinion (1922) may be cited as an example of the psychological study of politics which Professor Wallas has so much fostered.
61. This is clearly indicated in Professor McDougall's An Outline of Psychology. See especially Chapters II.–VI. inclusive.

## Chapter III

1. Figgis, J. N. From Gerson to Grotius, p. 1.
2. Locke, John. Two Treatises on Civil Government; and see also Laski, H. J., From Locke to Bentham, Chapter II.
3. On Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel, see Dunning, W. A., Chapters I. and IV., and Watson, John, The State in Peace and War, Chapter VI.
4. See Chapter I. above. For a fuller discussion of the political theory of Bentham see Chapters I. and II. above.
5. For a brief statement of the metaphysical foundation of political idealism, see Bosanquet's contribution to a volume on Contemporary British Philosophy edited by J. H. Muirhead.
6. For the political theory of T. H. Green, see Chapter I. above, and Barker, Ernest, Political Thought from Spencer to Present Day, Chapter II.
7. On Bradley and Bosanquet, see Barker, Chapter III.; and see also a criticism of Bosanquet's theory of the "general will" in Ginsberg, Morris, The Psychology of Society, Chapter V.
8. Jones, Sir Henry. The Working Faith of a Social Reformer, p. 62.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Jones, Sir Henry. The Principles of Citizenship, p. 149. The theory of state interference is given in Chapters V. and VI. of this book. The first four chapters present mainly a restatement of the principles offered in The Working Faith of the Social Reformer.
13. The Principles of Citizenship, p. 130.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 174–176.

15. On political pluralism, see Chapters VI. and VII. below and the books referred to there in the Bibliography.
16. In this book we analyze three chief theories of administration: the theory of the collectivists, in Chapter V.; of the guild socialists, in Chapter VII.; and of the communists, in Chapter VIII.
17. A discussion of some aspects of the right to work may be found in Mallock, W. H., The Limits of Pure Democracy, pp. 305–313.
18. See the criticism of applied idealism in Hobson, J. A., The Crisis of Liberalism, pp. 192–217, and Hobhouse, L. T., Democracy and Reaction, pp. 77–95. See also the reply to this criticism in Jones, Sir Henry, The Working Faith of the Social Reformer, Chapters VII. and VIII. On the political theory of Lord Hugh Cecil, refer to Chapter IV. below.
19. Compare Mallock, W. H., The Limits of Pure Democracy, and McDougall, William, Ethics and some Modern Social Problems. On McDougall, refer to Chapter II. above, and on Mallock to Chapter IV. below.
20. The Working Faith of the Social Reformer, p. 214.
21. See Preface to the State in Peace and War.
22. See Watson, John, The State in Peace and War, p. 167 foll.
23. See Chapter VI. below on the political theory of Laski.
24. The bulk of Professor Watson's discussion of sovereignty may be found in The State in Peace and War, pp. 194–212.
25. The State in Peace and War, pp. 201–202.
26. See, for example, the discussion of Austin's theory of sovereignty in Dunning, W. A., History of Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer, pp. 224–234.

27. The State in Peace and War, p. 202.
28. The idea that the state is the summation of all social relations was the accepted view in political theory till Maitland, following Gierke, pointed to the importance of associations within the state. See Chapter VI. below.
29. The State in Peace and War, p. 204.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 202; the quotation following is given on pp. 204–205.
32. The bulk of Professor Watson's discussion of interstate relations is given in The State in Peace and War, Chapter XI. See also Chapter X. below.
33. Hobhouse, L. T. Democracy and Reaction, pp. 77–95.
34. See Hobhouse, L. T., The Metaphysical Theory of the State, pp. 23–25 and 134–137.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
37. Hobson, J. A. The Crisis of Liberalism, pp. 192–217.
38. Hobhouse, L. T. The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 111.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
41. This point is made by Barker, Ernest, Political Thought from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day, p. 80.
42. The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 134.
43. Liberalism, by Herbert Samuel, with an Introduction by H. H. Asquith, p. x.

## Chapter IV

1. Thus, for example, to Maine the chief psychological tendency in man is habit, whereas to Bagehot it is imitation. See Wallas, Graham, The Great Society, Chapters V. and VIII., and also Chapter II. above.

2. Burke, Edmund. Reflections on the French Revolution, and Laski, H. J., Political Thought from Locke to Bentham, Chapter VI. Lord Hugh Cecil rightly traces the origin of contemporary conservative political theory to Burke, Conservatism, Chapter III.
3. Bagehot, Walter. The English Constitution. Also Wallas, Graham, The Great Society, Chapter VIII.
4. Stephen, Sir James. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. Also Barker, Ernest, Political Thought from Spencer to the Present Day, pp. 170–173.
5. Maine, Sir Henry. Popular Government. Also Barker, pp. 161–170.
6. See, for instance, Dicey's Introduction to the Second Edition of his Law and Public Opinion, and Chapter IV. in a volume on the Rights of Citizenship, with a Preface by the Marquess of Lansdowne, 1912.
7. Cecil, Lord Hugh. Nationalism and Catholicism, p. 18.
8. Cecil, Lord Hugh. Liberty and Authority, p. 10.
9. Lord Hugh Cecil's proposals for constitutional reforms are offered in his Conservatism, Chapter VIII.
10. See Conservatism, Chapter V.
11. Shaw, G. Bernard. The Case for Equality. A lecture delivered at the National Liberal Club, London, and reported fully in *The Metropolitan*, New York, December, 1913. For the doctrine of Shaw, see Chapters V. and XII. below.
12. R. H. Tawney's monograph on the Acquisitive Society is in amplification of this theme.
13. See also the discussion in Bryce's Modern Democracies, Vol. II., Chapter XLIV. On the theory of Bryce, see Chapter IX. below.

14. It is to be noted that it is chiefly conservative writers who advocate the forms of radical democracy like the referendum. See also, for example, Referendum, by the editor of the *Spectator*, J. St. Loe Strachey.
15. Mallock, W. H. The Limits of Pure Democracy, p. 392.
16. Published by the Fabian Society, 1910.
17. The Limits of Pure Democracy, pp. 114–116.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 275.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 374–377.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 377–387.
21. See especially Chapters VI. and VII. below.
22. The Limits of Pure Democracy, p. 272.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 279–290.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 323–328 and 354–357.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 389–392.
26. Mallock says that in the United Kingdom and America "about a tenth part of the total annual product which, like a kind of precipitate, goes to its recipients as income from inherited capital." *Ibid.*, p. 178.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 247–249.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 317–319.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 346–352.
30. See especially Chapter VI. below.
31. See also in this connection the Introduction by the Duke of Northumberland to Democracy, by W. H. Mallock. This book is an abridged edition of The Limits of Pure Democracy.

## Chapter V

1. On the history of British socialism the fullest account is in Beer, Max, A History of British Socialism, Parts II.–IV. inclusive. See also Barker, Ernest, Political Thought from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day, Chapter VIII., and also Chapter I. above.

2. Unlike Shaw and the Webbs, MacDonald is not a Fabian, but he well represents the liberal collectivism of the Independent Labour Party.
3. For the various schools of socialist thought in Great Britain, see also the three subsequent chapters. An approach to socialism and the state from the standpoint of the present and future development of the consumers' co-operative movement, and hence somewhat different from the various schools offered in these chapters, may be observed in L. S. Woolf, Co-operation and the Future of Industry (1918) and Socialism and Co-operation (1921).
4. On the doctrine of Shaw, see also Chapter XII. below.
5. See, for example, Shaw's pamphlets in the list of publications offered by the Fabian Society.
6. Fabian Essays in Socialism, edition of 1920, Essays one and six.
7. It may be of interest to note that the Fabian collectivist was wont to approach socialism with a criticism that capitalism entails the poverty of the masses; the guild socialist, on the other hand, stresses the criticism that capitalism involves the slavery of the masses. On guild socialism, see Chapter VII. below.
8. Fabian Essays in Socialism, p. 26.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
10. What is important for our purpose in Towards Social Democracy? is given on pp. 34–44.
11. Towards Social Democracy? p. 34.
12. We are here concerned primarily with the positive theory of socialism. For a criticism of capitalism, see The Decay of Capitalist Civilization, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1923).
13. Towards Social Democracy? p. 36.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

15. We refer especially to the criticism of Russell and Cole. See Chapters VI. and VII. below.
16. Sidney and Beatrice Webb introduce their scheme of government with a discussion of existing democracies of producers, of consumers, and of citizens. Their diagnosis of the imperfections of political democracy is, we believe, as we summarize in our text. See A Constitution, etc., pp. 1–107.
17. A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, p. 196.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 355–356.
19. Socialism and Society, p. xix.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
22. Socialism and Government, Vol. I., pp. 3–4.
23. See Chapter II. above.
24. This statement does not, however, imply that Plato's communism and modern socialism are necessarily similar.
25. On idealism, see Chapter III. above.
26. See A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, pp. 340–347.
27. See, for example, the discussion by the Webbs in their A Constitution, etc., pp. 350–352.
28. The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society, p. 51.
29. The Great Society, pp. 297–305.
30. See, for instance, his Socialism : Critical and Constructive, pp. 232–234.
31. See, however, Secondary Education for All, edited for the Education Advisory Committee of the Labour Party by R. H. Tawney.
32. See Chapter II. above.
33. See Chapter XI. below.
34. Industrial Democracy. See, for instance, pp. 60–62.
35. For their criticism of the present system of Local Government, see A Constitution, etc., pp. 203–212.

36. We refer especially to the belief that man's social relations are not confined to the state, but find their expression in varied groups. This doctrine is the starting point of political pluralism.
37. See, however, the criticism of territorial devolution in A Constitution, etc., pp. 131–134.
38. See the criticism of the proposal of a vocational parliament in A Constitution, etc., pp. 309–317.
39. Finer, Herman. Representative Government and a Parliament of Industry (1923). See especially pp. 210–230.
40. Our proposals do not, of course, exclude reform of the procedure of Parliament and extensive decentralization of the economic functions of the state. Our criticism of the plan of the Webbs to establish two Parliaments must not be interpreted to mean that we regard their division of function between the two Parliaments as identical with the division in present bicameral legislatures or in the Presidential system.

## Chapter VI

1. Convenient summaries of the contemporary criticism of sovereignty may be found in the following books: Morris, C. R. and M., A History of Political Ideas, Chapters VI. and VII.; Brown, I., English Political Theory, Chapters XI. and XII., and Gettell, R. G., History of Political Ideas, Chapters XXVI. and XXIX.
2. Figgis, J. N. Churches in the Modern State, p. 56.
3. See the introduction to his Political Theories of the Middle Ages. See also the discussion of Maitland's view in Barker, Ernest, Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day, pp. 175–183.
4. Belloc, H. The Servile State, 1912.
5. Figgis, J. N. Churches in the Modern State, p. 99.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 112–113.
9. Cole, G. D. H. Social Theory, p. 10. On the theory of Cole, see Chapter VII. below.
10. Laski, H. J. The Foundations of Sovereignty pp. 245–246.
11. On the idealists, see Chapter III. above.
12. On the psychologists, see Chapter II. above.
13. See also Russell's Political Ideals, 1917; Roads to Freedom, 1918; and The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, 1920.
14. Russell, Bertrand. Principles of Social Reconstruction, p. 236.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 134–135.
18. Principles of Social Reconstruction, pp. 43, 44, and The Prospects of Industrial Civilization, pp. 153–154.
19. On the collectivists, see Chapter V. above.
20. See on this point his Practice and Theory of Bolshevism, Part II.
21. Ginsberg, Morris. The Psychology of Society, p. 139.

## Chapter VII

1. A different theory of the state from the standpoint of guild socialism may be found in Hobson, S. G, National Guilds and the State, 1920.
2. The second edition, revised, of Social Theory, 1921, is being used.
3. A related analysis of the meaning of the terms of "community," "society," "state," and the relation between them may be seen in Maciver, R. M., Community. See especially pp. 22–47 and 244–299. Maciver's views are more briefly summarized in his Elements of Social Science, 1921. Note also

the treatment of the same topic by Ginsberg, Morris, The Psychology of Society, Chapter VIII., and by Hobhouse, L. T., Chapter IX. below.

4. Social Theory, p. 49.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 105–106.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
8. On this point, see Social Theory, Chapter IX., and Guild Socialism Re-stated, Chapter V.
9. See Duguit, Léon, Law in the Modern State, translated by F. and H. Laski.
10. The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society, 1920.
11. See Chapter V. above.
12. National Guilds and the State, p. 343.
13. A reading of Cole's Self-Government in Industry, 1917; Labour in the Commonwealth, 1918; Social Theory, first edition, 1920; Social Theory, second edition, revised, 1921; and Guild Socialism Re-stated, 1921, shows radical changes in his theory.
14. On the rise of guild socialism in revolt against the Fabianism of a decade ago, see Beer, M., A History of British Socialism, Vol. II., Chapter XVIII.

## Chapter VIII

1. See Chapter V.
2. See Chapter VII.
3. Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto; Lenin, N., The State and Revolution; Laski, H. J., Karl Marx; Beer, M., A History of British Socialism, Vol. II., pp. 202–213.
4. Quoted in Beer, p. 206.
5. Daniel De Leon is the most influential American Marxist of recent years.
6. Bukharin, N., and Preobrazhensky, E., A.B.C. of Communism (translated by E. and C. Paul); Lenin, Nicolai, Thesis presented to the First Con-

gress of the Communist International, and State and Revolution. See also The New Communist Manifesto. (Lenin's Thesis and The New Communist Manifesto are given in Postgate, R. W., The Bolshevik Theory.)

7. Communism and Society, p. 48. The passage underlined is as given in the original.
8. Laski, H. J., Karl Marx; and Russell, Bertrand, Roads to Freedom.
9. Quoted in Wallas, Graham, The Great Society, p. 306.
10. Quoted in MacDonald, J. Ramsay, Parliament and Revolution, p. 16.
11. Communism and Society, p. 185 foll.
12. See also The New Communist Manifesto on this point.
13. See Chapter IV.
14. See Chapter XII., and Shaw's Back to Methuselah.
15. Wallas, Graham. The Great Society, Chapter X., and Human Nature in Politics, pp. 114–269. It should be noted that in Chapter IV. we saw how an anti-intellectualist psychology was used to fortify a conservative theory.
16. Anticipations, 1902, p. 147.
17. Modern Democracies, Vol. II., p. 669.
18. On the question whether communists should participate in the elections of the present political state there is a difference of opinion. See Paul, W., The State, pp. 199–201, and Paul, E. and C., Creative Revolution, pp. 177–180.
19. See also, in Chapter XI., the discussion on the government of *samurai* in the utopia of H. G. Wells.
20. Communism and Society, pp. 116 foll.
21. Communism and Society, pp. 65 foll.
22. Ross, E. A. The Russian Soviet Republic, pp. 379–380. This book is impartial and authoritative.

23. Creative Revolution, p. 90.
24. Ross, E. A. The Russian Soviet Republic, Chapter XXIV.
25. Ross, Chapter XII.
26. Creative Revolution, pp. 51 foll.
27. Ross, Chapter XXVII.
28. Ross, pp. 74–75, Chapter XXVII., and p. 325.
29. Constitution for a Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain, by Sidney and Beatrice Webb. See also Chapter V. above.
30. Ross, pp. 320 foll.
31. Ross, Chapter XXVIII.
32. Ross, Chapter XXIII.
33. Ross, pp. 329 foll.
34. Russia in the Shadows, pp. 71–72.
35. Ross, pp. 7–8.
36. Ross, pp. 349 foll.
37. The State and Revolution.
38. Modern Democracies, 1921.

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1. A simple and lucid account of the varied contemporary social theories may be found in G. Lowes Dickinson, A Modern Symposium and Justice and Liberty.
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3. See especially Chapters VI.–VIII.
4. See especially pp. 91–139.
5. See Chapter I. above.
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7. A social and political outlook which may also be regarded as a theory of compromise is given by H. A. L. Fisher, The Common Weal, 1923.
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10. On this point, see particularly Social Development, Chapter II.
11. Social Development, pp. 51–52.
12. The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 125.
13. *Ibid.*
14. On Professor Hobhouse's discussion of the problem of rights, see The Elements of Social Justice, Chapter II.
15. On his theory of liberty, see particularly his The Elements of Social Justice, Chapters III. and IV.
16. The Elements of Social Justice, p. 67.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90.
18. Professor Hobhouse's views on the economic problem are offered in his The Elements of Social Justice, Chapters VII.–X. inclusive.
19. See on this point The Elements of Social Justice, Chapter XI.
20. See The Elements of Social Justice, Chapter X.; Social Development, pp. 292–300; and The Metaphysical Theory of the State, pp. 96–117.
21. The Metaphysical Theory of the State. See also Chapter III. above.
22. The Metaphysical Theory of the State, p. 136.
23. See his The Elements of Social Justice, Chapter IV.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 178–179.
25. See, for instance, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britian, pp. 304–309.
26. See Chapter V. above.
27. The Elements of Social Justice, pp. 185–189.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 203–204.

29. See, for example, his conclusion of his criticism of the Hegelian theory in his Metaphysical Theory of the State, pp. 134–137.
30. See The Elements of Social Justice, pp. 181–184.
31. See, for instance, Liberalism, p. 224.
32. The Elements of Social Justice, pp. 202–203.
33. This at least is the impression which his Metaphysical Theory of the State gives. See also The Elements of Social Justice, Chapter XI.
34. On regionalism, see Cole, G. D. H., The Future of Local Government, 1921; but see also Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britian, pp. 203–247.
35. Modern Democracies, Vol. I., p. 26.
36. Bryce's discussion of the results and present tendencies of democracy is to be found mainly in Modern Democracies, Vol. II., Chapters LXXIII.–LXXX. inclusive.
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38. *Ibid.*, p. 636.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 663.
40. Dicey, A. V. Law of the Constitution, first published in 1885.
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42. See on this point Bryce's Preface to Vol. I., and Vol. I., Chapter I.
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44. See Vol. II., Chapter LXIV.
45. See Vol. II., Chapter LXXX.
46. Compare the discussion of the problem of liberty by Professor Hobhouse, The Elements of Social Justice, Chapters III. and IV.; and by Bryce, Modern Democracies, Vol. I., Chapter VI.
47. In Bryce's Studies in History and Jurisprudence note, for instance, Essays IX. and X.
48. See Modern Democracies, Vol. I., Chapter XXXI.

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1. See Chapters VI. and VII. above.
2. See Figgis, J. N., From Gerson to Grotius, pp. 94–121; and also Machiavelli's The Prince.
3. See Treitschke's *Die Politik*, and Dewey, J., German Philosophy and Politics. On the general theory of nationalism and internationalism, see Dunning, W. A., Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer, Chapter VIII.; and Gettell, R. G., History of Political Thought, Chapter XXVII.
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5. See Hastie, W., Kant's Principles of Politics. It includes a translation of Kant's For Perpetual Peace. See also Dunning, W. A., Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer, pp. 130–137.
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7. See Barker, Ernest, Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day, pp. 237–239; Trevelyan, G. M., British History in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 360–424; and Brailsford, H. N., The War of Steel and Gold, Chapters II. and III.
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12. The Morality of Nations, 1915; and International Politics, 1920.
13. Towards International Government, 1915; and Problems of a New World, 1920.

14. International Government, 1916.
15. *War*: Its Nature, Cause and Cure, 1923.
16. The enlarged edition of 1912 of *The Great Illusion* is being used. See also Norman Angell's The Peace Treaty and the Economic Chaos of Europe, 1919; and If Britain is to Live, 1923.
17. The Fruits of Victory, pp. 256–259.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
19. The Great Illusion, edition of 1912, p. 348.
20. See, for instance, The Fruits of Victory, pp. 314 and 3–4.
21. See the criticism of Norman Angell's theory of the state as presented in his Great Illusion by Barker, Ernest, Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day, pp. 239–247; and by Lindsay, A. D., The Political Theory of Mr. Norman Angell, *Political Quarterly*, December, 1914.
22. The Fruits of Victory, p. 310.
23. See, for example, the two books by J. M. Keynes mentioned above, and also Brailsford's After the Peace.
24. Burns, C. D. International Politics, Chapters VII. and VIII.
25. Woolf, L. S. International Government, Part II.
26. See Burns, C. D., International Politics, pp. 158–161; and Williams, Roth, The League of Nations To-day, Chapter IV.
27. The Fruits of Victory, pp. 254–255.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 221–222.
29. See on this point Brailsford, H. N., After the Peace, Chapter I.
30. The Fruits of Victory, pp. 184–194.
31. See Brailsford, H. N., The War of Steel and Gold, Part I.; and Dickinson, G. Lowes, War: Its Nature, Cause and Cure, pp. 126–133.
32. The Fruits of Victory, pp. 50–61.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

34. See Figgis, J. N., From Gerson to Grotius, Lectures I. and IV.; and Dunning, W. A., Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu, Chapter III.

## CHAPTER XI

1. A discussion of past utopias may be found in Hertzler, J. O., The History of Utopian Thought, 1923; and Mumford, Lewis, The Story of Utopias, 1923.
2. See A Modern Utopia, pp 31–34.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 87–88.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 279–280.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 292.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
10. For a fuller discussion of this problem, see Chapter X. above.
11. See Chapter IV. above.
12. Wells does not now believe in government by a class of experts, yet the problem deserves our consideration, for it is frequently met in political theory. See also Chapter XIII. below.
13. A Modern Utopia, pp. 281 and 303.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 298–299.
15. On this point, see pp. 76–82, 89–91, and 310–312.
16. On the Fabian ideal of about 1900, see the discussion of the socialist theory of G. Bernard Shaw in Chapter V. above.
17. See, for instance, pp. 369–374.
18. See also the discussion on Wells in Chapter XIII. below.
19. The influence of Wells on contemporary British social thought, especially, for example, on the Webbs and Professor Graham Wallas, opens an interesting subject for discussion.

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### Chapter XII

1. A review of contemporary literature may be found in Compton-Rickett, Arthur, A History of English Literature, 1918, Part VIII.
2. See Chapter V. above.
3. See Chapter XI. above.
4. On Galsworthy, see Kaye-Smith, Sheila, John Galsworthy; and Chevrillon, André, Three Studies in English Literature, translated by Florence Simmonds.
5. See Chapter IV. above.
6. See Chapter VIII. above.
7. Quoted in Kaye-Smith, Sheila, John Galsworthy, pp. 101–102.
8. Galsworthy, John. A Sheaf, p. 127.
9. On Shaw, see Henderson, Archibald, George Bernard Shaw: His Life and Work; McCabe, Joseph, George Bernard Shaw; and Shanks, Edward, Bernard Shaw.
10. See Chapters IV. and V. above.
11. See also on this point Shaw's Preface to Major Barbara.
12. See on this point Shaw's lecture on Ruskin's Politics.
13. See his Back to Methuselah and his Preface to Saint Joan.
14. In Shaw's conception of the Life Force we notice another instance of the revolt against intellectualism. It is obviously akin to the Bergsonian *élan vital.*
15. See The Revolutionist's Handbook, in Man and Superman.
16. Man and Superman, The Revolutionist's Handbook, p. 182.
17. On marriage and divorce, see also his Preface to Getting Married.
18. Man and Superman, The Revolutionist's Handbook, p. 219.

19. The national income of the United Kingdom in 1912 was estimated to be £2,200,000,000; the population in 1911 was 45,221,615. Thus "the average annual income is about £48¾ per head, or £195 per adult man." See Facts for Socialists, Fabian Tract, No. 5, twelfth edition, 1915, pp. 2–3.
20. See Man and Superman, The Revolutionist's Handbook, p. 185.
21. See, for example, the idea of Wells in Chapter XI. above, and note also the discussion of Hobhouse, L. T., Social Development, Chapter V.
22. For a poignant analysis of the bewildered state of contemporary society before and during the war, see Shaw's Heartbreak House.

## Chapter XIII

1. In The White Monkey, 1924, Galsworthy has continued narrating the fortunes of the Forsyte family.
2. See Shaw's Preface to Major Barbara, and also Chapter XII. above.
3. See Chapter VI. above.
4. On Bennett, see Darton, Frederick J. H., Arnold Bennett.
5. On Wells, see Brown, Ivor J. C., H. G. Wells; and Dark, Sidney, The Outline of H. G. Wells.
6. The New Machiavelli is intentionally a political novel, but it is not of as high merit as Tono-Bungay. The idea of an intellectual aristocracy as the rallying centre of a reformed state, which is the unrealized ideal of Remington in The New Machiavelli, is fully presented by the author in his A Modern Utopia. In Chapter XI. above we have discussed this proposal.
7. In Tono-Bungay the constructive proposals of Wells are merely implied; but see also his The Passionate Friends, The Research Magnificent, and Mr. Britling Sees it Through.
8. See on this point also Chapter XI. above.

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